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implement verified compilers that are guaranteed to preserve program semantics and proved to be more
robust than ad-hoc non-verified compilers.
The goal of the dissertation is to make a step towards verifying an industrial strength modern compiler--
LLVM, which has a typed, SSA-based, and general-purpose intermediate representation, therefore allowing
more advanced program transformations than existing approaches. The dissertation formally defines the
sequential semantics of the LLVM intermediate representation with its type system, SSA properties, memory
model, and operational semantics. To design and reason about program transformations in the LLVM IR, we
provide tools for interacting with the LLVM infrastructure and metatheory for SSA properties, memory
safety, dynamic semantics, and control-flow-graphs. Based on the tools and metatheory, the dissertation
implements verified and extractable applications for LLVM that include an interpreter for the LLVM IR, a
transformation for enforcing memory safety, translation validators for local optimizations, and verified SSA
construction transformation.
This dissertation shows that formal models of SSA-based compiler intermediate representations can be used
to verify low-level program transformations, thereby enabling the construction of high-assurance compiler
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ABSTRACT
FORMALIZING THE SSA-BASED COMPILER FOR VERIFIED ADVANCED PROGRAM
TRANSFORMATIONS
Jianzhou Zhao
Steve Zdancewic
Compilers are not always correct due to the complexity of language semantics and transfor-
mation algorithms, the trade-offs between compilation speed and verifiability, etc. The bugs of
compilers can undermine the source-level verification efforts (such as type systems, static analysis,
and formal proofs) and produce target programs with different meaning from source programs. Re-
searchers have used mechanized proof tools to implement verified compilers that are guaranteed to
preserve program semantics and proved to be more robust than ad-hoc non-verified compilers.
The goal of the dissertation is to make a step towards verifying an industrial strength modern
compiler—LLVM, which has a typed, SSA-based, and general-purpose intermediate representation,
therefore allowing more advanced program transformations than existing approaches. The disser-
tation formally defines the sequential semantics of the LLVM intermediate representation with its
type system, SSA properties, memory model, and operational semantics. To design and reason
about program transformations in the LLVM IR, we provide tools for interacting with the LLVM
infrastructure and metatheory for SSA properties, memory safety, dynamic semantics, and control-
flow-graphs. Based on the tools and metatheory, the dissertation implements verified and extractable
applications for LLVM that include an interpreter for the LLVM IR, a transformation for enforc-
ing memory safety, translation validators for local optimizations, and verified SSA construction
transformation.
This dissertation shows that formal models of SSA-based compiler intermediate representations
can be used to verify low-level program transformations, thereby enabling the construction of high-
assurance compiler passes.
ii
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Background 5
2.1 Program Refinement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Static Single Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 LLVM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 The Simple SSA Language—Vminus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 Mechanized Verification of Computing Dominators 12
3.1 The Specification of Computing Dominators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1.1 Dominance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1.2 Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1.3 Instantiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2 The Allen-Cocke Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2.1 DFS: PO-numbering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2.2 Kildall’s algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2.3 The AC algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3 Extension: the Cooper-Harvey-Kennedy Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3.1 Correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.4 Constructing Dominator Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.5 Dominance Frontier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.6 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4 The Semantics of Vminus 32
iii
4.1 Dynamic Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.2 Dominance Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.3 Static Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5 Proof Techniques for SSA 37
5.1 Safety of Vminus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.2 Generalizing Safety to Other SSA Invariants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.3 The Correctness of SSA-based Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6 The formalism of the LLVM IR 43
6.1 The Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.2 The Static Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
6.3 A Memory Model for the LLVM IR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.3.1 Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.3.2 LLVM memory commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.3.3 The byte-oriented representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.3.4 The LLVM flattened values and memory accesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.4 Operational Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6.4.1 Nondeterminism in the LLVM operational semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.4.2 Nondeterministic operational semantics of the SSA form . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.4.3 Partiality, preservation, and progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.4.4 Deterministic refinements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6.5 Extracting an Interpreter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
7 Verified SoftBound 64
7.1 Formalizing SoftBound for the LLVM IR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
7.2 Extracted Verified Implementation of SoftBound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
8 Verified SSA Construction for LLVM 73
8.1 The mem2reg Optimization Pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
8.2 The vmem2reg Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
8.3 Correctness of vmem2reg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
iv
8.3.1 Preserving promotability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
8.3.2 Preserving well-formedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
8.3.3 Program refinement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
8.3.4 The correctness of vmem2reg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
8.4 Extraction and Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
8.5 Optimized vmem2reg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
8.5.1 O1 Level—Pipeline fusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
8.5.2 The Correctness of vmem2reg-O1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
8.5.3 O2 Level—Minimal φ-nodes Placement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
8.5.4 The Correctness of vmem2reg-O2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
9 The Coq Development 111
9.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
9.2 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
9.3 OCaml Bindings and Coq Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
10 Related Work 114
11 Conclusions and Future Work 118
Bibliography 122
v
List of Tables
3.1 Worst-case behavior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
9.1 Size of the development (approx. lines of code) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
vi
List of Figures
2.1 Simulation diagrams that imply program refinement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 An SSA-based optimization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 The LLVM compiler infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 Syntax of Vminus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1 The specification of algorithms that find dominators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 Algorithms of computing dominators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3 The postorder (left) and the DFS execution sequence (right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.4 The DFS algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.5 Termination of the DFS algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.6 Inductive principle of the DFS algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.7 Kildall’s algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.8 The dominator trees (left) and the execution of CHK (right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.9 The definition and well-formedness of dominator trees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.10 Analysis overhead over LLVM’s dominance analysis for our extracted analysis. . . . . 29
4.1 Operational Semantics of Vminus (excerpt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2 Static Semantics of Vminus (excerpt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.1 Syntax for LLVM (1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.2 Syntax for LLVM (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.3 An example use of LLVM’s memory operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.4 Vellvm’s byte-oriented memory model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.5 Relations between different operational semantics in Vellvm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
vii
6.6 LLVMND: Small-step, nondeterministic semantics of the LLVM IR (selected rules). . . 56
7.1 SBspec: The specification semantics for SoftBound. Differences from the LLVMND
rules are highlighted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
7.2 Simulation relations of the SoftBound pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7.3 Execution time overhead of the extracted and the C++ version of SoftBound . . . . . . 71
8.1 The tool chain of the LLVM compiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
8.2 Normalized execution time improvement of the LLVM’s mem2reg, LLVM’s O1, and
LLVM’s O3 optimizations over the LLVM baseline with optimizations disabled. For
comparison, GCC-O3’s speedup over the same baseline is also shown. . . . . . . . . . 75
8.3 The algorithm of mem2reg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
8.4 The SSA construction by the mem2reg pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
8.5 The SSA construction by the vmem2reg pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
8.6 Basic structure of vmem2reg_fn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
8.7 The algorithm of vmem2reg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
8.8 The simulation relation for the correctness of φ-node placement . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
8.9 The simulation relation for DSE and DAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
8.10 Execution speedup over LLVM -O0 for both the extracted vmem2reg and the original
mem2reg. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
8.11 Compilation overhead over LLVM’s original mem2reg. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
8.12 Basic structure of vmem2reg-O1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
8.13 eliminate stld of vmem2reg-O1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
8.14 The operations for elimination actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
8.15 Basic structure of vmem2reg-O2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.16 eliminate stld of vmem2reg-O2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
8.17 The algorithm of inserting φ-nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
11.1 The effectiveness of GVN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
11.2 The effectiveness of Alias Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
List of Abbreviations
AC Allen-Cocke.
ADCE Aggressive dead code elimination.
AH Aycock and Horspool.
CFG Control-flow graph.
CHK Cooper-Harvey-Kennedy.
DAE Dead alloca elimination.
DFS Depth first search.
DSE Dead store elimination.
GVN Global value numbering.
IR Intermediate representation.
LAA Load after alloca.
LAS Load after store.
LICM Loop invariant code motion.
LT Lengauer-Tarjan.
PO Postorder.
PRE Partial redundancy elimination.
SAS Store after store.
SCCP Sparse conditional constant propagation.
SSA Static Single Assignment.
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
Compiler bugs can manifest as crashes during compilation or even result in the silent generation of
incorrect program binaries. Such mis-compilations can introduce subtle errors that are difficult to
diagnose and generally puzzling to the software developers. A recent study [73] used random test-
case generation to expose serious bugs in mainstream compilers including GCC [2], LLVM [38],
and commercial tools. Whereas few bugs were found in the front end of the compiler, various
optimization phases of the compiler that aim to make the generated program faster was a prominent
source of bugs.
Improving the correctness of compilers is a worthy goal. Large-scale source-code verification
efforts (such as the seL4 OS kernel [36] and Airbus’s verification of fly-by-wire software [61]), pro-
gram invariants checked by sophisticated type systems (such as Haskell and OCaml), and sound pro-
gram synthesis (for example, Matlab/Simulink parallelizes high-level languages into C to achieve
high performance [3]) can be undermined by an incorrect compiler. The need for correct compilers
is amplified when compilers are parts of the trusted computing base in modern computer systems
that include mission-critical financial servers, life-critical pacemaker firmware, and operating sys-
tems.
Verified Compilers are tackling the problem of compiler bugs by giving a rigorous proof that a
compiler preserves the behavior of programs. The CompCert project [42, 68, 69, 70] first imple-
mented a realistic and mechanically verified compiler that is programmed and mechanically verified
in the Coq proof assistant [25] and generates compact and efficient assembly code for a large frag-
ment of the C language. The aforementioned study [73] supports the effectiveness of this approach.
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Whereas the study uncovered many bugs in other compilers, the only bugs found in CompCert were
in those parts of the compiler not formally verified:
“The apparent unbreakability of CompCert supports a strong argument that developing
compiler optimizations within a proof framework, where safety checks are explicit and
machine-checked, has tangible benefits for compiler users.”
Despite CompCert’s groundbreaking compiler-verification efforts, there still remain many chal-
lenges in applying its technology to industrial-strength compilers. In particular, the original Comp-
Cert development and the bulk of the subsequent work—with the notable exception of CompCert-
SSA [14] (which is concurrent with our work)—did not use a static single assignment (SSA) [28]
intermediate representation (IR), as Leroy [42] explains:
“Since the beginning of CompCert we have been considering using SSA-based inter-
mediate languages, but were held off by two difficulties. First, the dynamic semantics
for SSA is not obvious to formalize. Second, the SSA property is global to the code of
a whole function and not straightforward to exploit locally within proofs.”
In SSA, each variable is assigned statically only once and each variable definition must dom-
inate all of its uses in the control-flow graph. These SSA properties simplify or enable many
compiler optimizations [49, 71] including: sparse conditional constant propagation (SCCP), ag-
gressive dead code elimination (ADCE), global value numbering (GVN), common subexpression
elimination (CSE), global code motion, partial redundancy elimination (PRE), inductive variable
analysis (indvars) and etc. Consequently, open-source and commercial compilers such as GCC [2],
LLVM [38], Java HotSpot JIT [57], Soot framework [58], and Intel CC [59] use SSA-based IRs.
Despite their importance, there are few mechanized formalizations of the correctness properties
of SSA transformations. This dissertation tackles this problem by developing formal semantics
and proof techniques suitable for mechanically verifying the correctness of SSA-based compilers.
We do so in the context of our Vellvm framework, which formalizes the operational semantics of
programs expressed in LLVM’s SSA-based IR [43] and provides Coq [25] infrastructure to facilitate
mechanized proofs of properties about transformations on the LLVM IR. Moreover, because the
LLVM IR is expressive to represent arbitrary program constructors, maintain properties from high-
level programs, and hide details about target platforms, we define Vellvm’s memory model to
encode data along with high-level type information and to support arbitrary bit-width integers,
padding, and alignment issues.
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The Vellvm infrastructure, along with Coq’s facility for extracting executable code from con-
structive proofs, enables Vellvm users to manipulate LLVM IR code with high confidence in the
results. For example, using this framework, we can extract verified LLVM transformations that
plug directly into the LLVM compiler. In summary,
Thesis statement: Formal models of SSA-based compiler intermediate representations can be used
to verify low-level program transformations, thereby enabling the construction of high-assurance
compiler passes.
Contributions The specific contributions of the dissertation include:
• The dissertation formally defines the sequential semantics of the industrial strength mod-
ern compiler intermediate representation—the LLVM IR that includes its type system, SSA
properties, memory model, and operational semantics.
• To design and reason about program transformations in the IR, the dissertation designs tools
for interacting with the LLVM infrastructure, and metatheory for SSA properties, memory
safety, dynamic semantics, and control-flow-graphs.
• Based on the tools and metatheory, we implement verified and extractable applications for
LLVM that include the interpreter of the LLVM IR, a transformation for enforcing memory
safety, translation validators for local optimizations, and SSA construction.
The dissertation is based on our published work [75, 76, 77]. The rest of the dissertation is
organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the background and preliminaries used in the dissertation.
To streamline the formalization of the SSA-based transformations, Chapter 2 also describes Vmi-
nus, a simpler subset of our full LLVM formalization—Vellvm [75], but one that still captures the
essence of SSA. Chapter 3 formalizes one crucial component of SSA-based compilers—computing
dominators [77]. Chapter 4 shows the dynamic and static semantics of Vminus. Chapter 5 describes
the proof techniques we have developed for formalizing properties of SSA-style intermediate repre-
sentations in the context of Vminus [76]. To demonstrate that our proof techniques can be used for
practical compiler optimizations, Chapter 6 shows the syntax of the full LLVM IR—Vellvm. Then,
Chapter 6 formalizes the semantics of Vellvm. Chapter 7 presents an application of Vellvm—a veri-
fied program transformation that hardens C programs against spatial memory safety violations (e.g.,
buffer overflows, array indexing errors, and pointer arithmetic errors). Chapter 8 demonstrates that
3
our proof techniques developed in Chapter 5 can be used for practical compiler optimizations in Vel-
lvm: verifying the most performance-critical optimization pass in LLVM’s compilation strategy—
the mem2reg pass [76]. Chapter 9 summarizes our Coq development. Finally, Chapter 10 discusses
the related work, and Chapter 11 concludes.
4
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter presents the background and preliminaries used in the dissertation.
2.1 Program Refinement
In this dissertation, we prove the correctness of a compiler by showing that its output program P′
preserves the semantics of its original program P: informally, P′ cannot do more than what P does,
although P′ can have fewer behaviors than P. With this correctness, a compiler ensures that the
analysis and verification results for source programs still hold after compilation.
Formally, we use program refinement to formalize semantic preservation. Following the Comp-
Cert project [42], we define program refinement in terms of programs’ external behaviors (which
include program traces of input-output events, whether a program terminates, and the returned value
if a program terminates): a transformed program refines the original if the behaviors of the original
program include all the behaviors of the transformed program. We define the operational semantics
using traces of a labeled transition system.
Events e : : = v = fid(vj j )
Finite traces t : : = ε | e, t
Finite or infinite traces T : : = ε | e,T (coinductive)
We denote one small-step of evaluation as config ` S t−→ S′: in program environment config, pro-
gram state S transitions to the state S′, recording events e of the transition in the trace t. An event e
describes the inputs vj and output v of an external function call named fid. config ` S t ∗−→S′ denotes
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the reflexive, transitive closure of the small-step evaluation with a finite trace t. config ` S T−→ ∞
denotes a diverging evaluation starting from S with a finite or infinite trace T . Program refinement
is given by the following definition.
Definition 1 (Program refinement).
1. init(prog,fid, vj j ,S) means S is the initial program state of the program prog with the main
entry fid and inputs vj.
2. final(S,v) means S is the final state with the return value v.
3. ⇐(prog,fid, vj j , t,v) means ∃SS′. init(prog,fid, vj j ,S), config ` S
t ∗−→S′ and final(S′,v).
4. ⇒(prog,fid, vj j ,T ) means ∃S. init(prog,fid, vj j ,S) and config ` S
T−→ ∞.
5. 6⇐ (prog,fid, vj j , t) means ∃SS′. init(prog,fid, vj j ,S), config ` S t ∗−→S′ and S′ is stuck.
6. defined(prog,fid, vj j ) means ∀ t, ¬ 6⇐ (prog,fid, vj j , t)
7. prog2 refines program prog1, written prog1 ⊇ prog2, if
(a) defined(prog1,fid, vj j )
(b) ⇐(prog2,fid, vj j , t,v) ⇒ ⇐(prog1,fid, vj j , t,v)
(c) ⇒(prog2,fid, vj j ,T ) ⇒ ⇒(prog1,fid, vj j ,T )
(d) 6⇐ (prog2,fid, vj j , t) ⇒ 6⇐ (prog1,fid, vj j , t)
Note that refinement requires only that a transformed program preserves the semantics of a
well-defined original program, but does not constrain the transformation of undefined programs.
We use the simulation diagrams in Figure 2.1 to prove that a program transformation satisfies
the refinement property. Note that in Figure 2.1, we use S to denote program states of a source
program and use Σ to denote program states of a target program. The backward simulation diagrams
imply program refinement for both deterministic and non-deterministic semantics. The forward
simulation diagrams (which are similar to the diagrams the CompCert project [42] uses) imply
program refinement for deterministic semantics. In each diagram, the program states of original
and compiled programs are on the left and right respectively. A line denotes a relation ∼ between
program states. Solid lines or arrows denote hypotheses; dashed lines or arrows denote conclusions.
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Figure 2.1: Simulation diagrams that imply program refinement.
At a high-level, we first need to find a relation ∼ between program states and their transformed
counterparts. The relation must hold initially, imply equivalent returned values finally, and imply
that stuck states are related. Then, depending on the transformation, we prove that a specific
diagram holds: lock-step simulation is for variable substitution, right “option” simulation is for
instruction removal, and left “option” simulation is for instruction insertion. Because the existence
of a diagram implies that the source and target programs share traces, we can prove the equivalence
of program traces by decomposing program transitions into matched diagrams. To ensure that an
original program terminates iff the transformed program terminates, the “option” simulations are
parameterized by a measure of program states |S| that must decrease to prevent “infinite stuttering”
problems.
2.2 Static Single Assignment
One of the crucial analysis in compiler design is determining values of temporary variables stati-
cally. With the analysis, compilers can reason about equivalence among variables and expressions,
and then eliminate redundant computation to reduce the runtime overhead. However, the analysis
for an ordinary imperative language is not trivial: a temporary variable can be defined more than
once; therefore, at runtime its value introduced at one definition is alive only by the next definition
of the variable. Moreover, because program transformations can add or remove temporary variables,
change control flow graphs, compilers have to rerun the analysis after transformations.
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Original Transformed
l1 : · · ·
· · ·
brr0 l2 l3
l2 :r3 = phi int[0, l1][r5, l2]
r4 := r1 ∗ r2
r5 := r3 + r4
r6 := r5 ≥ 100
brr6 l2 l3
l3 :r7 = phi int[0, l1][r5, l2]
r8 := r1 ∗ r2
r9 := r8 + r7
l1 : · · ·
r4 := r1 ∗ r2
brr0 l2 l3
l2 :r3 = phi int[0, l1][r5, l2]
r5 := r3 + r4
r6 := r5 ≥ 100
brr6 l2 l3
l3 :r7 = phi int[0, l1][r5, l2]
r9 := r4 + r7
In the original program (left), r1 ∗ r2 is a partial common expression for the definitions of r4 and
r8, because there is no domination relation between r4 and r8. Therefore, eliminating the common
expression directly is not correct. For example, we cannot simply replace r8 := r1 ∗ r2 by r8 := r4
since r4 is not available at the definition of r8 if the block l2 does not execute before l3 runs. To
transform this program, we might first move the instruction r4 := r1 ∗ r2 from the block l2 to the
block l1 because the definitions of r1 and r2 must dominate l1, and l1 dominates l2. Then we can
safely replace all the uses of r8 by r4, because the definition of r4 in l1 dominates l3 and therefore
dominates all the uses of r8. Finally, r8 is removed, because there are no uses of r8.
Figure 2.2: An SSA-based optimization.
To address the issue, Static Single Assignment (SSA) form [28] 1 was proposed to enforce
referential transparency syntactically [9], therefore simplifying program analysis for compilers.
Informally, SSA form is an intermediate representation distinguished by its treatment of temporary
variables—each such variable may be defined only once, statically, and each use of the variable must
be dominated by its definition with respect to the control-flow graph of the containing function.
Informally, the variable definition dominates a use if all possible execution paths to the use go
through the definition first.
To maintain these invariants in the presence of branches and loops, SSA form uses φ-
instructions, which act like control-flow dependent move operations. Such φ-instructions appear
only at the start of a basic block and, crucially, they are handled specially in the dominance relation
to “cut” apparently cyclic data dependencies.
1 In the literature, there are different variants of SSA forms [16]. We use the LLVM SSA form: for example, memory
locations are not in SSA form; LLVM does not maintain any connection between a variable in LLVM and its original
name in imperative form; and the live ranges of variables can overlap.
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Figure 2.3: The LLVM compiler infrastructure
The left part of Figure 2.2 shows an example program in SSA form, written using the stripped-
down notation of Vminus (defined more formally in Section 2.4). The temporary r3 at the beginning
of the block labeled l2 is defined by a φ-instruction: if control enters the block l2 by jumping from
basic block l1, r3 will get the value 0; if control enters from block l2 (via the back edge of the branch
at the end of the block), then r3 will get the value of r5.
The SSA form is good for implementing optimizations because it identifies variable names with
the program points at which they are defined. Maintaining the SSA invariants thus makes definition
and use information of each variable more explicit. Also, because each variable is defined only
once, there is less mutable state to be considered (for purposes of aliasing, etc.) in SSA form, which
makes certain code transformations easier to implement.
Program transformations like the one in Figure 2.2 are correct if the transformed program refines
the original program (in the sense described above) and the result is well-formed SSA. Proving
that such code transformations are correct is nontrivial because they involve non-local reasoning
about the program. Chapter 5 describes how such optimizations can be formally proven correct by
breaking them into micro transformations, each of which can be shown to preserve the semantics of
the program and maintain the SSA invariants.
2.3 LLVM
LLVM [43] (Low-Level Virtual Machine) is a robust, industrial-strength, and open-source compi-
lation framework. LLVM uses a typed, platform-independent SSA-based IR originally developed
as a research tool for studying optimizations and modern compilation techniques [38]. The LLVM
project has since blossomed into a robust, industrial-strength, and open-source compilation platform
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Types typ : : = int
Constants cnst : : = Int
Values val : : = r | cnst
Binops bop : : = + | ∗ | && |= | ≥ | ≤ | · · ·
Right-hand-sides rhs : : = val1 bopval2
Commands c : : = r := rhs
Terminators tmn : : = brval l1 l2 | ret typval
Phi Nodes φ : : = r = phi typ [valj, lj]
j
Instructions insn : : = φ | c | tmn
Non-φs ψ : : = c | tmn
Blocks b : : = lφctmn
Functions f : : = fun{b}
Figure 2.4: Syntax of Vminus
that competes with GCC in terms of compilation speed and performance of the generated code [38].
As a consequence, it has been widely used in both academia and industry 2.
An LLVM-based compiler is structured as a translation from a high-level source language to the
LLVM IR (see Figure 2.3). The LLVM tools provide a suite of IR to IR translations, which provide
optimizations, program transformations, and static analyses. The resulting LLVM IR code can then
be lowered to a variety of target architectures, including x86, PowerPC, and ARM (either by static
compilation or dynamic JIT-compilation). The LLVM project focuses on C and C++ front-ends, but
many source languages, including Haskell, Scheme, Scala, Objective C and others have been ported
to target the LLVM IR.
2.4 The Simple SSA Language—Vminus
To streamline the formalization of the SSA-based transformations, we describe the properties
and proof techniques of SSA in the context of Vminus, a simpler subset of our full LLVM
formalization—Vellvm [75], but one that still captures the essence of SSA.
Figure 2.4 gives the syntax of Vminus. Every Vminus expression is of type integer. Operations
in Vminus compute with values val, which are either identifiers r naming temporaries or constants
cnst that must be integer values. We use R to range over sets of identifiers.
2See http://llvm.org/ProjectsWithLLVM/
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All code in Vminus resides in a top-level function, whose body is composed of blocks b. Here,
b denotes a list of blocks; we also use similar notation for other lists. As is standard, a basic block
consists of a labeled entry point l, a series of φ nodes, a list of commands cs, and a terminator
instruction tmn. In the following, we also use the label l of a block to denote the block itself.
Because SSA ensures the uniqueness of variables in a function, we use r to identify instruc-
tions that assign temporaries. For instructions that do not update temporaries, such as terminators,
we introduce “ghost” identifiers to identify them—r : brval l1 l2. Ghost identifiers satisfy unique-
ness statically but do not have dynamic semantics, and are not shown when we do not distinguish
instructions.
The set of blocks making up the top-level function constitutes a control-flow graph with a well-
defined entry point that cannot be reached from other blocks. We write f [l] = bbc if there is a block
b with label l in function f . Here, the bc (pronounced “some”) indicates that the function is partial
(might return “none” instead).
As usual in SSA, the φ nodes join together values from a list of predecessor blocks of the
control-flow graph—each φ node takes a list of (value, label) pairs that indicates the value chosen
when control transfers from a predecessor block with the associated label. The commands c include
the usual suite of binary arithmetic or comparison operations (bop—e.g., addition +, multiplication
∗, and &&, equivalence =, greater than or equal ≥, less than or equal ≤, etc.). We denote the
right-hand-sides of commands by rhs. Block terminators (br and ret) branch to another block or
return a value from the function. We also use metavariable insn to range over φ-nodes, commands
and terminators, and non-phinodes ψ to represent commands and terminators.
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Chapter 3
Mechanized Verification of Computing
Dominators
One crucial component of SSA-based compilers is computing dominators—on a control-follow-
graph, a node l1 dominates a node l2 if all paths from the entry to l2 must go through l1 [8]. Domi-
nance analysis allows compilers to represent programs in the SSA form [28] (which enables many
advanced SSA-based optimizations), optimize loops, analyze memory dependency, and parallelize
code automatically, etc. Therefore, one prerequisite to the formal verification of SSA-based com-
pilers is formalizing computing dominators.
In this chapter, we present the formalization of dominance analysis used in the Vellvm project.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first mechanized verification of dominator computation for
LLVM. Although the CompCertSSA project [14] also formalized dominance analysis to prove the
correctness of a global value numbering optimization, as we explain in Chapter 10, our results are
more general: beyond soundness, we establish completeness and related metatheory results that can
be used in other applications. Because different styles of formalization may also affect the cost of
proof engineering, we also discuss some tradeoffs in the choices of formalization.
To simplify the formal development, we describe the work in the context of Vminus in this
section. The following sections describe how to extend the work for the full Vellvm. Following
LLVM, we distinguish dominators at the block level and at the instruction level. Given the former
one, we can easily compute the latter one. Therefore, we will focus on the block-level analysis.
Section 4.2 discusses the instruction-level analysis, Section 4.3 shows how to use the dominance
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analysis to design a type checker for the SSA form, and Chapter 5 describes how to verify SSA-
based optimizations by the metatheory of the dominance analysis.
Concretely, we present the following specific contributions:
1. Section 3.1 gives an abstract and succinct specification of computing dominators at the block
level.
2. We instantiate the specification by two algorithms. Section 3.2 shows the standard dominance
analysis [7] (AC). Section 3.3 presents an extension of the standard algorithm [24] (CHK) that
is easy to implement and verify, but still fast. We verify the correctness of both algorithms.
In the meanwhile, we provide a verified depth first search algorithm (Section 3.2.1).
3. Then, Section 3.4 constructs dominator trees that compilers traverse to transform programs.
4. Section 3.6 evaluates performance of the algorithms, and shows that in practice CHK runs
nearly as fast as the sophisticated algorithm used in LLVM.
5. We formalize all the claims of the paper for Vminus and the full Vellvm in Coq (available at
http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~stevez/vellvm/).
Note that in this chapter we present definitions and proofs in Coq; the later chapters use mathe-
matical notations.
3.1 The Specification of Computing Dominators
This section first defines dominators in term of the syntax of Vminus, then gives an abstract and
succinct specification of algorithms that compute dominators.
3.1.1 Dominance
The set of blocks making up the top-level function f constitutes a control-flow graph (CFG) G =
(e,succs) where e is the entry point (the first block) of f ; succs maps each label to a list of its
successors. On a CFG, we use G |= l1→∗ l2 to denote a path ρ from l1 to l2, and l ∈ ρ to denote
that l is in the path ρ. By wf f (which Section 4.3 formally defines), we require that a well-formed
function must contain an entry point that cannot be reached from other blocks, all terminators can
13
only branch to blocks within f , and that all labels in f are unique. In this section, we only consider
well-formed functions to streamline the presentation.
Definition 2 (Domination (Block-level)). Given G with an entry e,
• A block l is reachable, written G→∗ l, if there exists a path G |= e→∗ l.
• A block l1 dominates a block l2, written G |= l1= l2, if for every path ρ from e to l2, l1 ∈ ρ.
• A block l1 strictly dominates a block l2, written G |= l1 l2, if for every path ρ from e to l2,
l1 6= l2∧ l1 ∈ ρ.
Because the dominance relations of a function at the block level and in its CFG are equivalent,
in the following we do not distinguish f and G. The following consequence of the definitions are
useful to define the specification of computing dominators. First of all, we can convert and=:
Lemma 1.
• If G |= l1 l2, then G |= l1= l2.
• If G |= l1= l2∧ l1 6= l2, then G |= l1 l2.
For all labels in G,= and are transitive.
Lemma 2 (Transitivity).
• If G |= l1= l2 and G |= l2= l3, then G |= l1= l3.
• If G |= l1 l2 and G |= l2 l3, then G |= l1 l3.
However, because there is no path from the entry to unreachable labels,= and relate every
label to any unreachable labels.
Lemma 3. If ¬(G→∗ l2), then G |= l1= l2 and G |= l1 l2.
If we only consider the reachable labels in V , is acyclic.
Lemma 4 ( is acyclic). If G→∗ l, then ¬G |= l l.
Moreover, all labels that strictly dominate a reachable label are ordered.
Lemma 5 ( is ordered). If G→∗ l3, l1 6= l2, G |= l1 l3 and G |= l2 l3, then G |= l1 l2∨G |=
l2 l1.
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Module Type ALGDOM.
Parameter sdom: f -> l -> set l.
Definition dom f l1 := l1 {+} sdom f l1.
Axiom entry_sound: forall f e, entry f = Some e -> sdom f e = {}.
Axiom successors_sound: forall f l1 l2,
In l1 ((succs f) !!! l2) -> sdom f l1 {<=} dom f l2.
Axiom complete: forall f l1 l2,
wf f -> f |= l1 >> l2 -> l1 ‘in‘ (sdom f l2).
End ALGDOM.
Module AlgDom_Properties(AD: ALGDOM).
Lemma sound: forall f l1 l2,
wf f -> l1 ‘in‘ (AD.sdom f l2) -> f |= l1 >> l2.
(**********************************************************************)
(* Properties: conversion, transitivity, acyclicity, ordering and ... *)
(**********************************************************************)
End AlgDom_Properties.
Figure 3.1: The specification of algorithms that find dominators.
3.1.2 Specification
Coq Notations. We use {} to denote an empty set; use {+}, {<=}, ‘in‘, {\/} and {/\} to
denote set addition, inclusion, membership, union and intersection respectively. Our developments
reuse the basic tree and map data structures implemented in the CompCert project [42]: ATree.t
and PTree.t are trees with keys of type l and positive respectively; PMap.t is a map with keys
of type positive. We use ! and !! to denote tree and map lookup respectively. A tree lookup
is partial, while a map lookup returns a default value when the key to search does not exist. succs
are defined by trees. !!! is a special tree lookup for succs, and it returns an empty list when a
searched-for key does not exist. [x] is a list with one element x.
Figure 3.1 gives an abstract specification of algorithms that compute dominators using a Coq
module interface ALGDOM. First of all, sdom defines the signature of a dominance analysis algorithm:
given a function f and a label l1, (sdom f l1) returns the set of strict dominators of l1 in f ; dom
defines the set of dominators of l1 by adding l1 into l1’s strict dominators.
To make the interface simple, ALGDOM requires only basic properties that ensure that sdom is
correct: it must be both sound and complete in terms of the declarative definitions (Definition 2).
Given the correctness of sdom, the AlgDom_Properties module can ‘lift’ properties (conversion,
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Efficiency
Lengauer-Tarjan (LT, in LLVM and GCC)
Based on graph theory
O(E x log(N))Cooper-Harvey-Kennedy (CHK)Extended from  AC
Nearly as fast as LT in common cases
Verifiability
Allen-Cocke (AC)
Based on Kildall’s algorithm
A large asymptotic complexity
Figure 3.2: Algorithms of computing dominators
transitivity, acyclicity, ordering, etc.) from the declarative definitions to the implementations of
sdom and dom. Section 3.4, Section 3.5, Section 4.3 and Chapter 8 show how clients of ALGDOM use
the properties proven in AlgDom_Properties by examples.
ALGDOM requires completeness of the algorithm directly. Soundness of the algorithm can be
proven by two more basic properties: entry_sound requires that the entry has no strict dominators;
successors_sound requires that if l1 is a successor of l2, then l2’s dominators must include l1’s
strict dominators. Given an algorithm that establishes the two properties, AlgDom_Properties
proves that the algorithm is sound by induction over any path from the entry to l2.
3.1.3 Instantiations
In the literature, there is a long history of algorithms that find dominators (See Figure 3.2), each
making different trade-offs between efficiency and simplicity. Most of the industrial compilers,
such as LLVM and GCC, use the classic Lengauer-Tarjan algorithm [40] (LT) that has a complexity
of O(E ∗ log(N)) where N and E are the number of nodes and edges respectively, but is complicated
to implement and reason about because it is base on complicated graph theory. The Allen-Cocke
algorithm [7] (AC) based on iteration is easier to design, but suffers from a large asymptotic com-
plexity of O(N3). Moreover, LT explictly creates dominator trees that provide convenient data
structures for compilers whereas AC needs an additional tree construction algorithm with more
overhead. The Cooper-Harvey-Kennedy algorithm [24] (CHK) extends from AC with careful en-
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{e,5}
{a,4}
{d,2}
{b,3}
{c,1}
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e[d]; a[]; b[]; e a b c d (c,1); (d,2); (b,3)
e[d]; a[]; e a b c d (c,1); (d,2); (b,3); (a,4)
e[] e a b c d (c,1); (d,2); (b,3); (a,4); (e,5)
Figure 3.3: The postorder (left) and the DFS execution sequence (right).
gineering and runs nearly as fast as LT in common cases [24, 31], but is still simple to implement
and reason about. Moreover, CHK generates dominator trees implicitly, and provides a faster tree
construction algorithm.
Because CHK gives a relatively good trade-off between verifiability and efficency, we present
CHK as an instance of ALGDOM. In the following sections, we first review the AC algorithm, and
then study its extension CHK.
3.2 The Allen-Cocke Algorithm
The Allen-Cocke algorithm (AC) is an instance of the forward worklist-based Kildall’s al-
gorithm [35] that computes program fixpoints by iteration. The number of iterations that a
worklist-based algorithm takes to meet a fixpoint depends on the order in which nodes are
processed: in particular, forward algorithms can converge relatively faster when visiting nodes in
reverse postorder (PO) [33].
At the high-level, our Coq implementation of AC works in three steps: 1) calculate the PO of a
CFG by depth-first-search (DFS); 2) compute strict dominators for PO-numbered nodes in Kildall;
3) finally relate the analysis results to the original nodes. We omit the 3rd step’s proofs here.
This section first presents a verified DFS algorithm that computes PO, then reviews Kildall’s
algorithm as implemented in the CompCert project [42], and finally it studies the implementation
and metatheory of AC.
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Record PostOrder := mkPO { PO_cnt: positive; PO_l2p: LTree.t positive }.
Record Frame := mkFr { Fr_name: l; Fr_scs: list l }.
Definition dfs_F_type : Type := forall (succs: LTree.t (list l))
(visited: LTree.t unit) (po:PostOrder) (stk: list Frame), PostOrder.
Definition dfs_F (f: dfs_F_type) (succs: LTree.t (list l))
(visited: LTree.t unit) (po:PostOrder) (stk: list Frame): PostOrder :=
match find_next succs visited po stk with
| inr po’ => po’
| inl (next, visited’, po’, stk’) => f succs visited’ po’ stk’
end.
Figure 3.4: The DFS algorithm.
3.2.1 DFS: PO-numbering
DFS starts at the entry, visits nodes as deep as possible along each path, and backtracks when all
deep nodes are visited. DFS generates PO by numbering a node after all its children are numbered.
Figure 3.3 gives a PO-numbered CFG. In the CFG, we represent the depth-first-search (DFS) tree
edges by solid arrows, and non-tree edges by dotted arrows. We draw the entry node in a box, and
other nodes in circles. Each node is labeled by a pair with its original label name on the left, and its
PO number on the right. Because DFS only visits reachable nodes, the PO numbers of unreachable
nodes are represented by ‘ ’.
Figure 3.4 shows the data structures and auxiliary functions used by a typical DFS algorithm
that maintains four components to compute PO. PostOrder takes the next available PO number and
a map from nodes to their PO numbers with type positive. The map from a node to its successors
is represented by succs. To facilitate reasoning about DFS, we represent the recursive information
of DFS explicitly by a list of Frame records that each contains a node Fr_name and its unprocessed
successors Fr_scs. To prevent the search from revisiting nodes, the DFS algorithm uses visited
to record visited nodes. dfs_F defines one recursive step of DFS.
Figure 3.3 (on the right) gives a DFS execution sequence (by running dfs_F until all nodes are
visited) of the CFG in Figure 3.3 (on the left) . We use l[l1 · · · ln] to denote a frame with the node l
and its unprocessed successors l1 to ln; (l, p) to denote a node l and its PO p. Initially the DFS adds
the entry and its successors to the stack. At each recursive step, find_next finds the next available
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Fixpoint iter (A:Type) (n:nat) (F:A->A) (g:A) : A :=
match n with
| O => g
| S p => F (iter A p F g)
end.
Definition wf_stk succs visited stk :=
stk_in_succs succs stk /\ incl visited succs
Program Fixpoint dfs_tmn succs visited po stk
(Hp: wf_stk succs visited stk) {measure (size succs - size visited)}:
{ po’:PostOrder | exists p:nat,
forall k (Hlt: p < k) (g:dfs_F_type),
iter _ k dfs_F g succs visited po stk = po’ } :=
match find_next succs visited po stk with
| inr po’ => po’
| inl (next, visited’, po’, stk’) =>
let _ := dfs_tmn succs visited’ po’ stk’ _ in _
end.
Program Definition dfs succs entry : PostOrder :=
fst (dfs_tmn succs empty (mkPO 1 empty) (mkFr entry [(succs!!!entry)]) _).
Figure 3.5: Termination of the DFS algorithm.
node that is the unvisited node in the Fr_scs of the latest node l′ of the stack. If the next available
node exists, the DFS pushes the node with its successors to the stack, and makes the node to be
visited. find_next pops all nodes in front of l′, and gives them PO numbers. If find_next fails
to find available nodes, the DFS stops.
We can see that the straightforward algorithm is not a structural recursion. To implement
the algorithm in Coq, we must show that it terminates. Although in Coq we can implement the
algorithm by well-founded recursion, such designs are hard to reason about [17]. One of possible
alternatives is implementing DFS with a ‘strong’ dependent type to specify the properties that we
need to reason about DFS. However, this design is not modular because when the type of DFS
is not strong enough—for example, if we need a new lemma about DFS—we must extend or
redesign its implementation by adding new invariants. Instead, following the ideas in Coq’Art [17],
we implement DFS by iteration and prove its termination and inductive principle separately. By
separating implementation and specification, the DFS design is modular and easier to reason about.
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Figure 3.5 presents our design. Similar to bounded iteration, the top-level entry is iter, which
needs a bounded step n, a fixpoint F and a default value g. iter only calls g when n reaches zero,
and otherwise recursively calls one more iteration of F. If F is terminating, we can prove that there
must exist a final value and a bound n, such that for any bound k that is greater than or equal to n,
iter always stops and generates the same final value. In other words, F must reach a fixpoint with
less than n steps. In fact, the proof of the existence of n is erasable; the computation part of the
proof provides a terminating algorithm for free, not requiring the bound step at runtime.
Figure 3.5 proves that the DFS must terminate, as shown by dfs_tmn, which is implemented
by well-founded recursion over the number of unvisited nodes. Intuitively, this follows because
after each iteration, the DFS visits more nodes. The invariant that the number of unvisited nodes
decreases holds only for well-formed recursion states (wf_stk), which requires that all visited nodes
and unprocessed nodes in frames must be in the CFG. We implemented dfs_tmn by Coq’s Program
Fixpoint, which allows programmers to leave holes for which Program Fixpoint automatically
generates obligations to solve. Using dfs_tmn, dfs defines the final definition of DFS.
To reason about dfs, Figure 3.6 shows a well-founded inductive principle for dfs. In Module
Ind, to prove that the final result has the property wf_po and the property wf_stack holds for all its
intermediate states, we need to show that the initial state satisfies wf_stack, and that find_next
preserves wf_stack when it can find a new available node, and produces a well-formed final result
when no available nodes exist. With the inductive principle, we proved the following properties of
DFS that are useful to establish the correctness of AC and CHK.
Variable (succs: ATree.t (list l)) (entry:l) (po:PostOrder).
Hypothesis Hdfs: dfs succs entry = po.
First of all, a non-entry node must have at least one predecessor that has a greater PO number than
the node’s. This is because 1) DFS must visit at least one predecessor of a node before visiting the
node; 2) PO gives greater numbers to the nodes visited earlier:
Lemma dfs_order: forall l1 p1, l1 <> entry -> (PO_l2p po)!l1 = Some p1,
exists l2, exists p2,
In l2 ((make_preds succs)!!!l1) /\ (PO_l2p po)!l2 = Some p2 /\ p2 > p1.
(* Given succs, (make_preds succs) computes predecessors of each node. *)
Second, a node is PO-numbered iff the node is reachable:
Lemma dfs_reachable:forall l,(PO_l2p po)!l <> None <-> (entry,succs)->* l.
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Module Ind.
Section Ind.
Variable (succs: ATree.t (list l)) (entry:l) (po:PostOrder).
Hypothesis find_next__wf_stack: forall ... (Hwf: wf_stack visited po stk)
(Heq: find_next succs visited po stk = inl (next, visited’, po’, stk’)),
wf_stack visited’ po’ stk’.
Hypothesis wf_stack__find_next__wf_order: forall ...,
(Hwf: wf_stack visited po1 stk)
(Heq: find_next succs visited po1 stk = inr po2), wf_po po2.
Hypothesis entry__wf_stack:
wf_stack empty (mkPO 1 empty) (mkFr entry [(succs!!!entry)]).
Lemma dfs_wf: dfs succs entry = po -> wf_po po.
End Ind.
End Ind.
Figure 3.6: Inductive principle of the DFS algorithm.
Moreover, different nodes do not have the same PO number.
Lemma dfs_inj: forall l1 l2 p,
(PO_l2p po)!l2 = Some p -> (PO_l2p po)!l1 = Some p -> l1 = l2.
3.2.2 Kildall’s algorithm
Figure 3.7 summarizes the Kildall module used in the CompCert project. The module is param-
eterized by the following components: NS that provides the order to process nodes, and a lattice L
that defines top, bot, equality (eq), least upper bound (lub) and order (ge) of the abstract domain
of an analysis; succs that is a tree that maps a node to their successors; transf that is the transfer
function of Kildall analysis; inits that initializes the analysis. Given the inputs, state records the
iteration states that include sin that records analysis states of each node, and a work list swrk hat
contains nodes to process.
fixpoint implements iterations by Iter.iter—bounded recursion with a maximal step num-
ber (num) [17]. Iter.iter is partial if an analysis does not stop after the maximal number of steps.
A monotone analysis must reach its fixpoint after a fixed number of steps. Therefore, we can alway
pick a large enough number of steps for a monotone analysis.
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Module Kildall (NS: PNODE_SET) (L: LATTICE).
Section Kildall.
Variable succs: PTree.t (list positive).
Variable transf : positive -> L.t -> L.t.
Variable inits: list (positive * L.t).
Record state : Type := mkst { sin: PMap.t L.t; swrk: NS.t }.
Definition start_st := mkst (start_state_in inits) (NS.init succs).
Definition propagate_succ (out: L.t) (s: state) (n: positive) :=
let oldl := s.(sin) !! n in
let newl := L.lub oldl out in
if L.eq newl oldl
then mkst (PMap.set n newl s.(sin)) (NS.add n s.(swrk)) else s.
Definition step (s: state): PMap.t L.t + state :=
match NS.pick s.(swrk) with
| None => inl s.(sin)
| Some(n, rem) => inr (fold_left
(propagate_succ (transf n s.(sin) !! n))
(succs !!! n) (mkst s.(sin) rem))
end.
Variable num : positive.
Definition fixpoint : option (PMap.t L.t):= Iter.iter step num start_st.
End Kildall.
End Kildall.
Figure 3.7: Kildall’s algorithm.
Initially Kildall’s algorithm calls start_st to initialize iteration states. Nodes not in inits are
initialized to be the bottom of L. Then start_st adds all nodes into the worklist and starts the loop.
step defines the loop body. At step, Kildall’s algorithm checks if there are still unprocessed nodes
in the worklist. If the worklist is empty, the algorithm stops. Otherwise, step picks a node from
the worklist in term of the order provided by NS, and then propagates its information (computed by
transf) to all the node’s successors by propagate_succ. In propagate_succ, the new value of
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a successor is L.lub of its old value and the propagated value from its predecessor. The algorithm
only adds a successor into the worklist when its value is changed.
Kildall’s algorithm satisfies the following properties:
Variable res: PMap.t L.t.
Hypothesis Hfix: fixpoint = Some res.
First of all, the worklist contains nodes that have unstable successors in the current state. Formally,
each state st preserves the following invariant:
forall n, NS.In n st.(swrk) \/
(forall s, In s (succs!!!n) -> L.ge st.(sin)!!s (transf n st.(sin)!!n)).
Each iteration may only remove the picked node n from the worklist. If none of n’s successors’
values are changed, no matter whether n belongs to its successors, n won’t be added back to the
worklist. Therefore, the above invariant holds. This invariant implies that when the analysis stops,
all nodes hold the in-equations:
Lemma fixpoint_solution: forall s,
In s (succs!!!n) -> L.ge res!!s (transf n res!!n).
The second property of Kildall’s algorithm is monotonicity. At each iteration, the value of a suc-
cessor of the picked node can only be updated from oldl to newl. Because newl is the least upper
bound of oldl and out, newl is greater than or equal to oldl. Therefore, iteration states are always
monotonic:
Lemma fixpoint_mono: incr (start_state_in inits) res.
where incr is a pointwise lift of L.ge for corresponding nodes. In particular, the final states must
be greater than or equal to the initial states. When an iteration does not change states, no nodes
will be added back to the worklist, but the size of worklist must decrease. Therefore, a monotonic
analysis must reach its fixpoint with less than N2 ∗H steps where N is the number of nodes; H is
the height of the lattice of the analysis [33].
3.2.3 The AC algorithm
AC instantiates Kildall with PN that picks nodes in reverse PO (by picking the maximal nodes
from the worklist), and LDoms that defines the lattice of AC. Dominance analysis computes a set
of strict dominators for each node. We represent the domain of LDoms by option (set l). The
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top and bot of LDoms are Some nil and None respectively. The least upper bound, order and
equality of LDoms are lifted from set intersection, set inclusion, and set equality to option: None is
smaller than Some x for any x. This design leads to better performance by providing shortcuts for
operations on None. Note that using None as bot does not make the height of LDoms to be infinite,
because any non-bot element can only contain nodes in the CFG, and the height of LDoms is N.
AC uses the following transfer function and initialization:
Definition transf l1 input := l1 {+} input.
Definition inits := [(e, LDoms.top)].
Initially AC sets the strict dominators of the entry to be empty, and other nodes’ strict dominators
to be all labels in the function. The algorithm will iteratively remove non-strict-dominators
from the sets until the conditions below hold (by Lemma fixpoint_mono and Lemma
fixpoint_solution):
(forall s, In s (succs!!!n) ->
L.ge (st.(sin))!!s (n{+}(st.(sin))!!n)) /\ (st.(sin))!!e = {}.
which proves that AC satisfies entry_sound and successors_sound.
To show that the algorithm is complete, it is sufficient to show that each iteration state st
preserves the following invariant:
forall n1 n2, ~ n1 ‘in‘ st.(sin)!!n2 -> ~ (e, succs) |= n1 >> n2.
In other words, AC only removes non-strict dominators. Initially, AC sets the entry’s strict dom-
inators to be empty. Because in a well-formed CFG, the entry has no predecessors, the invariant
holds at the very beginning. At each iteration, suppose that we pick a node n and update one of its
successors s. Consider a node n’ not in LDoms.lub st.(sin)!!s (n {+} st.(sin)!!n). If
n’ is not in LDoms.lub st.(sin)!!s, then n’ does not strictly dominate s because st holds the
invariant. If n’ is not in (n {+} st.(sin)!!n), then n’ does not strictly dominate n because st
holds the invariant. Appending the path from the entry to n that bypasses n’ with the edge from n
to s leads to a path from the entry to s that bypasses n’. Therefore, n’ does not strictly dominate
s, either.
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3.3 Extension: the Cooper-Harvey-Kennedy Algorithm
The CHK algorithm is based on the following observation: when AC processes nodes in a reversed
post-order (PO), if we represent the set of strict dominators in a list, and always add a newly
discovered strict dominator at the head of the list (on the left in Figure 3.8), the list must be sorted
by PO. Figure 3.8 (on the right) shows the execution of the algorithm for the CFG in Figure 3.3.
Because lists of strict dominators are always sorted, we can implement the set intersection (lub)
and the set comparison (eq) of two sorted lists by traversing the two lists only once. Moreover, the
algorithm only calls eq after lub. Therefore, we can group lub and eq into LDoms.lub together.
The following defines a merge function used by LDoms.lub that intersects two sorted lists and
returns whether the final result equals to the left one:
Program Fixpoint merge (l1 l2: list positive) (acc:list positive * bool)
{measure (length l1 + length l2)}: (list positive * bool) :=
let ’(rl, changed) := acc in
match l1, l2 with
| p1::l1’, p2::l2’ =>
match (Pcompare p1 p2 Eq) with
| Eq => merge l1’ l2’ (p1::rl, changed)
| Lt => merge l1’ l2 (rl, true)
| Gt => merge l1 l2’ (rl, changed)
end
| nil, _ => acc
| _::_, nil => (rl, true)
end.
(* (Pcompare p1 p2 Eq) returns whether p1 = p2, p1 < p2 or p1 > p2. *)
3.3.1 Correctness
To show that CHK is still correct, it is sufficient to show that all lists are well-sorted at each iteration,
which ensures that the above merge correctly implements intersection and comparison. First, if a
node with number n still maps to bot, the worklist must contain one of its predecessors that has a
greater number.
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entry
{e,5}
{a,4}
{b,3}
{d,2}{c,1}
Nodes sin
5 [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []
4 · [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5]
3 · · [45] [45] [45] [5] [5] [5] [5]
2 · · · [345] [345] [345] [35] [35] [35]
1 · [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5]
swrk [54321] [4321] [321] [21] [1] [3] [21] [1] []
Figure 3.8: The dominator trees (left) and the execution of CHK (right).
forall n, in_cfg n succs -> (st.(sin))!!n = None ->
exists p, In p ((make_preds succs)!!!n) /\ p > n /\ PN.In p st.(st_wrk).
(* in_cfg checks if a node is in CFG. *)
This invariant holds in the beginning because all nodes are in the worklist. At each iteration, the
invariant implies that the picked node n with the maximal number in st.(st_wrk) is not bot.
Suppose it is bot, there cannot be any node with greater number in the worklist. This property
ensures that after each iteration, the successors of n cannot be bot, and that the new nodes added
into the worklist cannot be bot, because they must be those successors. Therefore, the predecessors
of the remaining bot nodes still in the worklist cannot be n. Since only n is removed, the rest of the
bot nodes still hold the above invariant.
In the algorithm, a node’s value is changed from bot to non-bot when one of its non-bot
predecessors is processed. With the above invariant, we know that the predecessor must be of larger
number. Once a node turns to be non-bot, no new elements will be added in its set. Therefore,
this implies that, at each iteration, if the value of a node is not bot, then all its candidate strict
dominators must be larger than the node:
forall n sdms, (st.(sin))!!n = Some sdms -> Forall (Plt n) sdms.
(* Plt is the less-than of positive. *)
Moreover, a node n is considered as a candidate of strict dominators originally by tranf that
always cons n at the head of (st.(sin))!!n. Therefore, we proved that the non-bot value of a
node is always sorted:
forall n sdms, (st.(sin))!!n = Some sdms -> Sorted Plt (n::sdms).
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Inductive DTree : Set :=
| DT_node : l -> DTrees -> DTree
with DTrees : Set :=
| DT_nil : DTrees
| DT_cons : l -> DTrees -> DTrees.
Variable (f: function) (entry:l).
Inductive wf_dtree : DTree -> Prop :=
| Wf_DT_node : forall l0 dts (Hrd: f |= entry ->* l0)
(Hnotin: ~ l0 ‘in‘ (dtrees_dom dts)) (Hdisj: disjoint_dtrees dts)
(Hidom: forall_children idom l0 dts) (Hwfdts: wf_dtrees dts),
wf_dtree (DT_node l0 dts)
(* (dtrees_dom dts) returns all labels in dts. *)
(* (disjoint_dtrees dts) ensures that labels of dts are disjointed. *)
(* (forall_children idom l0 dts)) checks that l0 immediate-dominates all *)
(* roots of dts. *)
with wf_dtrees : DTrees -> Prop :=
| Wf_DT_nil : wf_dtrees DT_nil
| Wf_DT_cons : forall dt dts (Hwfdt: wf_dtree dt) (Hwfdts: wf_dtrees dts),
wf_dtrees (DT_cons dt dts).
Figure 3.9: The definition and well-formedness of dominator trees.
3.4 Constructing Dominator Trees
In practice, compilers construct dominator trees from dominators, and analyze or optimize
programs by recursion on dominator trees.
Definition 3.
• A block l1 is an immediate dominator of a block l2, written G |= l1≫ l2, if G |= l1 l2 and
(∀G |= l3 l2,G |= l3= l1).
• A tree is called a dominator tree of G if the tree has an edge from l to l′ iff G |= l≫ l′.
Figure 3.8 shows the dominator tree of the CFG in Figure 3.3. In Figure 3.8, solid edges
represent tree edges, and dotted edges represent non-tree but CFG edges.
Formally, we define dominator trees in Figure 3.9 that has the inductive well-formed
(wf_dtree) property with which we can reason about recursion on dominator trees: given a tree
node l, 1) l is reachable; 2) l is different from all labels in l’s descendants; 3) labels of l’s subtrees
are disjointed; 4) l immediate-dominates its children; 5) l’s subtrees are well-formed.
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Consider the final analysis results of CHK in Figure 3.8, we can see that for each node, its list
of strict dominators exactly presents a path from root to the node on the dominator tree. Therefore,
we can construct a dominator tree by merging the paths. We proved that the algorithm correctly
constructs a well-formed dominator tree (See our code). For the sake of space, we only present
that each tree edge represents ≫ by showing that for any node l in the final state, the list of l’s
dominators must be sorted by≫.
We first show that the list is sorted by . Consider two adjacent nodes in the list, l1 and
l2, such that l1 < l2. Because of soundness, G |= l1 = l and G |= l2 = l. By Lemma 5,
G |= l2  l1 ∨G |= l1  l2. Suppose G |= l1  l2, by completeness, l1 must be in the strict
dominators computed for l2, and therefore, be greater than l2. This is a contradiction. Then, we
prove that the list is sorted by≫. Suppose G |= l3 l1. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, G |= l3 l.
By completeness, l3 must be in the list. We have two cases:
1. l3 ≥ l2: Because the list is sorted by, G |= l3= l2.
2. l3 ≤ l1: Similarly, G |= l1= l3. This is a contradiction by Lemma 4.
3.5 Dominance Frontier
Another application of computing dominators is the calculation of dominance frontiers that has
applications to SSA construction algorithms, computing control dependence, and etc.
Cytron et al. define the dominance frontier of a node, b, as:
... the set of all CFG nodes, y, such that b dominates a predecessor of y but does not
strictly dominate y [28].
They propose finding the dominance frontier set for each node in a two step manner. They begin
by walking over the dominator tree in a bottom-up traversal. At each node, b, they add to b’s
dominance-frontier set any CFG successors not dominated by b. They then traverse the dominance-
frontier sets of b’s dominator-tree children each member of these frontiers that is not dominated by
b is copied into b’s dominance frontier.
We follow an algorithm designed by Cooper, Harvey and Kennedy [24] that approaches the
problem from the opposite direction, and tends to run faster than Cytron et al.’s algorithm in prac-
tice. The algorithm is based on three observations. First, nodes in a dominance frontier represent
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Figure 3.10: Analysis overhead over LLVM’s dominance analysis for our extracted analysis.
join points in the graph, nodes into which control flows from multiple predecessors. Second, the
predecessors of any join point, j, must have j in their respective dominance-frontier sets, unless
the predecessor dominates j. This is a direct result of the definition of dominance frontiers, above.
Finally, the dominators of j’s predecessors must themselves have j in their dominance-frontier sets
unless they also dominate j.
These observations lead to a simple algorithm. First, we identify each join point, j—any node
with more than one incoming edge is a join point. We then examine each predecessor, p, of j
and walk up the dominator tree starting at p. We stop the walk when we reach j’s immediate
dominator— j is in the dominance frontier of each of the nodes in the walk, except for j’s immediate
dominator. Intuitively, all of the rest of j’s dominators are shared by j’s predecessors as well. Since
they dominate j, they will not have j in their dominance frontiers.
As shown previously [24], this approach tends to run faster than Cytron et al..’s algorithm in
practice, almost certainly for two reasons. First, the iterative algorithm has already built the domina-
tor tree. Second, the algorithm uses no more comparisons than are strictly necessary. Section 8.5.3
will revisit the implementation of the algorithm.
3.6 Performance Evaluation
As we discussed, computing dominators is crucial in SSA-based compilers. Therefore, we use the
Coq extraction to obtain a certified implementation of AC and CHK and evaluate the performance
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Instance Analysis Times (s)
Name Vertices Edges LT CHK CHK-tree AC AC-tree
idfsquad 6002 10000 0.08 10.54 24.87
ibfsquad 4001 6001 0.14 11.38 13.16 12.43 30.00
itworst 2553 5095 0.14 8.47 11.22 19.16 69.72
sncaworst 3998 3096 0.19 17.03 32.08 205.07 740.53
Table 3.1: Worst-case behavior.
of the resultant code on a 1.73 GHz Intel Core i7 processor with 8 GB memory running benchmarks
selected from the SPEC CPU benchmark suite that consist of over 873k lines of C source code.
Figure 3.10 reports the analysis time overhead (smaller is better) over the C++ version of LLVM
dominance analysis (which uses LT) baseline. LT only generates dominator trees. Given a domina-
tor tree, the strict dominators of a tree node are all the node’s ancestors. The second left bar of each
group shows the overhead of CHK, which provides an average overhead of 27%. The right-most
bar of each group is the overhead of AC, which provides 36% on average.
To study the asymptotic complexity, Table 3.1 shows the result of graphs that elicit the worst-
case behavior used previously [31]. On average, CHK is 86 times slower than LT. The ‘ ’ indicates
that the running time is too long to collect. For the testcases on which AC stops, AC is 226 times
slower than LT.
The results of CHK match earlier experiments [24, 31]: in common cases, CHK runs nearly
as fast as LT. For programs with reducible CFGs, a forward iteration analysis in reverse PO will
halt in no more than size passes [33], and most CFGs of the common benchmarks are reducible.
The worst-case tests contain huge irreducible CFGs. Different from these experiments, AC does
not provide large overhead, because we use None to represent bot, which provides shortcuts for set
operations.
As shown in Section 3.4, CHK computes dominator trees implicitly, while AC needs additional
costs to create dominator trees. Figure 3.10 and Table 3.1 also report the performance of the
dominator tree construction. CHK-tree stands for the algorithm that first computes dominators
by CHK and then runs the tree construction defined in Section 3.4. AC-tree stands for the algorithm
that first computes dominators by AC, sorts strict dominators for each node, and then runs the same
tree construction. For common programs, on average, CHK-tree provides an overhead 40% over
the baseline; AC-tree provides an overhead 78% over the baseline. Note that in Figure 3.10 the
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testcase gcc’s overhead for AC-tree is 361%. The additional overhead of AC-tree is from its sorting
algorithm. For worst-case programs, on average, CHK-tree is 104 times slower than LT. For the
testcases on which AC-tree stops, on average, AC-tree is 738 times slower than LT.
These results match the previous evaluation [24] and indicate that CHK makes a good trade-off
between simplicity and efficiency.
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Chapter 4
The Semantics of Vminus
Given the formalism in Chapter 3, this chapter presents the semantics of Vminus. Chapter 6 extends
the semantics for the full Vellvm.
4.1 Dynamic Semantics
The operational semantics rules in Figure 4.1 are parameterized by the top-level function f , and
relate evaluation frames σ before and after an evaluation step. An evaluation frame keeps track of
the integer values v bound to local temporaries r in δ and current program counter. We also use
σ.pc and σ.δ to denote the program counter and locals of σ respectively. Because Vminus has no
function calls, the rules ignore program traces. This simplification does not affect the essence of the
proof techniques. Section 6.4 shows the full Vellvm semantics with traces.
Instruction positions are denoted by program counters pc: l.i indicates the i-th command in
the block l; l. t indicates the terminator of the block l. We write f [pc] = binsnc if some insn is at
the program counter pc of function f . We also use l.(i+ 1) to denote the next program counter
of l.i. When l.i is the last command of block l, l.(i+ 1) = l. t. To simplify presentation of the
operational semantics, we use l,c, tmn to “unpack” the instructions at a program counter in function
f . Here, l is the current block, c and tmn are the instructions of l that are not executed yet. “block
& offset” specification is equivalent to the “continuation commands” representation. To streamline
some presentations, we also use temporaries or ghost identifiers to represent program counters.
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Values v : : = Int Locals δ : : = r 7→ v
Frames σ : : = (pc,δ) Prog Counters pc : : = l.i | l. t
JvalKδ = bvc l3 = (v?l1 : l2)
f [l3] = b(l3 φ3 c3 tmn3)c Jφ3Klδ = bδ′c
f ` (l, /0,brval l1 l2,δ)−→ (l3,c3, tmn3,δ′) E BRJval1Kδ = bv1c Jval2Kδ = bv2c
c = r := val1 bopval2 eval(bop,v1,v2) = v3
f ` (l,(c,c), tmn,δ)−→ (l,c, tmn,δ{v3/r}) E BOP
Figure 4.1: Operational Semantics of Vminus (excerpt)
Most of the Vminus commands have straight-forward interpretation. The arithmetic and logic
instructions are all unsurprising (as shown in rule E BOP)—the JvalKδ function computes a value
from the local state δ and val, looking up the meanings of variables in the local state as needed; eval
implements arithmetic and logic operations. We use JrhsKδ to denote evaluating the right-hand-side
rhs in the state δ.
There is one wrinkle in specifying the operational semantics when compared to a standard
environment-passing call-by-value language. All of the φ instructions for a block must be executed
atomically and with respect to the “old” local value mapping due to the possibility of self loops and
dependencies among the φ nodes. For example the well-formed code fragment below has a circular
dependency between r1 and r2.
l0 : · · ·
l1 : r1 = phi int[r2, l1][0, l0]
r2 = phi int[r1, l1][1, l0]
r3 := r1 = r2
brr3 l1 l2
l2 : · · ·
Although front-ends usually do not generate codes with the circular dependency, optimizations,
such as copy propagation, may produce the above code [16]. In the code fragment, if control enters
this block from l0, r1 will map to 0 and r2 to 1, which causes the conditional branch to fail, jumping
back to the label l1. The new values of r1 and r2 should be 1 and 0, and not 1 and 1 as might
be computed if they were handled sequentially. This atomic update of the local state, similar to
“parallel assignment”, is handled by the Jφ3Klδ function as shown in rule E BR.
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4.2 Dominance Analysis
Dominance analysis plays an important role in the type system. To check that a program is in SSA
form, we need to extend domination relations from the block-level (Chapter 3) to the instruction-
level. Instruction positions are denoted by program counters pc. We write f [pc] = binsnc if insn is
at pc of f .
Definition 4 (Instruction-level domination).
• val usesr , val = r.
• insnusesr , ∃val.val usesr∧ val is an operand of insn.
• A variable r is defined at a program counter pc of function f , written f definesr @ pc if and
only if f [pc] = binsnc and r is the left-hand side of insn.
• In function f , pc1 strictly dominates pc2, written f |= pc1 pc2, if pc1 and pc2 are at distinct
blocks l1 and l2 respectively and f |= l1 l2; if pc1 and pc2 are in the same block, and pc1
appears earlier than pc2.
• sdom f (pc) is the set of variables strictly dominating pc:
sdom f (pc) = {r | f definesr @ pc′ and f |= pc′ pc}
We prove the following lemmas about the instruction-level domination relations, which are
needed to establish the SSA-based program properties in the following sections.
Lemma 6 (Domination is transitive). If f ` pc1 pc2 and f ` pc2 pc3, then f ` pc1 pc3.
Lemma 7 (Strict domination is acyclic). If f ; pc (pc is reachable), then ¬ f ` pc pc.
By Lemma 6, sdom f (pc) has the following properties:
Lemma 8 (sdom step).
1. If l.i and l.(i+1) are valid program counters of f , then sdom f (l.(i+1)) = sdom f (l.i)∪{r}
where f definesr @ l.i.
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2. If l. t and l′.0 are valid program counters of f , and l′ is a successor of l, then sdom f (l′.0)−
defs(φ)⊆ sdom f (l. t) where φ are from the block l′ and defs(φ) denotes all variables defined
by φ.
4.3 Static Semantics
Vminus requires a program satisfy certain invariants to be considered well formed: every variable
in the top-level function must dominate all its uses and be assigned exactly once statically. At
a minimum, any reasonable Vminus transformation must preserve these invariants; together they
imply that the program is in SSA form [28].
Figure 4.2 shows the judgments to check the SSA invariants with respect to the control-flow
graph and program points of the function f .
Rule WF F ensures that variables defs( f ) defined in the top function must be unique, which
enforces the single-assignment part of the SSA property; additionally all block labels labels( f )
in the function must also be unique for a well-formed control-flow graph; the entry block has no
predecessors (wf entry f ).
Rule WF B checks that all instructions in reachable blocks (written f ; l) satisfy the SSA
domination invariant. Because unreachable blocks have no effects at runtime, the rule does not
check them. Rule NONPHI ensures that a ψ at pc must be strictly dominated by the definitions of
all variables used by ψ; the rule PHI ensures that the number of incoming values is not zero, that
all incoming labels are unique, and that the current block’s predecessors is the same as the set of
incoming gables. If an incoming value valj from a predecessor block lj uses a variable rj at pcj, then
pcj must strictly dominate the terminator of lj. Importantly, this rule allows “cyclic” uses of SSA
variables of the kind used in the example above (Section 4.1).
Given the semantics in this chapter, the next chapter presents the proof techniques for reasoning
about SSA-based program properties and transformations of Vminus.
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f ` ψ @ pc
∀r.(ψusesr =⇒ r ∈ sdom f (pc))
f ` ψ @ pc
NONPHI
f , l ` φ
uniq(lj
j
) lj
j
= preds( f , l)
∀rj.(valj usesrj =⇒ rj ∈ sdom f (lj. t)) j len( [valj, lj] j )> 0 f ` valj : typ j
f , l ` r = phi typ [valj, lj]
j PHI
f ` ψ
f ` val1 : int f ` val2 : int
f ` r := val1 bopval2 WF BOP
f ` val : int f [l1] = bb1c f [l2] = bb2c
f ` brval l1 l2 WF BR
f ` val : typ
f ` ret typval WF RET
f ` ψ @ pc
f ` ψ @ pc f ` ψ
f ` ψ @ pc WF NONPHI
f ` b
f ; l =⇒ ( f , l ` φj j∧ f ` ci @ l.i i∧ f ` tmn @ (l. t))
f ` lφj j ci i tmn
WF B
` f
uniq(defs( f )) uniq(labels( f )) f = fun{bj j} f ` bj j wf entry f
` f WF F
Figure 4.2: Static Semantics of Vminus (excerpt)
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Chapter 5
Proof Techniques for SSA
This section describes the proof techniques we have developed for formalizing properties of SSA-
style intermediate representations. To most clearly articulate the approach, we present the results
using Vminus (see Chapter 4).
The key idea of the technique is to generalize the invariant used for Vminus’s preservation
lemma for proving safety to other predicates that are also shown to be invariants of the operational
semantics. Crucially, these predicates all share the same form, which only constrains variable
definitions that strictly dominate the current program counter. Because Vminus is such a stripped-
down language, the relevant lemmas are relatively straightforward to establish; Chapter 8 shows
how to scale the proof technique to the full Vellvm model of LLVM to verify the mem2reg pass.
Instances of this idea are found in the literature (see, for example, Menon, et al. [48]), and
related proof techniques have been recently used in the CompCertSSA [14] project, but as we
explain in Chapter 10, our results are more general: we provide proof techniques applicable to
many SSA-based optimizations and transformations.
The remainder of this section first proves safety (which in this context simply amounts to
showing that all variables are well-scoped). We then show how to generalize the safety invariant to
a form that is useful for proving program transformations correct and demonstrate its applicability
to a number of standard optimizations.
We mechanically verified all the claims in this chapter for Vminus in Coq.1
1Annotated Coq source available at http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~stevez/vellvm/.
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5.1 Safety of Vminus
There are two ways that a Vminus program might get stuck. First, it might try to jump to an
undefined label, but this property is ruled out statically by WF BR. Second, it might try to access
a variable whose value is not defined in δ. We can prove that this second case never happens by
establishing the following safety theorem:
Theorem 9 (Safety). If ` f and f ` (l.0, /0)−→∗ σ, then σ is not stuck. (Here, l is the entry block
of function f and /0 denotes an empty mapping for identifiers.)
The proof takes the standard form using preservation and progress lemmas with the invariant
for frames shown below:
pc ∈ f ∀r.(r ∈ sdom f (pc) =⇒∃v.δ[r] = bvc)
f ` (pc,δ) WF FR
This is similar to the predicate used in prior work for verifying the type safety of an SSA-based
language [48]. The invariant WF FR shows that a frame (pc,δ) is well-formed if every definition
that strictly dominates pc is defined in δ. The initial program state satisfies this invariant trivially:
Lemma 10 (Initial State). If ` f then f ` (l.0, /0), where l is the entry block of f .
The preservation and progress lemmas are straightforward—but note that they crucially rely on
the interplay between the invariant on δ “projected” onto sdom f (pc) (Lemma 8), and the PHI and
NONPHI rules of the static semantics.
Lemma 11 (Preservation). If ` f , f ` σ and f ` σ−→ σ′, then f ` σ′.
Proof. The proof proceeds by case analysis on the reduction rule. At the E BOP case: Let σ =
(l.i,δ), σ′ = (l.(i+1),δ{v3/r}), and f [l.i] = br := val1 bopval2c. The conclusion holds by Lemma 8.
At the E BR case: Let σ = (l. t,δ), σ′ = (l3.0,δ′), f [l. t] = bbrval l1 l2c, Jφ3Klδ = bδ′c, and φ3 is
from the block l3. Suppose r ∈ sdom f (l3.0). If r ∈ defs(φ3), then r must be defined in δ′ by the
definition of TUlφ3 . Otherwise, if ¬r ∈ defs(φ3), the conclusion holds by Lemma 8.
Lemma 12 (Progress). If ` f , f ` σ, then σ is not stuck.
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Proof. Assume that σ = (pc,δ). Since pc ∈ f , then ∃insn. f [pc] = binsnc. The proof proceeds by
case analysis on the insn. At the case when insn = r := val1 bopval2: The rule NONPHI ensures
that the definitions of the variables used by val1 and val2 strictly dominate pc, so are in sdom f (pc).
Therefore, σ is not stuck.
At the case when insn = brval l1 l2: First, the rule NONPHI ensures that the val must use
the variable defined in sdom f (pc). Therefore, JvalKδ = bvc. Suppose l3 = (v?l1 : l2), f [l3] =
b(l3 φ3 c3 tmn3)c, and insn is at block lj. The rule PHI ensures that the definitions of the j-th
incoming variables dominate lj. t, so are in sdom f (pc). Therefore, Jφ3Klδ = bδ′c.
At the case when insn = ret typval: The program terminates.
5.2 Generalizing Safety to Other SSA Invariants
The main feature of the preservation proof, Lemma 11, is that the constraint on sdom f (pc) is an
invariant of the operational semantics. But—and this is a key observation—we can parameterize
rule WF FR by a predicate P, which is an arbitrary proposition about functions and frames:
σ.pc ∈ f P f (σ| f )
f ,P ` σ
GWF FR
Here, σ| f is (σ.pc,(σ.δ)|(sdom f (σ.pc))) and we write (δ|R)[r] = bvc iff r ∈ R and δ[r] = bvc and
observe that dom(δ|R) = R. These restrictions say that we don’t need to consider all variables:
Intuitively, because SSA invariants are based on dominance properties, when reasoning about a
program state we need consider only the variable definitions that strictly dominate the program
counter in a given state.
For proving Theorem 9, we instantiated P to be:
Psafety , λ f .λσ.∀r.r ∈ dom(σ.δ) =⇒∃v.(σ.δ)[r] = bvc
For safety, it is enough to show that each variable in the domination set is well defined at its
use. To prove program transformations correct, we instantiate P with a different predicate, Psem,
that relates the syntactic definition of a variable with the semantic value:
λ f .λσ.∀r. f [r] = brhsc=⇒ (σ.δ)[r] 6= none =⇒ (σ.δ)[r] = JrhsK(σ.δ)
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This predicate ensures that if a definition r is in scope, the value of r must equal to the value to
which the right-hand-side of its definition evaluates.
Just as we proved preservation for Psafety, we can also prove preservation for Psem (using
Lemma 4):
Theorem 13. If ` f and f ,Psem ` σ and f ` σ−→ σ′, then f ,Psem ` σ′.
Proof (sketch): Suppose a command r := rhs is defined at a program counter pc1. The NONPHI
rule ensures that all variables used by rhs must strictly dominate pc1. Because strict domination
relation is acyclic (Lemma 4), at any program counter pc2 that pc1 strictly dominates, the program
cannot define r and any variable used by rhs. In other words, the values of r and rhs are not changed
between pc1 and pc2. The result follows immediately.
Theorem 13 shows the dynamic property of an SSA variable: the value of r is invariant in any
execution path that its definition strictly dominates. As we show next, Theorem 13 can be used to
justify the correctness of many SSA-based transformations. Instantiating P with other predicates
can also be useful—Section 8.3 shows how.
5.3 The Correctness of SSA-based Transformations
Consider again the example code transformation from Figure 2.2. It, and many other SSA-based
optimizations, can be defined by using a combination of simpler transformations: deleting an unused
definition, substituting a constant expression for a variable, substituting one variable by another,
or moving variable definitions. Each such transformation is subject to the SSA constraints—for
example, we can’t move a definition later than one of its uses—and each transformation preserves
the SSA invariants. By pipelining these basic transformations, we can define more sophisticated
SSA-based program transformations whose correctness is established by the composition of the
proofs for the basic transformations.
In general, an SSA-based transformation from f to f ′ is correct if it preserves both well-
formedness and program behavior.
1. Preserving well-formedness: if ` f , then ` f ′.
2. Program refinement: if ` f , then f ⊇ f ′.
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Here, behaviors of a Vminus program include whether the program terminates, and the returned
value if it does (see Section 2.1).
Each of the basic transformations mentioned above can be proved correct by using Theorem 13.
Here we present only the correctness of variable substitution (although we proved correct all the
mentioned transformations in our Coq development). Chapter 8 shows how to extend the transfor-
mations to implement memory-aware optimizations in the full Vellvm.
Variable substitution Consider the step of the program transformation from Figure 2.2 in which
the use of r8 on the last line is replaced by r4 (this is valid only after hoisting the definition of
r4 so that it is in scope). This transformation is correct because both r4 and r8 denote the same
value, and the definition of r4 (after hoisting) strictly dominates the definition of r8. In Figure 2.2,
it is enough to do redundant variable elimination—this optimization lets us replace one variable
by another when their definitions are syntactically equal; other optimizations, such as global value
numbering, allow a coarser, more semantic, equality to be used. Proving them correct follows the
same basic pattern as the proof shown below.
Definition 5 (Redundant Variable). In a function f , a variable r2 is redundant with variable r1 if:
1. f definesr1 @ pc1, f definesr2 @ pc2 and f |= pc1 pc2
2. f [pc1] = bc1c, f [pc1] = bc2c and c1 and c2 have syntactically equal right-hand-sides.
We would like to prove that eliminating a redundant variable is correct, and therefore must relate
a program f with f{r1/r2}, in which all uses of r2 have been substituted by r1.
Since substitution does not change the control-flow graph, it preserves the domination relations.
Lemma 14.
1. f |= l1= l2 ⇐⇒ f{r2/r1} |= l1= l2
2. f |= pc1 pc2 ⇐⇒ f{r2/r1} |= pc1 pc2
Applying Lemma 2 and Lemma 14, we have:
Lemma 15 ( f{r2/r1} preserves well-formedness). Suppose that in f , r1 is redundant with r2. If
` f , then ` f{r2/r1}.
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Let two program states simulate each other if they have the same local state δ and program
counter. We assume that the original program and its transformation have the same initial state.
Lemma 16. If ` f , r2 is redundant with r1 in f , and (pc,δ) is a reachable state, then
1. If val is an operand of a non-phinode at program counter pc, then ∃v.JvalKδ =
bvc∧ Jval{r1/r2}Kδ = bvc.
2. If pc is li. t, and li is a previous block of a block with φ-nodes φj
j, then ∃δ′.Jφj jKliδ = bδ′c∧Jφj{r1/r2} jKliδ = bδ′c.
Proof (sketch): The proof makes crucial use of Theorem 13. For example, to show part 1 for
a source instruction r := rhs (with transformed instruction r := rhs{r1/r2}) located at program
counter pc, we reason like this: if r2 is an operand used by rhs, then r2 ∈ sdom f (pc) and by
Theorem 13, property Psem, implies that δ[r2] = Jrhs2Kδ for some rhs2 defining r2. Since r1 is used
as an operand in rhs{r1/r2}, similar reasoning shows that δ[r1] = Jrhs1Kδ, but since r2 is redundant
with r1, we have rhs2 = rhs1, and the result follows immediately.
Using Lemma 16, we can easily show the lock-step simulation lemma, which completes the
correctness proof:
Lemma 17. If ` f , r2 is redundant with r1 in f , f{r1/r2} ` σ1 −→ σ2, then f ` σ1 −→ σ2.
This chapter showed the proof techniques for reasoning about SSA-based program properties
and transformations of Vminus. To demonstrate that our proof techniques can be used for practical
compiler optimizations, the following chapters present how to verify program transformations of
the full LLVM IR.
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Chapter 6
The formalism of the LLVM IR
Vminus provides a convenient minimal setting in which to study SSA-based optimizations, but it
omits many features necessary in a real intermediate representation. To demonstrate that our proof
techniques can be used for practical compiler optimizations, we next show how to apply them to the
LLVM IR.
The Vellvm infrastructure provides a Coq implementation of the full LLVM intermediate lan-
guage and defines (several) operational semantics along with some useful metatheory about the
memory model. Vellvm’s formalization is based on the LLVM release version 3.0, and the syntax
and semantics are intended to model the behavior as described in the LLVM Language Reference 1,
although we also used the LLVM IR reference interpreter and the x86 backend to inform our design.
The chapter describes the syntax and semantics of the LLVM IR, emphasizing those features that
are either unique to the LLVM or have non-trivial implications for the formalization.
6.1 The Syntax
Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 show the abstract syntax for the subset of the LLVM IR formalized in
Vellvm. The metavariable id ranges over LLVM identifiers, written %X, %T, %a, %b, etc., which
are used to name local types and temporary variables, and @a, @b, @main, etc., which name global
values and functions.
1See http://llvm.org/releases/3.0/docs/LangRef.html
43
Floats fp : : = float | double
Types typ : : = isz | fp | void | typ∗ | [sz × typ ] | { typj j } | typ typ j j | id | opaque
Bin ops bop : : = add | sub | mul | udiv | sdiv | urem | srem | shl | lshr | ashr
| and | or | xor
Float ops fbop : : = fadd | fsub | fmul | fdiv | frem
Extension eop : : = zext | sext | fpext
Trunc ops trop : : = truncint | truncfp
Cast ops cop : : = fptoui | fptosi | uitofp | sitofp | ptrtoint | inttoptr | bitcast
Conditions cond : : = eq | ne | ugt | uge | ult | ule | sgt | sge | slt | sle
Float conditions fcond : : = oeq | ogt | oge | olt | ole | one | ord | fueq | fugt | fuge | · · ·
Constants cnst : : = isz Int
| fpFloat
| typ∗ id
| (typ∗)null
| typzeroinitializer
| typ[cnstj j ]
| {cnstj j }
| typundef
| bopcnst1 cnst2
| fbopcnst1 cnst2
| tropcnst to typ
| eopcnst to typ
| copcnst to typ
| getelementptrcnst cst j j
| selectcnst0 cnst1 cnst2
| icmpcond cnst1 cnst2
| fcmp fcond cnst1 cnst2
| extractvaluecnst cnstj j
| insertvaluecnst cnst′ cnstj j
Figure 6.1: Syntax for LLVM (1).
Each source file is a module mod (which is also called a program P) that includes data layout
information layout (which defines sizes and alignments for types; see below), named types, and a
list of prods that can be function declarations, function definitions, and global variables. Figure 6.3
shows a small example of LLVM syntax (its meaning is described in more detail in Section 6.3).
Every LLVM expression has a type, which can easily be determined from type annotations that
provide sufficient information to check an LLVM program for type compatibility. The LLVM IR is
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Modules mod,P : : = layout namedt prod
Layouts layout : : = bigendian | littleendian | ptrszalign0 align1 | intszalign0 align1
| floatszalign0 align1 | aggrszalign0 align1 | stackszalign0 align1
Products prod : : = id = global typconst align | define typ id(arg){b} | declare typ id(arg)
Values val : : = id | cnst
Blocks b : : = lφctmn
φ nodes φ : : = id = phi typ [valj, lj]
j
Tmns tmn : : = brval l1 l2
| br l
| ret typval
| retvoid
| unreachable
Commands c : : = id = bop( intsz)val1 val2
| id = fbopfpval1 val2
| store typval1 val2 align
| id = load(typ∗)val1 align
| id = malloc typval align
| free( typ∗)val
| id = alloca typval align
| id = trop typ1 val to typ2
| id = eoptyp1 val to typ2
| id = coptyp1 val to typ2
| id = icmpcond typval1 val2
| id = selectval0 typval1 val2
| id = fcmp fcond fpval1 val2
| option id = call typ0 val0 param
| id = getelementptr( typ∗)val val j j
| id = extractvalue typval cnstj j
| id = insertvalue typval typ′ val′ cnstj j
Figure 6.2: Syntax for LLVM (2).
not a type-safe language, however, because its type system allows arbitrary casts, calling functions
with incorrect signatures, accessing invalid memory, etc. The LLVM type system ensures only that
the size of a runtime value in a well-formed program is compatible with the type of the value—a
well-formed program can still be stuck (see Section 6.4.3).
Types typ include arbitrary bit-width integers i8, i16, i32, etc., or, more generally, isz where
sz is a natural number. Types also include float, void, pointers typ∗, arrays [sz × typ ] that have
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%ST = type { i10 , [10 x i8*] }
define %ST* @foo(i8* %ptr) {
entry:
%p = malloc %ST, i32 1
%r = getelementptr %ST* %p, i32 0, i32 0
store i10 648, %r ; decomposes as 136, 2
%s = getelementptr %ST* %p, i32 0, i32 1, i32 0
store i8* %ptr, %s
ret %ST* %p
}
Here, %p is a pointer to a single-element array of structures of type %ST. Pointer %r indexes into the
first component of the first element in the array, and has type i10*, as used by the subsequent store,
which writes the 10-bit value 648. Pointer %s has type i8** and points to the first element of the
nested array in the same structure.
Figure 6.3: An example use of LLVM’s memory operations.
a statically-known size sz. Anonymous structure types { typj j } contain a list of types. Functions
typ typ j
j have a return type, and a list of argument types. Here, typj
j denotes a list of typ compo-
nents; we use similar notation for other lists throughout the paper. Finally, types can be named by
identifiers id which is useful to define recursive types.
The sizes and alignments for types, and endianness are defined in layout. For example.
intszalign0 align1 dictates that values with type isz are align0-byte aligned when they are within an
aggregate and when used as an argument, and align1-byte aligned when emitted as a global.
Operations in the LLVM IR compute with values val, which are either identifiers id naming
temporaries, or constants cnst computed from statically-known data, using the compile-time analogs
of the commands described below. Constants include base values (i.e., integers or floats of a
given bit width), and zero-values of a given type, as well as structures and arrays built from other
constants.
To account for uninitialized variables and to allow for various program optimizations, the LLVM
IR also supports a type-indexed undef constant. Semantically, undef stands for a set of possible
bit patterns, and LLVM compilers are free to pick convenient values for each occurrence of undef
to enable aggressive optimizations or program transformations. As described in Section 6.4, the
presence of undef makes the LLVM operational semantics inherently nondeterministic.
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All code in the LLVM IR resides in top-level functions, whose bodies are composed of block
bs. As in classic compiler representations, a basic block consists of a labeled entry point l, a series
of φ nodes, a list of commands, and a terminator instruction. As is usual in SSA representations,
the φ nodes join together values from a list of predecessor blocks of the control-flow graph—each
φ node takes a list of (value, label) pairs that indicates the value chosen when control transfers from
a predecessor block with the associated label. Block terminators (br and ret) branch to another
block or return (possibly with a value) from the current function. Terminators also include the
unreachable marker, indicating that control should never reach that point in the program.
The core of the LLVM instruction set is its commands (c), which include the usual suite of
binary arithmetic operations (bop—e.g., add, lshr, etc.), memory accessors (load, store), heap
operations (malloc and free), stack allocation (alloca), conversion operations among integers, floats
and pointers (eop, trop, and cop), comparison over integers (icmp and select), and calls (call).
Note that a call site is allowed to ignore the return value of a function call. Finally, getelementptr
computes pointer offsets into structured datatypes based on their types; it provides a platform- and
layout-independent way of performing array indexing, struct field access, and pointer arithmetic.
Omitted details This dissertation does not discuss all of the LLVM IR features that the Vellvm
Coq development supports. Most of these features are uninteresting technically but necessary to
support real LLVM code: (1) The LLVM IR provides aggregate data operations (extractvalue and
insertvalue) for projecting and updating the elements of structures and arrays; (2) the LLVM switch
instruction, which is used to compile jump tables, is lowered to the normal branch instructions that
Vellvm supports by a LLVM-supported pre-processing step.
Unsupported features Some features of LLVM are not supported by Vellvm. First, the LLVM
provides intrinsic functions for extending LLVM or to represent functions that have well known
names and semantics and are required to follow certain restrictions—for example, functions from
standard C libraries, handling variable argument functions, etc. Second, the LLVM functions,
global variables, and parameters can be decorated with attributes that denote linkage type, calling
conventions, data representation, etc. which provide more information to compiler transformations
than what the LLVM type system provides. Vellvm does not statically check the well-formedness
of these attributes, although they should be obeyed by any valid program transformation. Third,
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Vellvm does not support the invoke and unwind instructions, which are used to implement exception
handling, nor does it support variable argument functions. Forth, Vellvm does not support vector
types, which allow for multiple primitive data values to be computed in parallel using a single
instruction.
6.2 The Static Semantics
Following the LLVM IR specification, Vellvm requires that every LLVM program satisfy certain
invariants to be considered well formed: every variable in a function is well-typed, well-scoped,
and assigned exactly once. At a minimum, any reasonable LLVM transformation must preserve
these invariants; together they imply that the program is in SSA form [28].
All the components in the LLVM IR are annotated with types, so the typechecking algorithm is
straightforward and determined only by local information.The only subtlety is that types themselves
must be well formed. All typs except void and function types are considered to be first class,
meaning that values of these types can be passed as arguments to functions. A set of first-class
type definitions is well formed if there are no degenerate cycles in their definitions (i.e., every cycle
through the definitions is broken by a pointer type). This property ensures that the physical sizes of
such typs are positive (non-zero), finite, and known statically.
The LLVM IR has two syntactic scopes—a global scope and a function scope—and does not
have nested local scopes. In the global scope, all named types, global variables and functions have
different names, and are defined mutually. In the scope of a function fid in module mod, all the
global identifiers in mod, the names of arguments, locally defined variables and block labels in the
function fid must be unique, which enforces the single-assignment part of the SSA property.
The set of blocks making up a function constitute a control-flow graph with a well-defined entry
point. All instructions in the function must satisfy the SSA scoping invariant with respect to the
control-flow graph: the instruction defining an identifier must dominate all the instructions that use
it. These well-formedness constraints must hold only of blocks that are reachable from a func-
tion’s entry point—unreachable code may contain ill-typed and ill-scoped instructions. Chapter 5
described the proof techniques we have developed for formalizing the invariant in the context of
Vminus. We applied the idea in the full Vellvm.
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6.3 A Memory Model for the LLVM IR
6.3.1 Rationale
Vminus does not include memory operations because the LLVM IR does not represent memory in
SSA. However, understanding the semantics of LLVM’s memory operations is crucial for reasoning
about LLVM programs. LLVM developers make many assumptions about the “legal” behaviors of
such LLVM code, and they informally use those assumptions to justify the correctness of program
transformations.
There are many properties expected of a reasonable implementation of the LLVM memory
operations (especially in the absence of errors). For example, we can reasonably assume that
the load instruction does not affect which memory addresses are allocated, or that different calls
to malloc do not inappropriately reuse memory locations. Unfortunately, the LLVM Language
Reference Manual does not enumerate all such properties, which should hold of any “reasonable”
memory implementation.
On the other hand, details about the particular memory management implementation can be
observed in the behavior of LLVM programs (e.g., you can print a pointer after casting it to an
integer). For this reason, and also to address error conditions, the LLVM specification intentionally
leaves some behaviors undefined. Examples include: loading from an unallocated address; loading
with improper alignment; loading from properly allocated but uninitialized memory; and loading
from properly initialized memory but with an incompatible type.
Because of the dependence on a concrete implementation of memory operations, which can be
platform specific, there are many possible memory models for the LLVM. One of the challenges
we encountered in formalizing the LLVM was finding a point in the design space that accurately
reflects the intent of the LLVM documentation while still providing a useful basis for reasoning
about LLVM programs.
In this dissertation we adopt a memory model that is based on the one implemented for Comp-
Cert [42]. This model allows Vellvm to accurately implement the LLVM IR and, in particular,
detect the kind of errors mentioned above while simultaneously justifying many of the “reason-
able” assumptions that LLVM programmers make. The nondeterministic operational semantics
presented in Section 6.4 takes advantage of this precision to account for much of the LLVM’s
under-specification.
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Although Vellvm’s design is intended to faithfully capture the LLVM specification, it is also
partly motivated by pragmatism: building on CompCert’s existing memory model allowed us to
re-use a significant amount of their Coq infrastructure. A benefit of this choice is that our memory
model is compatible with CompCert’s memory model (i.e., our memory model implements the
CompCert Memory signature).
This Vellvm memory model inherits some features from the CompCert implementation: it is
single threaded (in this paper we consider only single-threaded programs); it assumes that pointers
are 32-bits wide, and 4-byte aligned; and it assumes that the memory is infinite. Unlike CompCert,
Vellvm’s model must also deal with arbitrary bit-width integers, padding, and alignment constraints
that are given by layout annotations in the LLVM program, as described next.
6.3.2 LLVM memory commands
The LLVM supports several commands for working with heap-allocated data structures:
• malloc and alloca allocate array-structured regions of memory. They take a type parameter,
which determines layout and padding of the elements of the region, and an integral size that
specifies the number of elements; they return a pointer to the newly allocated region.
• free deallocates the memory region associated with a given pointer (which should have been
created by malloc). Memory allocated by alloca is implicitly freed upon return from the
function in which alloca was invoked.
• load and store respectively read and write LLVM values to memory. They take type param-
eters that govern the expected layout of the data being read/written.
• getelementptr indexes into a structured data type by computing an offset pointer from an-
other given pointer based on its type and a list of indices that describe a path into the datatype.
Figure 6.3 gives a small example program that uses these operations. Importantly, the type an-
notations on these operations can be any first-class type, which includes arbitrary bit-width integers,
floating point values, pointers, and aggregated types—arrays and structures. The LLVM IR seman-
tics treats memory as though it is dynamically typed: the sizes, layout, and alignment, of a value
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This figure shows (part of) a memory state. Blocks less than 40 were allocated; the next fresh block
to allocate is 40. Block 5 is deallocated, and thus marked invalid to access; fresh blocks (≥ 40)
are also invalid. Invalid memory blocks are gray, and valid memory blocks that are accessible are
white. Block 11 contains data with structure type {i10, [10 x i8*]} but it might be read (due
to physical subtyping) at the type {i10, i8*}. This type is flattened into two byte-sized memory
cells for the i10 field, two uninitialized padding cells to adjust alignment, and four pointer memory
cells for the first element of the array of 32-bit i8* pointers. Here, that pointer points to the 24th
memory cell of block 39. Block 39 contains an uninitialized i32 integer represented by four muninit
cells followed by a pointer that points to the 32nd memory cell of block 11.
Figure 6.4: Vellvm’s byte-oriented memory model.
read via a load instruction must be consistent with that of the data that was stored at that address,
otherwise the result is undefined.
This approach leads to a memory model structured in two parts: (1) a low-level byte-oriented
representation that stores values of basic (non-aggregated) types along with enough information to
indicate physical size, alignment, and whether or not the data is a pointer, and (2) an encoding that
flattens LLVM-level structured data with first-class types into a sequence of basic values, computing
appropriate padding and alignment from the type. The next two subsections describe these two parts
in turn.
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6.3.3 The byte-oriented representation
The byte-oriented representation is composed of blocks of memory cells. Each cell is a byte-sized
quantity that describes the smallest chunk of contents that a memory operation can access. Cells
come in several flavors:
Memory cellsmc : : = mb(sz,byte) | mptr(blk,ofs, idx) | muninit
The memory cell mb(sz,byte) represents a byte-sized chunk of numeric data, where the LLVM-
level bit-width of the integer is given by sz and whose contents is byte. For example, an integer with
bit-width 32 is represented by four mb cells, each with size parameter 32. An integer with bit-width
that is not divisible by 8 is encoded by the minimal number of bytes that can store the integer, i.e.,
an integer with bit-width 10 is encoded by two bytes, each with size parameter ten (see Figure 6.4).
Floating point values are encoded similarly.
Memory addresses are represented as a block identifier blk and an offset ofs within that block;
the cell mptr(blk,ofs, idx) is a byte-sized chunk of such a pointer where idx is an index identifying
which byte the chunk corresponds to. Because Vellvm’s implementation assumes 32-bit pointers,
four such cells are needed to encode one LLVM-pointer, as shown in Figure 6.4. Loading a pointer
succeeds only if the 4 bytes loaded are sequentially indexed from 0 to 3.
The last kind of cell is muninit, which represents uninitialized memory, layout padding, and
bogus values that result from undefined computations (such as might arise from an arithmetic
overflow).
Given this definition of memory cells, a memory state M = (N,B,C) includes the following
components: N is the next fresh block to allocate, B maps a valid block identifier to the size of the
block; C maps a block identifier and an offset within the block to a memory cell (if the location is
valid). Initially, N is 1; B and C are empty. Figure 6.4 gives a concrete example of such a memory
state for the program in Figure 6.3.
There are four basic operations over this byte-oriented memory state: alloc, mfree, mload, and
mstore. alloc allocates a fresh memory block N with a given size, increments N, fills the newly
allocated memory cells with muninit. mfree simply removes the deallocated block from B, and its
contents from C. Note that the memory model does not recycle block identifiers deallocated by a
mfree operation, because this model assumes that a memory is of infinite size.
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The mstore operation is responsible for breaking non-byte sized basic values into chunks and
updating the appropriate memory locations. Basic values are integers (with their bit-widths), floats,
addresses, and padding.
Basic values bv : : = Int sz | Float | blk.ofs | padsz
Basic types btyp : : = isz | fp | typ∗
mload is a partial function that attempts to read a value from a memory location. It is annotated by
a basic type, and ensures compatibility between memory cells at the address it reads from and the
given type. For example, memory cells for an integer with bit-width sz cannot be accessed as an
integer type with a different bit-width; a sequence of bytes can be accessed as floating point values
if they can be decoded as a floating point value; pointers stored in memory can only be accessed
by pointer types. If an access is type incompatible, mload returns padsz, which is an “error”
value representing an arbitrary bit pattern with the bitwidth sz of the type being loaded. mload is
undefined in the case that the memory address is not part of a valid allocation block.
6.3.4 The LLVM flattened values and memory accesses
LLVM’s structured data is flattened to lists of basic values that indicate its physical representation:
Flattened Valuesv : : = bv | bv,v
A constant cnst is flattened into a list of basic values according to it annotated type. If the cnst
is already of basic type, it flattens into the singleton list. Values of array type [sz × typ ] are first
flattened element-wise according to the representation given by typ and then padded by uninitialized
values to match typ’s alignment requirements as determined by the module’s layout descriptor. The
resulting list is then concatenated to obtain the appropriate flattened value. The case when a cnst is
a structure type is similar.
The LLVM load instruction works by first flattening its type annotation typ into a list of basic
types, and mapping mload across the list; it then merges the returned basic values into the final
LLVM value. Storing an LLVM value to memory works by first flattening to a list of basic values
and mapping mstore over the result.
This scheme induces a notion of dynamically-checked physical subtyping: it is permitted to read
a structured value at a different type from the one at which it was written, so long as the basic types
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LLVMND
∈
LLVMInterp ≈ LLVMD & LLVM∗DFn & LLVM∗DB
Figure 6.5: Relations between different operational semantics in Vellvm.
they flatten into agree. For non-structured data types such as integers, Vellvm’s implementation is
conservative—for example, reading an integer with bit width two from the second byte of a 10-bit
wide integer yields undef because the results are, in general, platform specific. Because of this
dynamically-checked, physical subtyping, pointer-to-pointer casts can be treated as the identity.
Similar ideas arise in other formalizations of low-level language semantics [54, 55].
The LLVM malloc and free operations are defined by alloc and mfree in a straightforward
manner. As the LLVM IR does not explicitly distinguish the heap and stack and function calls
are implementation-specific, the memory model defines the same semantics for stack allocation
(alloca) and heap allocation (malloc) — both of them allocate memory blocks in memory. However,
the operational semantics (described next) maintains a list of blocks allocated by alloca for each
function, and it deallocates them on return.
6.4 Operational Semantics
Vellvm provides several related operational semantics for the LLVM IR, as summarized in Fig-
ure 6.5. The most general is LLVMND, a small-step, nondeterministic evaluation relation given by
rules of the form config ` S S′ (see Figure 6.6). This section first motivates the need for nonde-
terminism in understanding the LLVM semantics and then illustrates LLVMND by explaining some
of its rules. Next, we introduce several equivalent deterministic refinements of LLVMND—LLVMD,
LLVM∗DB, and LLVM
∗
DFn—each of which has different uses, as described in Section 6.4.4. All of
these operational semantics must handle various error conditions, which manifest as partiality in
the rules. Section 6.4.3 describes these error conditions, and relates them to the static semantics of
Section 6.2.
Vellvm’s operational rules are specified as transitions between machine states S of the form
M,Σ, where M is the memory and Σ is a stack of frames. A frame keeps track of the current
function fid and block label l, as well as the “continuation” sequence of commands c to execute next
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ending with the block terminator tmn. The map ∆ tracks bindings for the local variables (which
are not stored in M), and the list α keeps track of which memory blocks were created by the alloca
instruction so that they can be marked as invalid when the function call returns.
Value sets V : : = {v |Φ(v)} Locals ∆ : : = id 7→ V
Allocas α : : = [] | blk,α Frames Σ : : = fid, l,c, tmn,∆,α
Call stacks Σ : : = [] | Σ,Σ Program states S : : = M,Σ
6.4.1 Nondeterminism in the LLVM operational semantics
There are several sources of nondeterminism in the LLVM semantics: the undef value, which stands
for an arbitrary (and ephemeral) bit pattern of a given type, various memory errors, such as reading
from an uninitialized location. Unlike the “fatal” errors, which are modeled by stuck states (see
Section 6.4.3), we choose to model these behaviors nondeterministically because they correspond
to choices that would be resolved by running the program with a concrete memory implementation.
Moreover, the LLVM optimization passes use the flexibility granted by this underspecificity to
justify aggressive optimizations.
Nondeterminism shows up in two ways in the LLVMND semantics. First, stack frames bind local
variables to sets of values V; second, the  relation itself may relate one state to many possible
successors. The semantics teases apart these two kinds of nondeterminism because of the way that
the undef value interacts with memory operations, as illustrated by the examples below.
From the LLVM Language Reference Manual: “Undefined values indicate to the compiler that
the program is well defined no matter what value is used, giving the compiler more freedom to
optimize.” Semantically, LLVMND treats undef as the set of all values of a given type. For some
motivating examples, consider the following code fragments:
(a) %z = xor i8 undef undef
(b) %x = add i8 0 undef
%z = xor i8 %x %x
(c) %z = or i8 undef 1
(d) br undef %l1 %l2
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The value computed for %z in example (a) is the set of all 8-bit integers: because each occurrence
of undef could take on any bit pattern, the set of possible results obtained by xoring them still
includes all 8-bit integers. Perhaps surprisingly, example (b) computes the same set of values for %z:
one might reason that no matter which value is chosen for undef, the result of xoring %x with itself
would always be 0, and therefore %z should always be 0. However, while that answer is compatible
with the LLVM language reference (and hence allowed by the nondeterministic semantics), it is
also safe to replace code fragment (b) with %z = undef. The reason is that the LLVM IR adopts
a liberal substitution principle: because %x = undef would be a legitimate replacement for first
assignment in (b), it is allowed to substitute undef for %x throughout, which reduces the assignment
to %z to the same code as in (a).
Example (c) shows why the semantics needs arbitrary sets of values. Here, %z evaluates to the
set of odd 8-bit integers, which is the result of oring 1 with each element of the set {0, . . . ,255}.
This code snippet could therefore not safely be replaced by %z = undef; however it could be
optimized to %z = 1 (or any other odd 8-bit integer).
Example (d) illustrates the interaction between the set-semantics for local values and the nonde-
terminism of the relation. The control state of the machine holds definite information, so when a
branch occurs, there may be multiple successor states. Similarly, we choose to model memory cells
as holding definite values, so when writing a set to memory, there is one successor state for each
possible value that could be written. As an example of that interaction, consider the following ex-
ample program, which was posted to the LLVMdev mailing list [5], that reads from an uninitialized
memory location:
%buf = alloca i32
%val = load i32* %buf
store i32 10, i32* %buf
ret %val
The LLVM mem2reg pass optimizes this program to program (a) below; though according to
the LLVM semantics, it would also be admissible to replace this program with option (b) (perhaps
to expose yet more optimizations):
(a) ret i32 10 (b) ret i32 undef
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6.4.2 Nondeterministic operational semantics of the SSA form
The LLVMND semantics we have developed for Vellvm (and the others described below) is param-
eterized by a configuration, which is a triple of a module containing the code, a (partial) map g
that gives the values of global constants, and a function pointer table θ that is a (partial) map from
values to function identifiers. The globals and function pointer maps are initialized from the module
definition when the machine is started.
Fun tables θ : : = v 7→ id Globals g : : = id 7→ v Configurations config : : = mod,g,θ
The LLVMND rules relate machine states to machine states, where a machine state takes the form
of a memory M (from Section 6.3) and a stack of evaluation frames. The frames keep track of the
(sets of) values bound to locally-allocated temporaries and which instructions are currently being
evaluated. Figure 6.6 shows a selection of evaluation rules from the development.
Most of the commands of the LLVM have straight-forward interpretation: the arithmetic, logic,
and data manipulation instructions are all unsurprising—the evalND function computes a set of flat-
tened values from the global state, the local state, and an LLVM val, looking up the meanings of
variables in the local state as needed; similarly, evalbopND implements binary operations, com-
puting the result set by combining all possible pairs drawn from its input sets. LLVMND’s malloc
behaves as described in Section 6.3, while load uses the memory model’s ability to detect ill-typed
and uninitialized reads and, in the case of such errors, yields undef as the result. Function calls push
a new stack frame whose initial local bindings are computed from the function parameters. The α
component of the stack frame keeps track of which blocks of memory are created by the alloca in-
struction (see rule NDS ALLOCA); these are freed when the function returns (rule NDS RET). As
discussed in Section 4.1, the computephinodesND function in the operational semantics, as shown,
for example, in rule NDS BR TRUE implements “parallel assignment”.
6.4.3 Partiality, preservation, and progress
Throughout the rules the “lift” notation f (x) = bvc indicates that a partial function f is defined on
x with value v. As seen by the frequent uses of lifting, both the nondeterministic and deterministic
semantics are partial—the program may get stuck.
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Some of this partiality is related to well-formedness of the SSA program. For example,
evalND(g,∆,%x) is undefined if %x is not bound in ∆. These kinds of errors are ruled out by the
static well-formedness constraints imposed by the LLVM IR (Section 6.2).
In other cases, we have chosen to use partiality in the operational semantics to model certain
failure modes for which the LLVM specification says that the behavior of the program is undefined.
These include: (1) attempting to free memory via a pointer not returned from malloc or that has
already been deallocated, (2) allocating a negative amount of memory, (3) calling load or store on
a pointer with bad alignment or a deallocated address, (4) trying to call a non-function pointer, or
(5) trying to execute the unreachable command. We model these events by stuck states because
they correspond to fatal errors that will occur in any reasonable realization of the LLVM IR by
translation to a target platform. Each of these errors is precisely characterized by a predicate over
the machine state (e.g., BadFree(config,S)), and the “allowed” stuck states are defined to be the
disjunction of these predicates:
Stuck(config,S) = BadFree(config,S)
∨ BadLoad(config,S)
∨ . . .
∨ Unreachable(config,S)
To see that the well-formedness properties of the static semantics rule out all but these known
error configurations, we prove the usual preservation and progress theorems for the LLVMND se-
mantics.
Theorem 18 (Preservation for LLVMND). If (config, S) is well formed and config ` S S′, then
(config, S′) is well formed.
Here, well-formedness includes the static scoping, typing properties, and SSA invariants from
Section 6.2 for the LLVM code, but also requires that the local mappings ∆ present in all frames of
the call stack must be inhabited—each binding contains at least one value v—and that each defined
variable that dominates the current continuation is in ∆’s domain.
That defined variables dominate their uses in the current continuation follows Lemma 11 with
considering the context of the full LLVM IR. To show that the ∆ bindings are inhabited after the step,
we prove that (1) non-undef values V are singletons; (2) undefined values from constants typundef
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contain all possible values of first class types typ; (3) undefined values from loading uninitialized
memory or incompatible physical data contain at least paddings indicating errors; (4) evaluation of
non-deterministic values by evalbopND returns non-empty sets of values given non-empty inputs.
Theorem 19 (Progress for LLVMND). If the pair (config, S) is well formed, then either S has
terminated successfully or Stuck(config,S) or there exists S’ such that config ` S S′.
This theorem holds because in a well-formed machine state, evalND always returns a non-empty
value set V; moreover jump targets and internal functions are always present.
6.4.4 Deterministic refinements
Although the LLVMND semantics is useful for reasoning about the validity of LLVM program
transformations, Vellvm provides a LLVMD, a deterministic, small-step refinement, along with two
large-step operational semantics LLVM∗DFn and LLVM
∗
DB.
These different deterministic semantics are useful for several reasons: (1) they provide the basis
for testing LLVM programs with a concrete implementation of memory (see the discussion about
Vellvm’s extracted interpreter in the next Section), (2) proving that LLVMD is an instance of the
LLVMND and relating the small-step rules to the large-step ones provides validation of all of the
semantics (i.e., we found bugs in Vellvm by formalizing multiple semantics and trying to prove
that they are related), and (3) the small- and large-step semantics have different applications when
reasoning about LLVM program transformations.
Unlike LLVMND, the frames for these semantics map identifiers to single values, not sets,
and the operational rules call deterministic variants of the nondeterministic counterparts (e.g., eval
instead of evalND). To resolve the nondeterminism from undef and faulty memory operations, these
semantics fix a concrete interpretation as follows:
• undef is treated as a zeroinitializer
• Reading uninitialized memory returns zeroinitializer
These choices yield unrealistic behaviors compared to what one might expect from running
a LLVM program against a C-style runtime system, but the cases where this semantics differs
correspond to unsafe programs. There are still many programs, namely those compiled to LLVM
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from type-safe languages, whose behaviors under this semantics should agree with their realizations
on target platforms. Despite these differences from LLVMND, LLVMD also has the preservation and
progress properties.
Big-step semantics Vellvm also provides big-step operational semantics LLVM∗DFn, which evalu-
ates a function call as one large step, and LLVM∗DB, which evaluates each sub-block—i.e., the code
between two function calls—as one large step. Big-step semantics are useful because compiler
optimizations often transform multiple instructions or blocks within a function in one pass. Such
transformations do not preserve the small-step semantics, making it hard to create simulations that
establish correctness properties.
As a simple application of the large-step semantics, consider trying to prove the correctness of a
transformation that re-orders program statements that do not depend on one another. For example,
the following two programs result in the same states if we consider their execution as one big-step,
although their intermediate states do not match in terms of the small-step semantics.
(a) %x = add i32 %a, %b (b) %y = load i32* %p
%y = load i32* %p %x = add i32 %a, %b
The proof of this claim in Vellvm uses the LLVM∗DB rules to hide the details about the intermedi-
ate states. To handle memory effects, we use a simulation relation that uses symbolic evaluation [52]
to define the equivalence of two memory states. The memory contents are defined abstractly in terms
of the program operations by recording the sequence of writes. Using this technique, we defined
a simple translation validator to check whether the semantics of two programs are equivalent with
respect to such re-orderings execution. For each pair of functions, the validator ensures that their
control-flow graphs match, and that all corresponding sub-blocks are equivalent in terms of their
symbolic evaluation. This approach is similar to the translation validation used in prior work for
verifying instruction scheduling optimizations [68].
Although this is a simple application of Vellvm’s large-step semantics, proving correctness of
other program transformations such as dead expression elimination and constant propagation follow
a similar pattern—the difference is that, rather than checking that two memories are syntactically
equivalent according to the symbolic evaluation, we must check them with respect to a more se-
mantic notion of equivalence [52].
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Relationships among the semantics Figure 6.5 illustrates how these various operational seman-
tics relate to one another. Vellvm provides proofs that LLVM∗DB simulates LLVM
∗
DFn and that
LLVM∗DFn simulates LLVMD. In these proofs, simulation is taken to mean that the machine states
are syntactically identical at corresponding points during evaluation. For example, the state at a
function call of a program running on the LLVM∗DFn semantics matches the corresponding state at
the function call reached in LLVMD. Note that in the deterministic setting, one-direction simulation
implies bisimulation [42]. Moreover, LLVMD is a refinement instance of the nondeterministic
LLVMND semantics.
These relations are useful because the large-step semantics induce different proof styles than the
small-step semantics: in particular, the induction principles obtained from the large step semantics
allow one to gloss over insignificant details of the small step semantics.
Omitted details The operational semantics supports external function calls by assuming that their
behavior is specified by axioms; the implementation applies these axioms to transition program
states upon calling external functions.
6.5 Extracting an Interpreter
To test Vellvm’s operational semantics for the LLVM IR, we used Coq’s code extraction facilities
to obtain an interpreter for executing the LLVM distribution’s regression test suite. Extracting such
an interpreter is one of the main motivations for developing a deterministic semantics, because the
evaluation under the nondeterministic semantics cannot be directly compared against actual runs of
LLVM IR programs.
Unfortunately, the small-step deterministic semantics LLVMD is defined relationally in the
logical fragment of Coq, which is convenient for proofs, but can not be used to extract code.
Therefore, Vellvm provides yet another operational semantics, LLVMInterp, which is a deterministic
functional interpreter implemented in the computational fragment of Coq. LLVMInterp is proved to
be bisimilar to LLVMD, so we can port results between the two semantics.
Although one could run this extracted interpreter directly, doing so is not efficient. First, integers
with arbitrary bit-width are inductively defined in Coq. This yields easy proof principles, but does
not give an efficient runtime representation; floating point operations are defined axiomatically.
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To remedy these problems, at extraction we realize Vellvm’s integer and floating point values by
efficient C++ libraries that are a standard part of the LLVM distribution. Second, the memory model
implementation of Vellvm maintains memory blocks and their associated metadata as functional
lists, and it converts between byte-list and value representations at each memory access. Using
the extracted data-structures directly incurs tremendous performance overhead, so we replaced the
memory operations of the memory model with native implementations from the C standard library.
A value v in local mappings δ is boxed, and it is represented by a reference to memory that stores
its content.
Our implementation faithfully runs 134 out of the 145 tests from the LLVM regression suite that
lli, the LLVM distribution interpreter, can run. The missing tests cover instructions (like variable
arguments) that are not implemented in Vellvm.
Although replacing the Coq data-structures by native ones weakens the absolute correctness
guarantees one would expect from an extracted interpreter, this exercise is still valuable. In the
course of carrying out this experiment, we found one severe bug in the semantics: the br instruction
inadvertently swapped the true and false branches.
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Chapter 7
Verified SoftBound
To demonstrate the effectiveness of Vellvm, our first application of Vellvm is a verified instance
of SoftBound [50, 51], a previously proposed program transformation that hardens C programs
against spatial memory safety violations (e.g., buffer overflows, array indexing errors, and pointer
arithmetic errors). SoftBound works by first compiling C programs into the LLVM IR and then
instrumenting the program with instructions that propagate and check per-pointer metadata. Soft-
Bound maintains base and bound metadata with each pointer, shadowing loads and stores of pointer
with parallel loads and stores of their associated metadata. This instrumentation ensures that each
pointer dereferenced is within bounds and aborts the program otherwise.
The original SoftBound paper includes a mechanized proof that validates the correctness of
this idea, but it is not complete. In particular, the proof is based on a subset of a C-like language
with only straight-line commands and non-aggregate types, in contrast a SoftBound implementation
needs to consider all of the LLVM IR shown in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2, the memory model, and
the full operational semantics of the LLVM IR. Also the original proof ensures the correctness only
with respect to a specification that the SoftBound instrumentation must implement, but it does not
prove the correctness of the instrumentation pass itself. Moreover, the specification requires that
every temporary must contain metadata, not just pointer temporaries.
Using Vellvm to verify SoftBound This chapter describes how we use Vellvm to formally verify
the correctness of the SoftBound instrumentation pass with respect to the LLVM semantics, demon-
strating that the promised spatial memory safety property is achieved. Moreover, Vellvm allows us
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to extract a verified OCaml implementation of the transformation from Coq. The end result is a
compiler pass that is formally verified to transform a program in the LLVM IR into a program aug-
mented with sufficient checking code such that it will dynamically detect and prevent all spatial
memory safety violations.
SoftBound is a good test case for the Vellvm framework. It is a non-trivial translation pass
that nevertheless only inserts code, thereby making it easier to prove correct. SoftBound’s intended
use is to prevent security vulnerabilities, so bugs in its implementation can potentially have severe
consequences. Also, the existing SoftBound implementation already uses the LLVM.
Modifications to SoftBound since the original paper As described in the original paper, Soft-
Bound modifies function signatures to pass metadata associated with the pointer parameters or
returned pointers. To improve the robustness of the tool, we transitioned to an implementation that
instead passes all pointer metadata on a shadow stack [50]. This has two primary advantages. The
first is that this design simplifies the implementation while simultaneously better supporting indi-
rect function calls (via function pointers) and more robustly handling improperly declared function
prototypes. The second is that it also simplifies the proofs.
7.1 Formalizing SoftBound for the LLVM IR
The SoftBound correctness proof has the following high-level structure:
1. We define a nonstandard operational semantics SBspec for the LLVM IR. This semantics
“builds in” the safety properties that should be enforced by a correct implementation of Soft-
Bound. It uses meta-level datastructures to implement the metadata and meta-level functions
to define the semantics of the bounds checks.
2. We prove that an LLVM program P, when run on the SBspec semantics, has no spatial safety
violations.
3. We define a translation pass SBtrans(−) that instruments the LLVM code to propagate meta-
data.
4. We prove that if SBtrans(P) = bP′c then P’, when run on the LLVMD, simulates P running
on SBspec.
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The SoftBound specification Figure 7.1 gives the program configurations and representative
rules for the SBspec semantics. SBspec behaves the same as the standard semantics except that
it creates, propagates, and checks metadata of pointers in the appropriate instructions.
A program state Sˆ is an extension of the standard program state S for maintaining metadata
md, which is a pair defining the start and end address for a pointers: µ in each function frame Σˆ
maps temporaries of pointer type to their metadata; MM is the shadow heap that stores metadata
for pointers in memory. Note that although the specification is nondeterministic, the metadata is
deterministic. Therefore, a pointer loaded from uninitialized memory space can be undef, but it
cannot have arbitrary md (which might not be valid).
Metadata md : : = [v1,v2) Memory metadata MM : : = blk.o f s 7→ md
Frames Σˆ : : = fid, l, c, tmn, ∆, µ, α Call stacks Σˆ : : = [] | Σˆ, Σˆ
Local metadata µ : : = id 7→ md Program states Sˆ : : = M, MM, Σˆ
SBspec is correct if a program P must either abort on detecting a spatial memory violation with
respect to the SBspec, or preserve the LLVM semantics of the original program P; and, moreover,
P is not stuck by any spatial memory violation in the SBspec (i.e., SBspec must catch all spatial
violations).
Definition 6 (Spatial safety). Accessing a memory location at the offset ofs of a block blk is spatially
safe if blk is less than the next fresh block N, and ofs is within the bounds of blk:
blk < N∧ (B(blk) = bsizec → 0≤ ofs < size)
The legal stuck states of SoftBound—StuckSB(config, Sˆ) include all legal stuck states of
LLVMND (recall Section 6.4.3) except the states that violate spatial safety. The case when B does
not map blk to some size indicates that blk is not valid, and pointers into the blk are dangling—this
indicates a temporal safety error that is not prevented by SoftBound and therefore it is included in
the set of legal stuck states.
Because the program states of a program in the LLVMND semantics are identical to the cor-
responding parts in the SBspec, it is easy to relate them: let Sˆ ⊇◦ S mean that common parts of
the SoftBound state Sˆ and S are identical. Because memory instructions in the SBspec may abort
without accessing memory, the first part of correctness is by a straightforward simulation relation
between states of the two semantics.
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Theorem 20 (SBspec simulates LLVMND). If the state Sˆ⊇◦ S, and config` Sˆ Sˆ′, then there exists
a state S′, such that config ` S S′, and Sˆ′ ⊇◦ S′.
The second part of the correctness is proved by the following preservation and progress theo-
rems.
Theorem 21 (Preservation for SBspec).
If (config, Sˆ) is well formed, and config ` Sˆ Sˆ′, then (config, Sˆ′) is well formed.
Here, SBspec well-formedness strengthens the invariants for LLVMND by requiring that if any id
defined in ∆ is of pointer type, then µ contains its metadata and a spatial safety invariant: all bounds
in µs of function frames and MM must be memory ranges within which all memory addresses are
spatially safe.
The interesting part is proving that the spatial safety invariant is preserved. It holds initially,
because a program’s initial frame stack is empty, and we assume that MM is also empty. The other
cases depend on the rules in Figure 7.1.
The rule SB MALLOC, which allocates the number v of elements with typ at a memory block
blk, updates the metadata of id with the start address that is the beginning of blk, and the end address
that is at the offset blk.(sizeo f typ × v) in the same block. LLVM’s memory model ensures that the
range of memory is valid.
The rule SB LOAD reads from a pointer val with runtime data v, finds the md of the pointer,
and ensures that v is within the md via checkbounds. If the val is an identifier, findbounds
simply returns the identifier’s metadata from µ, which must be a spatial safe memory range. If
val is a constant of pointer type, findbounds returns bounds as the following. For global pointers,
findbounds returns bounds derived from their types because globals must be allocated before a
program starts. For pointers converted from some constant integers by inttoptr, it conservatively
returns the bounds [null,null) to indicate a potentially invalid memory range. For a pointer cnst1
derived from an other constant pointer cnst2 by bitcase or getelementptr, findbounds returns the
same bound of cnst2 for cnst1. Note that {|v′|} denotes conversion from a deterministic value to a
nondeterministic value.
If the load reads a pointer-typed value v from memory, the rule finds its metadata in MM and
updates the local metadata mapping µ. If MM does not contain any metadata indexed by v, that
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Figure 7.2: Simulation relations of the SoftBound pass
means the pointer being loaded was not stored with valid bounds, so findbounds returns [null,null)
to ensure the spatial safety invariant. Similarly, the rule SB STORE checks whether the address to be
stored to is in bounds and, if storing a pointer, updates MM accordingly. SoftBound disallows
dereferencing a pointer that was converted from an integer, even if that integer was originally
obtained from a valid pointer. Following the same design choice, findbounds returns [null,null)
for pointers cast from integers. checkbounds fails when a program accesses such pointers.
Theorem 22 (Progress for SBspec). If Sˆ1 is well-formed, then either Sˆ1 is a final state, or Sˆ1 is a
legal stuck state, or there exists a Sˆ2 such that config ` Sˆ1 Sˆ2.
This theorem holds because all the bounds in a well-formed SBspec state give memory ranges
that are spatially safe, if checkbounds succeeds, the memory access must be spatially safe.
The correctness of the SoftBound instrumentation Given SBspec, we designed an instrumen-
tation pass in Coq. For each function of an original program, the pass implements µ by generating
two fresh temporaries for every temporary of pointer type to record its bounds. For manipulating
metadata stored in MM, the pass axiomatizes a set of interfaces that manage a disjoint metadata
space with specifications for their behaviors.
Figure 7.2 pictorially shows the simulation relations '◦ between an original program P in the
semantics of SBspec and its transformed program P′ in the LLVM semantics. First, because P′ needs
additional memory space to store metadata, we need a mapping mi that maps each allocated memory
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block in M to a memory block in M′ without overlap, but allows M′ to have additional blocks for
metadata, as shown in dashed boxes. Note that we assume the two programs initialize globals
identically. Second, basic values are related in terms of the mapping between blocks: pointers are
related if they refer to corresponding memory locations; other basic values are related if they are
same. Two values are related if they are of the same length and the corresponding basic values are
related.
Using the value simulations, '◦ defines a simulation for memory and stack frames. Given two
related memory locations blk.ofs and blk′.ofs′, their contents in M and M′ must be related; if MM
maps blk.ofs to the bound [v1,v2), then the additional metadata space in M′ must store v′1 and v
′
2
that relate to v1 and v2 for the location blk′.ofs′. For each pair of corresponding frames in the two
stacks, ∆ and ∆′ must store related values for the same temporary; if µ maps a temporary id to the
bound [v1,v2), then ∆′ must store the related bound in the fresh temporaries for the id.
Theorem 23. Given a state sˆ1 of P with configuration config and a state s′1 of P′ with configuration
config′, if sˆ1 '◦ s′1, and config ` sˆ1 −→ sˆ2, then there exists a state s′2, such that config′ ` s′1 −→∗ s′2,
sˆ2 '◦ s′2.
Here, config ` sˆ1 −→ sˆ2 is a deterministic SBspec that, as in Section 6.4, is an instance of the
non-deterministic SBspec.
The correctness of SoftBound
Theorem 24 (SoftBound is correct). Let SBtrans(P) = bP′c denote that the SoftBound pass instru-
ments a well-formed program P to be P′. A SoftBound instrumented program P′ either aborts on
detecting spatial memory violations or preserves the LLVM semantics of the original program P. P′
is not stuck by any spatial memory violation.
7.2 Extracted Verified Implementation of SoftBound
The above formalism not only shows that the SoftBound transformation enforces the promised
safety properties, but the Vellvm framework allows us to extract a translator directly from the Coq
code, resulting in a verified implementation of the SoftBound transformation. The extracted imple-
mentation uses the same underlying shadowspace implementation and wrapped external functions
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Figure 7.3: Execution time overhead of the extracted and the C++ version of SoftBound
as the non-extracted SoftBound transformation written in C++. The only aspect not handled by the
extracted transformation is initializing the metadata for pointers in the global segment that are non-
NULL initialized (i.e., they point to another variable in the global segment). Without initialization,
valid programs can be incorrectly rejected as erroneous. Thus, we reuse the code from the C++
implementation of the SoftBound to properly initialize these variables.
Effectiveness To measure the effectiveness of the extracted implementation of SoftBound versus
the C++ implementation, we tested both implementations on the same programs. To test whether
the implementations detect spatial memory safety violations, we used 1809 test cases from the
NIST Juliet test suite of C/C++ codes [53]. We chose the test cases which exercised the buffer
overflows on both the heap and stack. Both implementations of SoftBound correctly detected all the
buffer overflows without any false violations. We also confirmed that both implementations properly
detected the buffer overflow in the go SPEC95 benchmark. Finally, the extracted implementation is
robust enough to successfully transform and execute (without false violations) several applications
selected from the SPEC95, SPEC2000, and SPEC2006 suites (around 110K lines of C code in total).
Performance overheads Unlike the C++ implementation of SoftBound that removes some ob-
viously redundant checks, the extracted implementation of SoftBound performs no SoftBound-
specific optimizations. In both cases, the same suite of standard LLVM optimizations are applied
post-transformation to optimize the code to reduce the overhead of the instrumentation. To deter-
71
mine the performance impact on the resulting program, Figure ?? reports the execution time over-
heads (lower is better) of extracted SoftBound (leftmost bar of each benchmark) and the C++ imple-
mentation (rightmost bar of each benchmark) for various benchmarks from SPEC95, SPEC2000 and
SPEC2006. Because of the check elimination optimization performed by the C++ implementation,
the code is slightly faster, but overall the extracted implementation provides similar performance.
Bugs found in the original SoftBound implementation In the course of formalizing the Soft-
Bound transformation, we discovered two implementation bugs in the original C++ implementation
of SoftBound. First, when one of the incoming values of a φ node with pointer type is an undef,
undef was propagated as its base and bound. Subsequent compiler transformations may instantiate
the undefined base and bound with defined values that allow the checkbounds to succeed, which
would lead to memory violation. Second, the base and bound of constant pointer (typ∗)null was set
to be (typ∗)null and (typ∗)null+ sizeof (typ), allowing dereferences of null or pointers pointing to
an offset from null. Either of these bugs could have resulted in faulty checking and thus expose the
program to the spatial violations that SoftBound was designed to prevent. These bugs underscore
the importance of a formally verified and extracted implementation to avoid such bugs.
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Chapter 8
Verified SSA Construction for LLVM
Chapter 5 described the proof techniques we have developed for verifying SSA-based program
transformations in the context of Vminus. This chapter demonstrates that these proof techniques
can be used for practical compiler optimizations in Vellvm: verifying the most performance-critical
optimization pass in LLVM’s compilation strategy—the mem2reg pass.
8.1 The mem2reg Optimization Pass
LLVM provides a large suite of optimization passes, including aggressive dead code elimination
(ADCE), global value numbering (GVN), partial redundancy elimination (PRE), and sparse condi-
tional constant propagation (SCCP) among others. Figure 2.3 shows the tool chain of the LLVM
compiler. Each transformation pass consumes and produces code in this SSA form, and they typi-
cally have the flavor of the code transformations described above in Chapter 5.
A critical piece of LLVM’s compilation strategy is the mem2reg pass, which takes code that is
“trivially” in SSA form and converts it into a minimal, pruned SSA program [62]. This strategy
simplifies LLVM’s many front ends by moving work in to mem2reg. An SSA form is “minimal”
if each φ is placed only at the dominance frontier of the definitions of the φ node’s incoming
variables [28]. A minimal SSA form is “pruned” if it contains only live φ nodes [62]. This pass
enables many subsequent optimizations (and, in particular, backend optimizations such as register
allocation) to work effectively.
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Figure 8.1: The tool chain of the LLVM compiler
Figure 8.2 demonstrates the importance of the mem2reg pass for LLVM’s generated code per-
formance. In our experiments, running only the mem2reg pass yields a 81% speedup (on aver-
age) compared to LLVM without any optimizations; doing the full suite of -O1 level optimizations
(which includes mem2reg) yields a speedup of 102%, which means that mem2reg alone captures all
but %12 of the benefit of the -O1 level optimizations. Comparison with -O3 optimizations yields
similar results. These observations make mem2reg an obvious target for our verification efforts.
The “trivial” SSA form is generated directly by compiler front ends, and it uses the alloca
instruction to allocate stack space for every source-program local variable and temporary needed.
In this form, an LLVM SSA variable is used either only locally to access those stack slots, in
which case the variable is never live across two basic blocks, or it is a reference to the stack slot,
whose lifetime corresponds to the source-level variable’s scope. These constraints mean that no
φ instructions are needed—it is extremely straightforward for a front end to generate code in this
form.
As an example, consider this C program (which is a running example through this chapter):
int i = 0;
while (i<=100) i++;
return i;
The “trivial” SSA form that might be produced by the frontend of a compiler is shown in the
left-most column of Figure 8.4 and Figure 8.5. The r0 := allocaint instruction on the first line
allocates space for the source variable i, and r0 is a reference from which local load and store
instructions access i’s contents.
The mem2reg pass converts promotable uses of stack-allocated variables to SSA temporaries.
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Figure 8.2: Normalized execution time improvement of the LLVM’s mem2reg, LLVM’s O1, and
LLVM’s O3 optimizations over the LLVM baseline with optimizations disabled. For comparison,
GCC-O3’s speedup over the same baseline is also shown.
Definition 7 (Promotable allocations). An allocation r is promotable in f , written promotable( f ,r),
if r := alloca typ is in the entry block of f , and r does not escape (r is not stored into memory;
∀insn ∈ f , insnusesr =⇒ insn is a store or load).
An alloca’ed variable like r0 is considered to be promotable if it is created in the entry block
of function f and it doesn’t escape—i.e., its value is never written to memory or passed as an
argument to a function call. The mem2reg pass identifies promotable stack allocations and then
replaces them by temporary variables in SSA form. It does this by placing φ nodes, substituting each
variable defined by a load with the previous value stored into the stack slot, and then eliminating
the memory operations (which are now dead). The right-most column of Figure 8.5 shows the
resulting pruned SSA program for this example. The mem2reg algorithm can also be viewed as a
restricted version of a transformation that considers a general register promotion problem by using
sophisticated alias analysis and partial redundant elimination of loads and stores to make more
locations promotable [44].
Algorithm 8.3 shows the algorithm that the LLVM mem2reg pass uses, and Figure 8.4 gives
an example of the algorithm. The code on the left most of Figure 8.4 is the output of a front-
end that compiles mutable variables of the non-SSA form to stack allocations, and is in the SSA
form trivially. The first step of the mem2reg algorithm is to find all stack allocations (stored at
Allocas) that can be promoted to temporaries by the function FINDPROMOTABLEALLOCAS that
simply checks if the front-end follows the contract with LLVM—only the allocations in the entry
block (returned by ENTRYOF) are candidates; stack allocations for mutable variables can only be
used by store and load, and not written into memory. For example, r0 is promotable. Note that
promoting such allocations to temporaries is definitely safe for programs that do not have undefined
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function RENAME( f , l, Vmap)
blφctmnc= f [l]
for all φ ∈ φ do
if φ is placed for an r ∈ A then
Vmap[r] = GETID(φ)
end if
end for
for all c ∈ c do
if c = r′ := load( typ∗)r and r ∈ A then
REPLACEALLUSES( f , r′, Vmap[ r ])
REMOVE( f , c)
else if c = store typval r and r ∈ A then
Vmap[r] = val
REMOVE( f , c)
end if
end for
for all successor l′ of l do
bl′ φ′ c′ tmn′c= f [l′]
for all φ′ ∈ φ′ do
if φ′ is placed for promotion then
SUBSTITUTION( f , Vmap, φ′, l)
end if
end for
end for
for all child l′ of l do
RENAME( f , l′, Vmap)
end for
end function
A← /0
function ISPROMOTABLE( f , r)
if r is only used by store and load in f , and
r is not written into memory then
return true
else
return f alse
end if
end function
function FINDPROMOTABLEALLOCAS( f )
for all r := alloca typ ∈ ENTRYOF( f ) do
if ISPROMOTABLE( f , r) then
A← A ∪{r}
end if
end for
end function
function MEM2REG( f )
FINDPROMOTABLEALLOCAS( f )
PHINODESPLACEMENT( f )
RENAME( f , ENTRYOF( f ), INITVMAP())
for all r ∈ A and r is not used do
REMOVE( f , r)
end for
end function
Figure 8.3: The algorithm of mem2reg
behaviors, such as out-of-bound accessing, using dangling pointers, reading from uninitialized
memory locations, etc.; on the other hand, the transformation is also correct for programs that
violate these assumptions, because they can be of any behavior.
After finding all promotable allocations, the mem2reg algorithm applies the variant of the stan-
dard SSA construction. It first inserts minimal number of φ nodes by PHINODESPLACEMENT.
The φ-node placement algorithm avoids computing dominance frontiers explictly by using a data-
structure called DJ-graphs [62], so is very fast in practice. We omitted its detail in the presentation.
The second code in Figure 8.4 is the code after φ nodes placement. In this case, the algorithm only
needs to place r6 = phi [r0, l1][r0, l3] at the beginning of block l2. Note that after the replacement, the
code is not well-formed because r6 is expected to be of type int, while all its coming values are of
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type int∗. The later pass RENAME will incrementally recover the well-formedness, and eventually
makes the final program simulates the behavior of the original program.
The RENAME follows the structure of the classic renaming algorithm [8], but also does redun-
dant memory operation eliminations, and constant propagation in the mean while. The algorithm
follows dominator tree rooted by the entry block—not the flow graph, and also maintains a map
V map in which for each promotable variable r, V map[r] is the its most recently value with respect
to the dominator tree of the function f . Initially, INITVMAP sets the most recently value to be
the default value that alloca assigns for allocated memory; the depth-first-recursion starts from the
entry block.
At each visited block lφctmn, the algorithm first checks if there is any φ placed for a promotable
temporary r. If so, the algorithm takes the temporary defined by the φ as the most recent value for
r in the map V map. Then, for each command c, if c is a load from a promotable temporary r to
r′, then the algorithm replaces all the uses of r′ by the most recent value of r stored in V map, then
remove the c; if c is a store to a promotable temporary r with a value val, then the algorithm sets
val to be the most recent value for r, then removes the c; otherwise, the algorithm does nothing. At
the end, it examines all the successors (in term of the control-flow graph) of l to see if there are any
φ nodes whose operands need to be properly renamed, and then recursively renames all children
blocks (in term of the dominator tree) of l.
After the renaming of block l1, the store store int0r0 in block l1 was removed; because at the
end of block l1 the recent value of r1 is 0 that is from the removed store, in the φ of l2 that is the
successor of l1, the algorithm replaced the r0 corresponding to l1 by 0. The next code in Figure 8.4
shows the depth-first-search-based renaming up to one leaf of the dominator tree when all the blocks
l1, l2 and l3 were renamed. Note that the algorithm does not change the incoming value of the φ
node in block l2 when RENAME visited l2, but changed the r0 of the incoming block l3 to be r4
when RENAME visited the end of the block l3 whose successor is l2. The other observation is that
although the code is well-formed, it does not preserve the meaning of its original program because
the value of r5 is read from the uninitialized location r0, while in the original program r5 should be
100 at the return of the program.
After renaming, the last step of the mem2reg pass is checking if there is any promotable tempo-
raries r which is not used at all, and, therefore, can be safely removed. As shown in the right most
code of Figure 8.4, renaming the block l4 removed the load in block l4, and then the l0 is not used
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any more, and was removed. At this point, the code is not only well-formed, but also preserves the
semantics of the original code by returning the same final result 100.
Proving that mem2reg is correct is nontrivial because it makes significant, non-local changes to
the use of memory locations and temporary variables. Furthermore, the specific mem2reg algorithm
used by LLVM is not directly amenable to the proof techniques developed in Chapter 5—it was not
designed with verification in mind, so it produces intermediate stages that break the SSA invariants
or do not preserve semantics. The next section therefore describes an alternate algorithm that is
more suitable to formalization.
8.2 The vmem2reg Algorithm
This section presents vmem2reg, an SSA algorithm that is structured to lead to a clean formalism
and yet still produce programs with effectiveness similar to the LLVM mem2reg pass. To demon-
strate the main ideas of vmem2reg, this section describes an algorithm that uses straightforward
micro-pass pipelining. Section 8.5 presents a smarter way to “fuse” the micro passes, thereby re-
ducing compilation time. Proving pipeline fusion correct is (by design) independent of the proofs
for the vmem2reg algorithm shown in the section.
At a high level, vmem2reg (whose code is shown in Figure 8.7) traverses all functions of the
program, applying the transformation vmem2reg_fn to each. Figure 8.6 depicts the main loop,
which is an extension of Aycock and Horspool’s SSA construction algorithm [12]. vmem2reg_fn
first iteratively promotes each promotable alloca by adding φ nodes at the beginning of every
block. After processing all promotable allocas, vmem2reg_fn removes redundant φ nodes, and
eventually will produce a program almost in pruned SSA form,1 in a manner similar to previous
algorithms [62].
The transformation that vmem2reg_fn applies to each function is a composition of a series of
micro transformations (LAS, LAA, SAS, DSE, and DAE, shown in Figure 8.6). Each of these
transformations preserves the well-formedness and semantics of its input program; moreover, these
transformations are relatively small and local, and can therefore be reasoned about more easily.
1Technically, fully pruned SSA requires a more aggressive dead-φ-elimination pass that we omit for the sake of
simplicity. Section 8.4 shows that this omission has negligible impact on performance.
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Figure 8.6: Basic structure of vmem2reg_fn
At each iteration of alloca promotion, vmem2reg_fn finds a promotable allocation r. Then φ-
nodes_placement (code shown in Figure 8.7) adds φ nodes for r at the beginning of every block.
To preserve both well-formedness and the original program’s semantics, φ-nodes_placement also
adds additional loads and stores around each inserted φ node. At the end of every block that
has successors, φ-nodes_placement introduces a load from r, and stores the result in a fresh
temporary; at the beginning of every block that has predecessor, φ-nodes_placement first inserts
a fresh φ node whose incoming value from a predecessor l is the value of the additional load we
added at the end of l, then inserts a store to r with the value of the inserted φ node.
The second column in Figure 8.5 shows the result of running the φ-node placement pass starting
from the example program in its trivial SSA form. It is not difficult to check that this code is in
SSA form. Moreover, the output program also preserves the meaning of the original program. For
example, at the end of block l1, the program loads the value stored at r0 into r7. After jumping to
block l2, the value of r7 is stored into the location r0, which should contain the same values as r7.
Therefore, the additional store does not change the status of memory. Although the output program
contains more temporaries than the original program, these temporaries are used only to connect
inserted loads and stores, and so they do not interfere with the original temporaries.
To remove the additional loads and stores introduced by the φ-node placement pass and even-
tually promote allocas to registers, vmem2reg_fn next applies a series of micro program transfor-
mations until no more optimizations can be applied.
First, vmem2reg_fn iteratively does the following transformations (implemented by
eliminate_stld shown in Figure 8.7):
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let vmem2reg prog =
map (function f → vmem2reg_fn f
| prod → prod) prog
let rec eliminate_stld f r =
match find_stld_pair f r with
| LAS (pc2, val2, r1)→ eliminate_stld ( f{val2/r1}− r1) r
| LAA r1 → eliminate_stld ( f{0/r1}− r1) r
| SAS (pc1, pc2)→ eliminate_stld ( f −pc1) r
| NONE→ f
end
let φ-nodes_placement f r =
let define typfid(arg){b} = f in
let (ldnms, phinms) = gen_fresh_names b in
define typfid(arg){(map
(function lφctmn→
let r := alloca typ ∈ f in
let (φ′, c1) = match predecessors_of f l with
| []→ (φ, c)
| lj
j → let rj j = map (find ldnms) lj j in
let r′ = find phinms l in
(r′ = phi typ [rj, lj]
j
::φ, store typr′ r::c)
end in
let c′ = match successors_of f l with
| []→ c1
| _→ let r′ = find ldnms l in c1 ++ [r′ := load( typ∗)r]
end in
lφ′ c′ tmn) b)}
Figure 8.7: The algorithm of vmem2reg
1. LAS (r1, pc2, val2) “Load After Store”: r1 is loaded from r after a store of val2 to r at program
counter pc2, and there are no other stores of r in any path (on the control-flow graph) from
pc2 to r1. In this case, all uses of r2 can be replaced by val2, and the load can be removed.
2. LAA r1 “Load After Alloca”: As above, but the load is from an uninitialized memory location
at r. r1 can be replaced by LLVM’s default memory value, and the load can be removed.
3. SAS (pc1, pc2): The store at program counter pc2 is a store after the store at program counter
pc1. If both of them access r, and there is no load of r in any path (on the control-flow graph)
from pc1 to pc2, then the store at pc1 can be removed.
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At each iteration step of eliminate_stld, the algorithm uses the function find_stld_pair
to identify each of the above cases. Because the φ-node placement pass only adds a store and a load
as the first and the last commands at each block respectively, find_stld_pair only needs to search
for the above cases within blocks. This simplifies both the implementation and proofs. Moreover,
eliminate_stld must terminate because each of its transformations removes one command. The
third column in Figure 8.5 shows the code after eliminate_stld.
Next, the algorithm uses DSE (Dead Store Elimination) and DAE (Dead Alloca Elimination) to
remove the remaining unnecessary stores and allocas.
1. DSE “Dead Store Elimination”: The store of r at program counter pc1 is dead—there is no
load of r, so the store at pc1 can be removed.
2. DAE “Dead Alloca Elimination”: The allocation of r is dead—there is no use of r, so the
alloca can be removed.
The fourth column in Figure 8.5 shows the code after DSE and DAE.
Finally, vmem2reg_fn eliminates unnecessary and dead φ nodes [12]:
1. AH φ-nodes [12]: if any φ is of the form r = phi typ [valj, lj]
j
where all valj are either equal
to r or val, then all uses of r can be replaced by val, and the φ can be removed. Aycock and
Horspool [12] proved that when there is no such φ node in a reducible program, the program
is of the minimal SSA form.
2. D φ-nodes: if there is no any use of the φ node. Removing D φ-nodes produces programs in
nearly pruned SSA form.
The right-most column in Figure 8.5 shows the final output of the algorithm.
8.3 Correctness of vmem2reg
We prove the correctness of vmem2reg using the techniques developed in Chapter 5. At a high level,
the correctness of vmem2reg is the composition of the correctness of each micro transformation
of vmem2reg shown in Figure 8.7. Given a well-formed input program, each shaded box must
produce a well-formed program that preserves the semantics of the input program. Moreover, the
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micro transformations except DAE and φ-nodes elimination must preserve the promotable predicate
(Definition 7), because the correctness of subsequent transformations relies on fact that promotable
allocations aren’t aliased.
Formally, let prog{ f ′/ f} be the substitution of f by f ′ in prog, and let L f M be a micro transfor-
mation of f applied by vmem2reg. L M must satisfy:
1. Preserving promotable: when L M is not DAE or φ-nodes elimination, if promotable( f ,r),
then promotable(L f M,r).
2. Preserving well-formedness: if promotable( f ,r) when L M is φ-nodes placement, and ` prog,
then ` prog{L f M/ f}.
3. Program refinement: if promotable( f ,r) when L M is not φ-nodes elimination, and ` prog,
then prog⊇ prog{L f M/ f}.
8.3.1 Preserving promotability
At the beginning of each iteration for promoting allocas, the algorithm indeed finds promotable
allocations.
Lemma 25. If prog ` f , and vmem2reg_fn finds a promotable allocation r in f , then
promotable( f ,r).
We next show that φ-nodes placement preserves promotable:
Lemma 26. If promotable( f ,r),
then promotable(φ–nodes placement f r,r).
Proof (sketch): The φ-nodes placement pass only inserts instructions. Therefore, if r is in the entry
block of the original function, r is still in the entry block of the transformed one. Moreover, in the
transformed function, the instructions copied from the original function use r in the same way, the
inserted stores only write fresh definitions into memory, and the φ-nodes only use fresh definitions.
Therefore, r is still promotable after φ-nodes placement.
Each of the other micro transformations is composed of one or two more basic transformations:
variable substitution, denoted by f{val/r}, and instruction removal, denoted by filtercheck f where
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filter removes an instruction insn from f if check insn = false. For example, f{val2/r1}− r1 (LAS)
is a substitution followed by a removal in which check insn = false iff insn defines r1; DSE of
a promotable alloca r is a removal in which check insn = false iff insn is a store to r. We first
establish that substitution and removal preserve promotable.
Lemma 27. Suppose promotable( f ,r),
1. If ¬(val1 usesr), then promotable( f{val1/r1},r).
2. If check insn = false⇒ insn does not define r, then promotable(filtercheck f ,r).
We can show that the other micro transformations preserve promotable by checking the pre-
conditions of Lemma 27.
Lemma 28. Suppose promotable( f ,r), r is still promotable after LAS, LAA, SAS or DSE.
The substituted value of LAS is written to memory by a store in f , which cannot use r because r
is promotable in f . The substituted value of LAA is a constant that cannot use r trivially. Moreover,
LAS, LAA, SAS and DSE remove only loads or stores.
8.3.2 Preserving well-formedness
It is sufficient to check the following conditions to show that a function-level transformation pre-
serves well-formedness:
Lemma 29. Suppose
1. L f M and f have the same signature.
2. if prog ` f , then prog{L f M/ f} ` L f M.
If ` prog, then ` prog{L f M/ f}.
It is easy to see that all transformations vmem2reg applies satisfy the first condition. We first
prove that φ-nodes placement preserves the second condition:
Lemma 30. If promotable( f ,r), prog` f and let f ′ be φ–nodes placement f r, then prog{ f ′/ f} `
f ′.
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Proof (sketch): Because φ-nodes placement only inserts fresh definitions, and does not change
control-flow graphs, dominance relations are preserved, and all the instructions from the original
program are still well-formed after the transformation.
To show the well-formedness of the inserted instructions, we need to check that they satisfy the
use/def properties of SSA. The inserted instructions only use r or fresh definitions introduced by
the pass. The well-formedness of f ensures that 1) because r is defined at the entry block, it must
dominate the end of all blocks, and the beginning of all non-entry block; 2) the entry block has not
predecessors. Therefore, the definition of r must strictly dominate all its uses in the inserted load’s
and store’s. The fresh variable used by each inserted store is well-formed because its definition is
by an inserted φ-node in the same block of the store, and must strictly dominate its use in the store.
The incoming variables used by each φ-node is well-formed because they are all defined at the end
of the corresponding incoming blocks.
Similarly, to reason about other transformations, we first establish that substitution and removal
preserve well-formedness.
Lemma 31. Suppose prog ` f ,
1. If f ` val1 r2, f ′ = f{val1/r2}, then prog{ f ′/ f} ` f ′.
2. If check insn= false⇒ f does not use insn, and let f ′ be filtercheck f , then prog{ f ′/ f} ` f ′.
Here, f ` val1 r2 if f ` r1 r2 when val1 usesr1. Note that the first part of Lemma 31 is an
extension of Lemma 15 that only allows substitution on commands. In vmem2reg, LAS and φ-nodes
elimination may transform φ-nodes.
LAS, LAA and φ-nodes elimination remove instructions after substitution. The following auxil-
iary lemma shows that the substituted definition is removable after substitution:
Lemma 32. If f ` val1 r2, then f{val1/r2} does not use r2.
This lemma holds because val1 cannot use r2 by Lemma 7.
Lemma 33. LAS, LAA, SAS, DSE, DAE and φ-nodes elimination preserve well-formedness.
Proof (sketch): Most of the proofs follow Lemma 31 and Lemma 32. The interesting case is
showing that if a φ-node in f is of the form r = phi typ [valj, lj]
j
where all valj are either equal to r
or val′ (which is an AH φ-node [12]), then f ` val′ r.
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It is trivial if val′ is a constant. Suppose val′usesr′, r and r′ are defined in l and l′ respectively.
We first have that r = phi typ [rj, l]
j
is not well-formed. Suppose such a φ-node is well-formed.
The well-formedness of the φ-node ensures that the definition of rj dominates the end of all l’s
predecessors. Therefore, l strictly dominates itself. This is a contradiction by Lemma 7.
By the above result, r′ cannot be r, and l′ cannot be l. Suppose ¬ f ` r′ r. There must exist
a simple path (which has no cycles) from the entry to l that bypasses l′. The simple path must visit
one of l’s predecessors. The predecessor can be neither the one for r because the path is simple, nor
the one for r′ because the path bypasses l′. This is a contradiction.
8.3.3 Program refinement
The proofs of program refinement use the simulation diagrams in Chapter 2 and different instantia-
tions of the GWF FR rule we developed in Chapter 5, where instead of just a function f and frame
σ, we now have a configuration config that also includes the program memory.
config,P ` S , S ∈ config.prog∧Pconfig(S|sdom)
Let σ|sdom be (σ. f , σ.pc, (σ.δ)|(sdom(σ. f )(σ.pc)), σ.α). S|sdom is (S.M,S.σ|sdom). S ∈ prog ensures
that all f and pc in each frame of S are defined in prog.
Promotability As we discussed above, the micro transformations (except φ-nodes elimination)
rely on the promotable property. We start by establishing the invariants related to promotability,
namely that promotable allocations aren’t aliased. This proof is itself an application of GWF FR.
The promotable property ensures that a promotable alloca of a function does not escape—the
function can access the data stored at the allocation, but cannot pass the address of the allocation to
other contexts. Therefore, in the program, the promotable alloca and all other pointers (in memory,
local temporaries and temporaries on the stack) must not alias. Formally, given a promotable
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l1:  r0 := alloca int
     store int 0 r0
     br l2
 store int r6 r0
     r1 := load (int*) r0
 r7 := load (int*) r0
     ...
l1:  r0 := alloca int
     store int 0 r0
     r1 := load (int*) r0
     ...
l2:
 Before φ-nodes placements  After φ-nodes placements
     br l2
 r6 = phi [r7, l1] [r9, l3]l2:
Figure 8.8: The simulation relation for the correctness of φ-node placement
allocation r with type typ∗ in f , we define Pnoalias( f ,r, typ):
λconfig.λS.
∀σ1++σ :: σ2 = S.σ. f = σ. f ∧ JrKσ.δ = bblkc=⇒
∃v.load(S.M, typ,blk) = bvc
∧ ∀blk′.∀typ′.¬load(S.M, typ′,blk′) = bblkc
∧ ∀r′ 6= r =⇒¬Jr′Kσ.δ = bblkc
∧ ∀σ′ ∈ σ1.∀r′.¬Jr′Kσ′.δ = bblkc
The last clause ensures that the alloca and the variables in the callees reachable from f do no alias.
In CompCert, the translation from C#minor to Cminor uses properties (in non-SSA form) similar
to Pnoalias( f ,r, typ) to allocate local variables on stack.
Lemma 34 (Promotable alloca is not aliased). At any reachable program state S, we have that
config,Pnoalias( f ,r, typ) ` S holds.
The invariant holds initially. At all reachable states, the invariant holds because a promotable
allocation cannot be copied to other temporaries, stored to memory, passed into a function, or
returned. Therefore, in a well-defined program no external code can get its location by accessing
other temporaries and memory locations. Importantly, the memory model ensures that from a
consistent initial memory state, all memory blocks in temporaries and memory are allocated—it
is impossible to forge a fresh pointer from an integer.
φ-node placement Figure 8.8 pictorially shows an example (which is the code fragment from
Figure 8.5) of the simulation relation ∼ for proving that the φ-node placement preserves semantics.
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It follows left “option” simulation, because φ-node placement only inserts instructions. We use the
number of unexecuted instructions in the current block as the measure function.
The dashed lines indicate where the two program counters must be synchronized. Although the
pass defines new variables and stores (shaded in Figure 8.8), the variables are only passed to the
new φ nodes, or stored into the promotable allocation; additional stores only update the promotable
allocation with the same value. Therefore, by Lemma 34, ∼ requires that two programs have the
same memory states and the original temporaries match.
Lemma 35.
If f ′ = φ–nodes placement f r, and promotable( f ,r), and ` prog, then prog⊇ prog{ f ′/ f}.
The interesting case is to show that∼ implies a correspondence between stuck states. Lemma 34
ensures that the promotable allocation cannot be dereferenced by operations on other pointers.
Therefore, the inserted memory accesses are always safe.
LAS/LAA We present the proofs for the correctness of LAS. The proofs for the correctness of LAA
is similar. In the code after φ-node placement of Figure 8.5, r7 := load( int∗)r0 is an LAS of
store int0r0. We observe that at any program counter pc between the store and load, the value
stored at r0 must be 0 because alive(pc1,pc2) holds—the store defined at pc1 is not overwritten by
other writes until pc.
To formalize the observation, consider a promotable r with type typ∗ in f . Suppose
find_stld_pair f r = LAS (pc2, val2, r1). Consider the invariant Plas( f ,r, typ,pc2,val2):
λconfig.λS.∀σ ∈ S.σ.
( f = σ. f ∧ Jval2Kσ.δ = bv2c∧ JrKσ.δ = bblkc∧
alive(pc2,σ.pc)) =⇒ load(S.M, typ,blk) = bv2c
Using Lemma 34, we have that:
Lemma 36. If promotable( f ,r), then alive(pc2,r1) and config,Plas( f ,r, typ,pc2,val2) ` S holds
at any reachable state S.
Let two programs relate to each other if they have the same program states. Lemma 36 estab-
lishes that the substitution in LAS is correct. The following lemma shows that removal of unused
instructions preserves semantics in general.
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v1 v2 v3 v4
Memory simulation Frame simulation
v1 v2 v3 v4
v1' v3' v4'
Promotable 
Allocation
DSE
DAE
r1 r2 r3 r4
~ ~ ~
= = = =
Figure 8.9: The simulation relation for DSE and DAE
Lemma 37. If check insn = false ⇒ f does not use insn, and ` prog, then prog ⊇
prog{filtercheck f/ f}.
Lemma 32 shows that the precondition of Lemma 37 holds after the substitution in LAS. Finally,
we have that:
Lemma 38. LAS preserves semantics.
SAS/DSE/DAE Here we discuss only the simulation relations used by the proofs. SAS removes a
store to a promotable allocation overwritten by a following memory write. We consider a memory
simulation that is the identity when the program counter is outside the SAS pair, but ignores the
promotable alloca when the program counter is between the pair. Due to Lemma 34 and the fact
that there is no load between a SAS pair, no temporaries or other memory locations can observe the
value stored at the promotable alloca between the pair.
Figure 8.9 pictorially shows the simulation relations between the program states before and
after DSE or DAE. Shaded memory blocks contain uninitialized values. The program states on the
top are before DSE, where r2 is a temporary that holds the promotable stack allocation and is not
used by any loads. After DSE, the memory values for the promotable allocation may not match
the original program’s corresponding block. However, values in temporaries and all other memory
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locations must be unchanged (by Lemma 34). Note that unmatched memory states only occur after
the promotable allocation; before the allocation, the two memory states should be the same.
The bottom part of Figure 8.9 illustrates the relations between programs before and after DAE.
After DAE, the correspondence between memory blocks of the two programs is not bijective, due
to the removal of the promotable alloca. However, there must exist a mapping ∼ from the output
program’s memory blocks to the original program’s memory blocks. The simulation requires that
all values stored in memory and temporaries (except the promotable allocation) are equal modulo
the mapping ∼.
φ-nodes elimination Consider r = phi typ [valj, lj]
j
(an AH φ-node) where all the valj’s are either
equal to r or some val′. Lemma 33 showed that f ` val′ r. Intuitively, at any pc that both val′ and
r strictly dominate, the values of val′ and r must be the same. Consider the invariant Pah( f ,r,val′):
λconfig.λS.∀σ ∈ S.σ.
f = σ. f ∧ JrKσ.δ = bv1c∧ Jval′Kσ.δ = bv2c=⇒ v1 = v2
Lemma 39. config,Pah( f ,r,val′) ` S holds for any reachable program state S.
Lemma 39 establishes that the substitution in φ-nodes elimination is correct by using the identity
relation. Lemma 32 and Lemma 37 show that removing dead φ-nodes is correct.
8.3.4 The correctness of vmem2reg
Our main result, fully verified in Coq, is the composition of the correctness proofs for all the micro
program transformations:
Theorem 40 (vmem2reg is correct). If f ′ = vmem2reg f and ` prog, then ` prog{ f ′/ f} and
prog⊇ prog{ f ′/ f}.
8.4 Extraction and Performance Evaluation
This section shows that (1) an implementation of vmem2reg extracted directly from the Coq code
can successfully transform actual programs and (2) vmem2reg is almost as effective at optimizing
code as LLVM’s existing unverified implementation in C++.
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Figure 8.10: Execution speedup over LLVM -O0 for both the extracted vmem2reg and the original
mem2reg.
Extracted vmem2reg and experimental methodology We used the Coq extraction mechanism
to obtain a certified implementation of the vmem2reg optimization directly from the Coq sources
(which are 838 lines to specify the algorithm). mem2reg is the first optimization pass applied by
LLVM2, so we tested the efficacy of the extracted implementation on LLVM IR bitcode gener-
ated directly from C source code using the clang compiler. At this stage, the LLVM bitcode is
unoptimized and in “trivial” SSA form (as was discussed earlier). To prevent the impact of this op-
timization pass from being masked by subsequent optimizations, we apply either LLVM’s mem2reg
or the extracted vmem2reg to the unoptimized LLVM bitcode and then immediately invoke the
back-end code generator. We evaluate the performance of the resultant code on a 2.66 GHz Intel
Core 2 processor running benchmarks selected from the SPEC CPU benchmark suite that consist
of over 336k lines of C source code in total.
Figure 8.10 reports the execution time speedups (larger is better) over a LLVM’s-O0 compilation
baseline for various benchmarks. The left bar of each group shows the speedup of the extracted
vmem2reg, which provides an average speedup of 77% over the baseline. The right bar of each
group is the benefit provided by LLVM’s mem2reg, which provides 81% on average; vmem2reg
captures much of the benefit of the LLVM’s mem2reg.
Comparing vmem2reg and mem2reg The vmem2reg pass differs from LLVM’s mem2reg in a few
ways. First, mem2reg promotes allocas used by LLVM’s intrinsics, while vmem2reg conservatively
considers such allocas to potentially escape, and so does not promote them. We determined that
such intrinsics (used by LLVM to annotate the liveness of variable definitions) lead to almost all
the difference in performance in the equake benchmark. Second, although vmem2reg deletes most
2All results reported are for LLVM version 3.0.
92
01
10
100
1000
10000
co
m
pi
la
tio
n 
ov
er
he
ad
 o
ve
r m
em
2r
eg Imperative vmem2reg-O2 Extracted vmem2reg
Extracted vmem2reg-O1 Extracted vmem2reg-O2
go
com
press ijpeg gzip vpr mesa art ammpequake bzip2 parser twolf bzip2 mcfhmmerlibquan
tum lbm milc sjengh264re
f
Geo. 
mean
Figure 8.11: Compilation overhead over LLVM’s original mem2reg.
unused φ-nodes, it does not aggressively remove them and, therefore, does not generate fully pruned
SSA as mem2reg does. However, our results show that this does not impose a significant difference
in performance.
8.5 Optimized vmem2reg
The algorithm of vmem2reg is designed with verification in mind, but it is not efficient in practice:
Figure 8.11 shows that on average vmem2reg is 329 times slower than mem2reg in terms of compile-
time. Such an inefficient design is aimed at streamlining the presentation of the proof techniques
we developed for SSA, such that our research can focus on the crucial part of the problem—
understanding how the proofs should go. This section shows how to design an efficient algorithm
based on vmem2reg, and verify its correctness by extending the proofs for vmem2reg.
The costs of vmem2reg include (1) the pessimistic φ-node insertion algorithm, which introduces
unnecessary φ nodes that lead to more inserted loads and stores to remove; and (2) the pipelined
strategy that requires much more passes than necessary. Given a CFG with N nodes and I instruc-
tions and a promotable alloca, vmem2reg, in the worst case, first inserts N φ nodes and N “Load
After Store” or “Load After Alloca” pairs, then takes N passes to promote the loads and stores, and
finally takes at most N passes to remove AH φ-nodes. Therefore, the complexity of vmem2reg is
O(N ∗ I).
To address the compilation overhead, we implemented two improved algorithms: vmem2reg-O1
and vmem2reg-O2 in terms of the difficulty for reasoning about their correctness. Section 8.5.1
shows vmem2reg-O1 that composes the pipelined elimination passes into a single pass. Sec-
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Figure 8.12: Basic structure of vmem2reg-O1
tion 8.5.3 shows vmem2reg-O2 that improves vmem2reg-O1 by placing the minimal number of
φ nodes at domination frontier, and does not need the AH φ-node elimination pass. Note that
vmem2reg-O1 is verified in Coq, and vmem2reg-O2 is not fully verified in Coq.
8.5.1 O1 Level—Pipeline fusion
Figure 8.12 gives the structure of vmem2reg-O1, which takes one pass to collect all LAS/LAA pairs
and then uses one more pass to remove them. Figure 8.13 presents the composed elimination
algorithm (eliminate_stld). We denote each micro elimination by actions ac.
Actions ac : : = r 7→ val Lists of Actions AC : : = /0 | ac,AC
Here, r 7→ val denotes LAS (r, pc, val) or LAA r with the default memory value val. Note that unlike
vmem2reg the optimized version does not consider SAS because (1) the later DSE removes all dead
stores in one pass (2) vmem2reg-O2 (in Section 8.5.3) needs to traverse all subtrees to find SAS,
which does not lead to a simple algorithm.
To find all initial elimination pairs AC, eliminate_stld traverses the list of blocks of
a function, finds elimination pairs for each block (by find_stld_pairs_block), and then
concatenates them. At each block, we use stld_state to keep track of the search state (by
find_stld_pairs_cmd): STLD_INIT is the initial state; STLD_AL typ records the element type
of the memory value stored at the latest promotable allocation; STLD_ST val records the the value
stored by the latest store to the promotable allocation. When find_stld_pairs_cmd meets a
load, it generates an action in terms of the current state.
Consider the following code in Figure 8.14 with entry l1. The algorithm finds a list of actions:
r4 7→ r3,r5 7→ r4,r2 7→ r1,r3 7→ r2,r6 7→ r3, /0, which forms a tree because SSA ensures acyclicity of
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let find_stld_pair_cmd r acc c: stld_state * Action list =
let (st, AC) = acc in
match c with
| r0 := alloca typ→ if r = r0 then (STLD_AL typ, AC) else acc
| store typval1 r2 → if val1 usesr0 then (STLD_ST val1, AC) else acc
| r0 := load( typ∗)r1 →
if r = r1 then
match st with
| STLD_ST val → (st, (r0 7→ val,AC))
| STLD_AL typ→ (st, (r0 7→ undef typ,AC))
| _→ acc
end
else acc
| _→ acc
end
let find_stld_pairs_block r acc b: stld_state * Action list =
let (_ _ c _) = b in
fold_left (find_stld_pair_cmd r) c acc
let eliminate_stld r f =
let fheader{b} = f in
let AC = flat_map (rev (snd (find_stld_pairs_block r (STLD_INIT, /0)))) b in
AC( f )
Figure 8.13: eliminate stld of vmem2reg-O1
def/use chains. However, we cannot simply take a pass that, for each r 7→ val, replaces all uses of
r by val, and then deletes the definition of r, because the later actions may depend on the former
ones—for example, after applying r4 7→ r3, the action r5 7→ r4 should update to r5 7→ r3; and the
later actions can also affect the former ones—the action r3 7→ r2 will change the first action to be
r4 7→ r2.
To address the problem, we first define the basic operations for actions:
AC[r] = bvalc when r 7→ val ∈ AC AC{val} = val′ when AC[val] = bval′c
AC[val] = · otherwise = val otherwise
AC{val/r} , /0{val/r} = /0
(r0 7→ val0,AC){val/r} = r0 7→ val0{val/r},AC{val/r}
AC(val) , /0(val) = val
(r0 7→ val0,AC)(val) = AC(val{val0/r0})
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Figure 8.15: Basic structure of vmem2reg-O2
where AC[val] finds the value mapped from val; AC{val} returns AC[val] if val is mapped to some
value, otherwise returns val; AC{val/r} substitutes r in all substitutees of AC by val; AC(val)
applies AC to val. Given the basic operations, we define
−→
AC , −→/0 = /0 ←−AC , ←−/0 = /0
−−−−−−−−−→
(r 7→ val,AC) = r 7→ val,−−−−−−−−→(AC{val/r}) ←−−−−−−−−−(r 7→ val,AC) = r 7→ AC(val),←−AC
←→
AC ,
←−−→
AC AC , /˜0= /0
(r 7→ val,AC) = r 7→ AC{val},(AC){AC{val}/r}
Here,
−→
AC applies all the former substitutions to the later actions;
←−
AC applies all the later substitu-
tions to the former actions;
←→
AC composes
−→
AC and
←−
AC, actually equals to the actions that vmem2reg
finds in the pipelined transformation. Figure 8.14 gives the calculation of
←→
AC whose result is a flat-
tened tree with height one. The complexity of
−→
AC and
←−
AC are O((log(N) ∗N2) where the log(N)
is from the absence of efficient, purely functional hash tables. Applying actions to a function costs
O(log(N)∗ I). Note that in practice I is much larger than N.
In fact, we can compute
←→
AC with a faster algorithm AC that processes the initial actions from
right to left, and has the invariant that the trees of its intermediate forest are flattened. Figure 8.14
gives the calculation of AC. The complexity of AC is O((log(N)∗N2), which is the half of←→AC’s.
Figure 8.11 shows that on average vmem2reg-O1 is 22 times slower than mem2reg in terms of
compile-time. The next section shows the correctness of vmem2reg-O1.
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8.5.2 The Correctness of vmem2reg-O1
This section shows the correctness of vmem2reg-O1 (which are fully verified in Coq). The follow-
ing diagram shows the proof structure for the correctness of vmem2reg-O1.
prog0 ⊇ prog1 = prog0{ac0( f0)/ f0} ⊇ prog2 = prog1{ac1( f1)/ f1} ⊇ ·· · ⊇ progn = progn−1{acn−1( fn−1)/ fn−1}
= ?
prog0 ⊇? prog′ = prog0{←→AC( f0)/ f0}
= ?
prog0 ⊇? prog′′ = prog0{AC( f0)/ f0}
Suppose that we optimize the function f0 in a program prog0. Let aci be the elimination action
applied in the i-th step of vmem2reg, fi be the function after the i-th step from f0, and progi be the
function after the i-th step from prog0. By composing Theorem 40, we can prove that progn refines
prog0:
Theorem 41 (Composition of vmem2reg). If ` prog0, then ` progn and prog0 ⊇ progn.
To show that vmem2reg-O1 is correct, we only need to show that prog0{AC( f0)/ f0} equals to
progn. To simplify reasoning, we prove that both of them equal to prog0{←→AC( f0)/ f0}.
The equivalence of prog0{←→AC( f0)/ f0} and progn
Theorem 42. If prog ` f0, then prog0{←→AC( f0)/ f0}= progn. 3
The equivalence of prog0{AC( f0)/ f0} and prog0{←→AC( f0)/ f0}
Figure 8.14 gives the following observations: (1) the SSA form ensures that the original AC is
acyclic, and forms a tree; (2)
←→
AC and AC computed from an acyclic AC form the same “flattened”
tree. To formalize the observations, we first define the following functions and predicates:
1. Paths ρ: connected definitions. For example, < r3,r2,r1,r0 > denotes
r0→ r1→ r2→ r3
2. (r,val) ∈ ρ: an edge from r to val is in a path ρ.
3. < r,ρ>: extend the path ρ at head with r.
4. < ρ,val >: extend the path ρ at tail with val.
3Here, we omit the proofs. See our Coq development.
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5. ρ;ρ′: connect two paths ρ and ρ′.
6. (r,val) ∈ AC: AC maps r to val.
7. ρ⊆ AC: ∀r, if (r,val) ∈ ρ, then (r,val) ∈ AC.
8. AC ` val1
ρ
−→∗ val2: a path < val2,ρ > from val1 to val2 defined in terms of AC—
< val2,ρ>⊆ AC.
9. AC ` val1
ρ
(∗ val2: AC ` val1
ρ
−→∗ val2 and val2 is a root of AC—AC[val2] = ·. We also
define an algorithm for finding roots:
AC ⇑ r : (AC1;r 7→ r1,AC2) ⇑ r = (AC1;AC2) ⇑ r1
= r
10. AC⇒ AC′: ∀r val, if AC ` r
ρ
−→∗ val, then ∃ρ′, AC′ ` r
ρ′
−→∗ val.
11. AC =]AC′: ∀r val, if AC ` r
ρ
(∗ val, then ∃ρ′, AC′ ` r
ρ′
(∗ val.
12. AC[=]AC′: AC =]AC′ and AC′ =]AC.
13. ¬@AC: ∀ρ⊆ AC, ρ is acyclic.
14. ⇑ AC: if AC = AC1;r 7→ val,AC2, then r /∈ codom(AC2).
15. uniqAC: the domain of AC is unique.
16. 2AC: ∀(r1,r2) ∈ AC,¬∃val.(r2,val) ∈ AC.
AC is well-formed
Lemma 43. If prog ` f , f header{b} = f , and AC = flat map (rev (snd (find stld pairs block r
(STLD INIT, /0)))) b, then uniqAC and ¬@AC.
The equivalence of AC and
−→
AC
We first prove the facts about substituting codomains of AC—AC{val/r}, which are useful for
reasoning about
−→
AC.
Lemma 44. If (r,val) ∈ AC and ¬val usesr′, then (r,val) ∈ AC{val′/r′}.
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Lemma 45. If AC ` r
ρ
−→∗ val and r′ /∈ rl < val,ρ >, then AC{val′/r′} ` r
ρ
−→∗ val (Here, rl
denotes removelast.)
Proof (sketch): Because r′ /∈ rl < val,ρ>, all targets of the edges in < val,ρ> do not use r′. By
Lemma 44, we prove that AC{val′/r′} has the same path from r to val.
Lemma 46. If (r′,val′) /∈ AC and (r′,val′) ∈ AC{val/r}, then (r′,r) ∈ AC and val = val′.
Lemma 47. If (r′,r) ∈ AC, then (r′,val) ∈ AC{val/r}.
Lemma 48. If uniqAC, ¬@AC and (r,val) ∈ AC, then AC =]AC{val/r}.
Proof (sketch): Consider AC ` r0
ρ
(∗ val0. If r /∈ rl < val0,ρ >, Lemma 45 concludes. If
r ∈ rl < val0,ρ >, by uniqAC, ¬@AC and that val0 is a root, we can partition < val0,ρ > as
below:
r0
ρ1
−→∗ r′→ r→ val
ρ2
(∗ val0
Here, r /∈ rl < r′,ρ1 > and r /∈< val0,ρ2 >.
Consider the path ρ′:
r0
ρ1
−→∗ r′→ val
ρ2
(∗ val0
By Lemma 47, (r′,val) ∈ AC{val/r}. By Lemma 45, AC{val/r} ` r0
ρ1
−→∗ r′ and AC{val/r} `
val
ρ2
−→∗ val0. This concludes the proofs.
Lemma 49. If uniqAC and (r,val) ∈ AC, then AC{val/r}⇒ AC.
Proof (sketch): Consider AC{val/r} ` r0
ρ′
−→∗ val0. We can partition ρ′ as below:
r0
ρ0
−→∗ r′0→ val′0
ρ1
−→∗ r′1→ val′1 · · ·r′n→ val′n
ρn
−→∗ val0
Here, (r′i,val
′
i) /∈ AC, and < r′i,ρi >⊆ AC when i < n, and < val0,ρn >⊆ AC.
We construct the path ρ:
r0
ρ0
−→∗ r′0→ r→ val
ρ1
−→∗ r′1→ r→ val · · ·r′n→ r→ val
ρn
−→∗ val0
Lemma 46 shows that (r′i,r) ∈ AC and val′i = val. Therefore, AC ` r0
ρ
−→∗ val0.
By Lemma 48 and Lemma 49, we have that:
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Lemma 50. If uniqAC, ¬@AC and (r,val) ∈ AC, then AC{val/r}[=]AC.
By Lemma 49, we have that:
Lemma 51. If uniqAC, (r,val) ∈ AC, and ¬@AC, then ¬@AC{val/r}.
Lemma 52. If ¬val usesr, then r /∈ codom(AC{val/r}).
Lemma 53. If uniqAC, then uniq(AC{val/r}).
We also need the following properties about weakening:
Lemma 54. If AC1⇒ AC2, then AC;AC1⇒ AC;AC2.
Proof. By induction of AC. Consider the inductive case AC = r0 7→ val0,AC′. Consider AC;AC1 `
r
ρ
−→∗ val. Partition < r,ρ> into
r
ρ0
−→∗ r0→ val0
ρ1
−→∗ r0→ val0 · · ·r0→ val0
ρn
−→∗ val
where (r0,val0) /∈< r,ρ0 > and (r0,val0) /∈< val0,ρi > where i > 0.
Consider each AC;AC1 ` vali
ρi
−→∗ val′i . Because (r0,val0) /∈< vali,ρi > and IH, AC′;AC2 `
vali
ρ′i−→∗ val′i . So, AC;AC2 ` vali
ρ′i−→∗ val′i . The proof concludes by ρ′ :
r
ρ′0
−→∗ r0→ val0
ρ′1−→∗ r0→ val0 · · ·r0→ val0
ρ′n
−→∗ val
Lemma 55. If AC1 =]AC2, uniq(AC;AC1) and domAC1 = domAC2, then AC;AC1 =]AC;AC2.
Proof. By induction of AC. Consider the inductive case AC = r0 7→ val0,AC′. Consider AC;AC1 `
r
ρ
(∗ val. Partition < r,ρ> into
r
ρ0
−→∗ r0→ val0
ρ1
−→∗ r0→ val0 · · ·r0→ val0
ρn
(∗ val
where (r0,val0) /∈< r,ρ0 > and (r0,val0) /∈< val0,ρi > where i > 0.
Consider each AC;AC1 ` vali
ρi
−→∗ val′i . Because (r0,val0) /∈< vali,ρi >, AC′;AC1 ` vali
ρi
−→∗
val′i . By uniq(AC;AC1), AC′;AC1 ` vali
ρi
(∗ val′i . By IH, AC′;AC2 ` vali
ρ′i
(∗ val′i . So, AC;AC2 `
vali
ρ′i−→∗ val′i .
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Because val0 is the root of AC;AC1 and domAC1 = domAC2, val0 must also be the root of
AC;AC2.
The proof concludes by ρ′:
r
ρ′0
−→∗ r0→ val0
ρ′1−→∗ r0→ val0 · · ·r0→ val0
ρ′n
(∗ val
By Lemma 55, we have:
Lemma 56. If AC1[=]AC2, uniq(AC;AC1), uniq(AC;AC2) and domAC1 = domAC2, then
AC;AC1[=]AC;AC2.
By Lemma 54, we have:
Lemma 57. If AC2⇒ AC1, then ¬@AC;AC1 ⇒ ¬@AC;AC2.
With the above properties, we prove that AC and
−→
AC are equivalent.
Lemma 58. If uniqAC and ¬@AC, then −→AC[=]AC.
Proof. By induction on the length of AC. The base case is trivial. Consider the case AC = r 7→
val,AC′. We have
−→
AC = r 7→ val,−−−−−−−−−→(AC′{val/r}). By Lemma 50, AC[=]r 7→ val{val/r},AC′{val/r}.
Because of ¬@AC, val{val/r}= val. We conclude by IH and Lemma 56.
The equivalence of AC and
←−
AC
Lemma 59.
1. If ¬@AC, r ∈ dom(AC)∨ r ∈ codom(AC) and AC ⇑ r = val, then AC ` r
ρ
(∗ val.
2. If uniqAC, ¬@AC and AC ` r
ρ
(∗ val, then AC ⇑ r = val.
Lemma 60.
1. AC[r] = bcnstc iff −→AC[r] = bcnstc.
2. AC[r] = · iff −→AC[r] = ·.
Lemma 61. If uniqAC and ¬@AC, then −→AC⇒ AC and ¬@−→AC.
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By Lemma 58, Lemma 60, Lemma 59 and Lemma 61,
Theorem 62. If uniqAC and ¬@AC, then AC ⇑ r =−→AC ⇑ r.
Lemma 63. If r /∈ dom(AC) and r /∈ codom(AC), then r /∈ codom(−→AC).
All elements in
−→
AC are sorted in terms of AC—⇑ −→AC.
Lemma 64. If uniqAC and ¬@AC, then ⇑ −→AC.
Proof (sketch): By induction on the length of AC. Consider the case AC = r 7→ val,AC′ and
−→
AC = r 7→ val,−−−−−−−−−→(AC′{val/r}). By Lemma 51 and Lemma 53, ¬@AC′{val/r} and uniqAC′{val/r}.
Let
−→
AC = AC1;r1 7→ val1,AC2. If (r1,val1) ∈ AC′{val/r}, the proof is by IH—⇑ AC′{val/r}.
Otherwise, if r1 = r and val1 = val, the proof is by Lemma 52 and Lemma 63.
Lemma 65. If uniq(AC1;r1 7→ r2,AC2), then (AC1;r1 7→ r2,AC2)(r1) = AC2(r2).
Lemma 66. If uniq(AC1;r1 7→ r2,AC2) and ⇑ (AC1;r1 7→ r2,AC2), then (AC1;AC2) ⇑ r2 = AC2 ⇑
r2.
Lemma 67. If uniqAC and ⇑ AC, then AC(r) = AC ⇑ r.
Proof (sketch): By induction on the length of AC. It is trivial if AC does not map r. Consider the
case AC = AC1;r 7→ r′,AC2.
AC ⇑ r = (AC1;AC2) ⇑ r′ definition
= AC2 ⇑ r′ By Lemma 66
= AC2(r′) By IH
= AC(r′) By Lemma 65
Theorem 68. If uniqAC and ⇑ AC, then←−AC[r] = AC ⇑ r.
Proof (sketch): It is trivial if AC does not map r. Consider the case AC = AC1;r 7→ r′,AC2.
←−
AC[r] = AC′1;r 7→ (
←−−
AC2(r′)),
←−−
AC2[r] definition
=
←−−
AC2(r′) definition
= AC2 ⇑ r′ By Lemma 67
= (AC1;AC2) ⇑ r′ By Lemma 66
= AC ⇑ r definition
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The equivalence of AC and
←→
AC
Theorem 69. If uniqAC and ¬@AC, then←→AC[r] = AC ⇑ r.
Proof (sketch):
AC ⇑ r = −→AC ⇑ r By Theorem 62
=
←→
AC[r] By Theorem 68 and Lemma 64
The equivalence of AC and AC
Lemma 70. If uniq(AC1;AC) and ¬@(AC1;AC), then ¬@(AC1;AC) and 2AC.
Proof (sketch): To streamline the presentation, we show the proofs separately in the following. We
first show ¬@(AC1;AC).
1. By induction of AC. Consider the case AC = r 7→ val,AC′. By IH, ¬@(AC1;r 7→ val,AC′).
By Lemma 49 and Lemma 57, ¬@(AC1;r 7→ val{val/r},(AC′){val/r}). By ¬@(AC1;AC),
val{val/r}= val, so ¬@(AC1;r 7→ val,(AC′){val/r}).
It is trivial if val is a constant. Suppose val = r′. If (AC′){r′} = r′, it is trivial. If
(AC′){r′}= val′, then (r′,val′) ∈ AC′. By acyclicity, ¬val′usesr. By Lemma 44, (r′,val′) ∈
AC′{r′/r}. By Lemma 49 and Lemma 57, ¬@(AC1;r 7→ r′{val′/r′},(AC′){r′/r}{val′/r′}).
Because 2AC′ (by IH), (AC′){r′/r}{val′/r′} = (AC′){val′/r}. Therefore, ¬@(AC1;r 7→
val′,(AC′){val′/r}).
2. Proving 2AC is equivalent to prove that if ¬@AC and AC[r] = bvalc, then AC[val] = ·.
By induction on AC. Consider the case AC = r 7→ r′,AC′, and AC = r 7→ val′,(AC′){val′/r}
where val′ = (AC′){r′} and (r′,val′) ∈ AC′. By the first part of the proof, ¬@AC.
Suppose AC[r1] = br2c. Case r1 = r and r2 = val′. By acyclicity, ¬val′usesr. By IH,
AC[r2] = ·.
Case r1 6= r. AC[r1] = (AC′){val′/r}[r1] = br2c. Therefore, AC′[r1] = br′2c where r2 =
r′2{val′/r}. By IH, AC′[r′2] = ·, so (AC′){val′/r}[r′2] = ·.
If r′2 6= r, then r2 = r′2 and it is trivial. If r′2 = r, then r2 = val′ and the proof is by IH.
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Lemma 71. If ¬@AC, then AC[=]AC.
Proof (sketch): By induction on AC. Consider the case AC = r 7→ r′,AC′. Let val′ = (AC′){r′}.
By Lemma 70, ¬@(r 7→ r′,AC′). So, (r,val′) ∈ (AC′){r′/r}.
AC = r 7→ val′,AC′{val′/r}
= r 7→ r′{val′/r′},AC′{r′/r}{val′/r′}
= (r 7→ r′,AC′{r′/r}){val′/r′}
[=] (r 7→ r′,AC′{r′/r}) By Lemma 50
= (r 7→ r′,AC′){r′/r} By acyclicity
[=] (r 7→ r′,AC′) By Lemma 50
[=] (r 7→ r′,AC′) By Lemma 56 and IH
By Lemma 71, Lemma 70 and Lemma 59,
Theorem 72. If uniqAC and ¬@AC, then AC[r] = AC ⇑ r.
The equivalence of AC and
←→
AC
By Theorem 72 and Theorem 69,
Theorem 73. If uniqAC and ¬@AC, then AC[r] =←→AC[r].
The correctness of vmem2reg-O1
By Theorem 41, Theorem 73, Lemma 43 and Theorem 42,
Theorem 74 (vmem2reg-O1 is correct). If f ′ = vmem2reg-O1 f and ` prog, then ` prog{ f ′/ f}
and prog⊇ prog{ f ′/ f}.
8.5.3 O2 Level—Minimal φ-nodes Placement
vmem2reg-O1 addresses one kind of compile-time cost by “fusing” micro passes. To address the
other cost—the number of φ-nodes, we implemented vmem2reg-O2 based on vmem2reg-O1, which
is shown in Figure 8.15.
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let find_stld_pairs_dtree r (acc:stld_state * Action list) (dt:DTree)
: stld_state * Action list =
match dt with
| DT_node b dts→ find_stld_pairs_dtrees r (find_stld_pairs_block r acc b) dts
end
with find_stld_pairs_dtrees r (acc:stld_state * Action list) (dts:DTrees)
: stld_state * Action list =
match dts with
| DT_nil→ acc
| DT_cons dt dts’→
let (_, AC) = find_stld_pairs_dtree r acc dt in
find_stld_pairs_dtrees r (fst acc, AC) dts’
end
let eliminate_stld r f =
let dt = construct_dtree f in
let AC = rev (snd (find_stld_pairs_dtree r (STLD_INIT, /0) dt)) in
AC( f )
Figure 8.16: eliminate stld of vmem2reg-O2
vmem2reg-O2 places the minimal number of φ-nodes by the dominance-frontier algorithm im-
plemented in Section 3.5. Our experiments show that on average, the algorithm only introduces 1/8
of the φ-nodes of the pessimistic one and does not need the additional AH φ-node elimination pass.
vmem2reg-O2 does not insert φ-nodes at every block, so LAS/LAA pairs may appear across
blocks. To find them, Figure 8.16 extends the algorithm in Figure 8.13 by depth-first-searching
functions’ dominator trees (which are computed by the algorithm in Section 3.4).
Although vmem2reg-O2 has the same complexity as vmem2reg-O1, Figure 8.11 shows that on
average vmem2reg-O2 is 5.9 times slower than mem2reg in terms of compile-time. To study the
overhead cause by the purely functional programming, we also implemented the C++ version of
vmem2reg-O2. Because it uses constant-time hashtables and does alias-based substitution, the C++
version’s complexity is O(I). In practice, Figure 8.11 shows that its compile-time is 0.63 time of
mem2reg’s because we use a slightly more efficient dominance-frontier calculation [24] and do not
allow intrinsics to use promotable allocations.
The correctness of vmem2reg-O2 is composed of two parts. The first part needs to general-
ize the proofs of vmem2reg that assume that LAS/LAA pairs must be in the same block to allow
LAS/LAA pairs in terms of arbitrary domination relations. The second part can reuse the proofs of
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Record IDFstate := mkIDFst {
IDFwrk : list l;
IDFphi : AVLMap.t unit
}.
Definition IDFstep D DF (st : IDFstate) : AVLMap.t unit + IDFstate :=
let ’(W, Φ) := st in
match W with
| nil => inl Φ
| l0::W ′ => inr (W ′∪ (DF [l0]−D−Φ), Φ∪DF [l0])
end.
Definition IDF D DF :=
PrimIter.iterate _ _ (IDFstep D DF) (D, /0).
Figure 8.17: The algorithm of inserting φ-nodes
vmem2reg-O1 for reasoning about composing micro transformations. The next section shows the
correctness of vmem2reg-O2 (which have not fully been verified in Coq).
8.5.4 The Correctness of vmem2reg-O2
This section shows the correctness of vmem2reg-O2. Note that the proofs are not fully verified in
Coq yet). We first study the algorithms used in vmem2reg-O2 that are omitted by the main part of
the dissertation.
Lemma 75. The dominance frontier computation algorithm in Section 3.5 is correct: the set of
blocks the algorithm calculates for a block l0 equals to l0’s dominance frontier.
Proof. This is equivalent to show that l1 is l0’s dominance frontier iff l1 has a predecessor l2, l0
dominates l2, and l1’s immediate dominator l4 strictly dominates l0. The “if” part is straight-forward.
We present the “only-if” part.
Suppose l2 is l1’s predecessor, l0 dominates l2 and does not strictly dominates l1. Because
dominance relations form a tree, the tree path to l1 and the tree path to l2 must have the same prefix.
Suppose the path of l2 joins l1’s at l3 that strictly dominates l1’s immediate dominator l4. Then,
there must exist a path ρ to l2 that does not go through l4. Otherwise, l4 must strictly dominate l2,
and the tree paths of l1 and l2 must join at l4. However, ρ also reaches l1. This is contradictory to
that l4 strictly dominates l1. Therefore, l4 must be in the same prefix of the two tree paths.
107
l0 cannot dominate l4. Otherwise l0 strictly dominate both l1 and l2. Therefore, l0 must be in the
set of blocks calculated by the algorithm.
Figure 8.17 shows the algorithm that calculates where to insert φ-node [8]: given a promotable
location, all the dominance frontiers of the definitions at the location need φ-nodes. The definitions
of a promotable location include alloca’s of the location, store’s to the location and inserted φ-nodes
for the location. Therefore, the algorithm needs to iteratively insert φ-nodes until all the inserted
φ-nodes also satisfy the above requirement.
The algorithm is implemented by a primitive recursion (PrimIter.iterate) based on a work-
list. IDFstate defines calculation states of each recursion step: IDFwrk is the worklist that records
blocks to process; IDFphi is the blocks that need to insert φ-nodes. Initially, the worklist includes
blocks all with original definitions (which are denoted by D, and only contain alloca’s and store’s)
of a promotable locations. IDFstep, given D and dominance frontiers DF , implements each re-
cursion step. If the current worklist is empty, IDFstep returns the inserted φ-nodes, and stops the
entire recursion. Otherwise, IDFstep picks a block from the worklist, adds the dominance frontiers
that do not have the original and inserted definitions to the worklist, and inserts φ-nodes for the
dominance frontiers.
Lemma 76. IDF (in Figure 8.17) terminates.
Proof. Consider the following measure function:
M(W,Φ) = |W |+N ∗ (N−|Φ|)
Here, || computes the size of a set; N is the number of blocks in the function IDF computes. It is
sufficient to show that
1. M(W,Φ)≥ 0.
2. If IDF D DF (W,Φ) = inr(W ′,Φ′), then M(W,Φ)> M(W ′,Φ′).
The first fact is true because the number of inserted φ-nodes cannot be greater than the number of
all blocks.
Suppose W = l0 :: W ′′, W ′ =W ′′∪ (DF [l0]−D−Φ) and Φ′ =Φ∪DF [l0].
M(W ′,Φ′)−M(W,Φ) = N ∗ (|Φ|− |Φ′|)+ |W ′|− |W |
= N ∗ (|Φ|− |Φ∪DF [l0]|)+ |W ′′∪ (DF [l0]−D−Φ|−1−|W ′′|
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Consider two cases. The first case is when DF [l0] 6⊂Φ.
M(W ′,Φ′)−M(W,Φ) ≤ N ∗ (|Φ|− (|Φ|+1))+ |W ′′∪Φ|−1−|W ′′|
≤ N ∗ (|Φ|− (|Φ|+1))+ |W ′′|+ |Φ|−1−|W ′′|
= −N+ |Φ|−1
< 0
The second case is when DF [l0]⊂Φ.
M(W ′,Φ′)−M(W,Φ) = N ∗ (|Φ|− |Φ|)+ |W ′′|−1−|W ′′|
< 0
Lemma 77. IDF is correct: if IDF D DF (D, /0) = inlΦ, then ∀l0 ∈ D∪Φ, DF [l0]⊂ D∪Φ.
Proof. In general, consider the following invariant:
INV DDF (W,Φ) = ∀l0 ∈ D∪Φ, l0 ∈W ∨DF [l0]⊂ D∪Φ
It is sufficient to show that
If IDF D DF (W,Φ) = inr(W ′,Φ′) and INV DDF (W,Φ), then INV DDF (W ′,Φ′).
It is trivial if W is empty. Consider W = l1 :: W ′′, W ′ = W ′′ ∪ (DF [l1]−D−Φ) and Φ′ =
Φ∪DF [l1]. Suppose l0 ∈ D∪Φ′.
1. l0 ∈ D∪Φ: By assumption, l0 ∈W ∨DF [l0]⊆ D∪Φ.
a) l0 ∈W = l1 :: W ′′:
i. l0 = l1: DF [l1]⊆Φ∪DF [l1] =Φ′ ⊆ D∪Φ′
ii. l0 ∈W ′′: l0 ∈W ′ =W ′′∪ (DF [l1]−D−Φ)
b) DF [l0]⊆ D∪Φ: DF [l0]⊆ D∪ (Φ∪DF [l1]) = D∪Φ′:
2. l0 ∈ DF [l1]∧ l0 /∈ D∪Φ: l0 ∈ (DF [l1]−D−Φ)⊆W ′ =W ′′∪ (DF [l1]−D−Φ).
By Lemma 75 and the proofs in [28], we have that
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Lemma 78. Given the dominance frontier calculated by the algorithm in Section 3.5, IDF and
the iterated path-convergence criterion [8] specify exactly the same set of nodes at which to put
φ-nodes.
By Lemma 75 and Lemma 77, we prove that
Lemma 79. After the φ-node insertion of vmem2reg-O2, given a load to r1 from a promotable
location,
1. If there exists a store with value val2 to the promotable location at program counter pc2 and
the store is the closest one that dominates the load, we have LAS (r1, pc2, val2): in other
words, there are no other store’s to the location between the load and the store.
2. Otherwise, we have LAA r1: in other words, there are no other store’s to the location between
the load and the alloca.
Proof. We present the proofs of the first fact. Suppose between pc2 and r1 there exists a simple
path ρ that goes through another store to the location. Consider the closest store at pc3 to r1 on
ρ. Because pc2 is the closest store that dominates r1, there must exist a path ρ′ from pc2 to r1
that bypasses pc3, and ρ and ρ′ join between pc3 and r1. In terms of the iterated path-convergence
criterion and Lemma 78, a φ-node and a corresponding store must be inserted at the joint point.
Therefore, pc3 is not the closest store to r1 on ρ.
Finally, by Lemma 79, we need the following extended lemma for reasoning about
vmem2reg-O2.
Lemma 80. LAS/LAA are correct with respect to arbitrary domination relations (Section 8.3 re-
quires that domination relations must be in the same block).
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Chapter 9
The Coq Development
This chapter summarizes our Coq development.
9.1 Definitions
Table 9.1 shows the size of our development. Note that the size of the formalism of vmem2reg-O1
does not include the development of vmem2reg. Vellvm encodes the abstract syntax from Chapter 6
in an entirely straightforward way using Coq’s inductive datatypes (generated in a preprocessing
step via the Ott [60] tool). The implementation uses Penn’s Metatheory library [13], which was
originally designed for the locally nameless representation, to represent identifiers of the LLVM,
and to reason about their freshness.
The Coq representation deviates from the full LLVM language in only a few (mostly minor)
ways. In particular, the Coq representation requires that some type annotations be in normal form
(e.g., the type annotation on load must be a pointer; named types must be sorted in terms of their
dependency), which simplifies type checking at the IR level. The Vellvm tool that imports LLVM
bitcode into Coq provides such normalization, which simply expands definitions to reach the normal
form.
Vellvm’s type system is also represented via Ott [60], and refers to the imperative LLVM
verification pass that checks the well-formedness of LLVM bitcode. The current type system is
formalized by predicates that are not extractable. We leave the extraction as our future work, i.e., a
verified LLVM type checker.
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Definition Metatheory Total
Coq
Core
Syntax 652 6,443 7,095
Computing dominators 1,658 14,437 16,095
Type system 1,225 6,308 7,533
Memory model (extension) 1,045 7,844 8,889
Operational semantics 1,960 6,443 8,403
Interpreter 228 279 507
Total 5,110 27,317 32,427
App.
SoftBound 762 17,420 18,182
Translation validators 127 9,768 9,895
vmem2reg 2,358 52,138 54,496
vmem2reg-O1 665 10,318 10,983
Total 3,912 89,644 92,556
Vminus 806 21,541 22,347
Total 9,828 138,502 148,330
Total
OCaml
Parser & Printer 2,031
LLVM bindings (extension) 6,369
Table 9.1: Size of the development (approx. lines of code)
Vellvm’s memory model implementation extends CompCert’s with 8,889 lines of code to sup-
port integers with arbitrary precision, padding, and an experimental treatment of casts that has not
yet needed for any of our proofs. On top of this extended memory model, all of the operational
semantics and their metatheory have been proved in Coq.
9.2 Proofs
Checking the entire Vellvm implementation using coqc in a single processor takes about 105 min-
utes on a 1.73 GHz Intel Core i7 processor with 4 GB RAM. We expect that this codebase could be
significantly reduced in size by refactoring the proof structure and making it more modular.
Our formalism uses two logical axioms: functional extensionality and proof irrelevance [1]. We
also use axioms to specify the specification of external functions and intrinsics, and the behavior
of program initialization. The verification of mem2reg relies on about a dozen axioms, almost all
of which define either the initial state of the machine (i.e., where in memory functions and globals
are stored) or the behavior of external function calls. One axiom asserts that memory alignment
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is a power of two, which is not necessary for LLVM programs in general, but is true of almost all
real-world platforms.
9.3 OCaml Bindings and Coq Extraction
The LLVM distribution includes primitive OCaml bindings that are sufficient to generate LLVM IR
code (“bitcode” in LLVM jargon) from OCaml. To convert between the LLVM bitcode represen-
tation and the extracted OCaml representation, we implemented a library consisting of about 8,400
lines of OCaml-LLVM bindings. This library also supports pretty-printing of the abstract syntax
tree of the LLVM IR; this code was also useful in the extracted interpreter.
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Chapter 10
Related Work
Verified compilers Compiler verification has a considerable history; see the bibliography of
Leroy [42] for a comprehensive overview. Vellvm is closest in spirit to CompCert [42], which
was the first fully-verified compiler to generate compact and efficient assembly code for a large
fragment of the C language. CompCert also uses Coq. It formalizes the operational semantics
of CompCert C, several intermediate languages used in the compilation, and assembly languages
including PowerPC, ARM and x86. The latest version of CompCert also provides an executable
reference interpreter for the semantics of CompCert C. Based on the formalized semantics, the
CompCert project fully proves that all compiler phases produce programs that preserve the seman-
tics of the original program. Optimization passes include local value numbering, constant propaga-
tion, coalescing graph coloring register allocation [18], and other back-end transformations. It uses
translation validators for certifying advanced compiler optimizations, such as instruction schedul-
ing [68], lazy code motion [69], and software pipelining [70]. The XCERT project [64, 66] extends
the CompCert compiler by a generic translation validator based on SMT solvers.
Other research has also used Coq for compiler verification tasks, including much recent work
on compiling functional source languages to assembly [15, 21, 22].
Formalization for computing dominators The CompCertSSA project [14] improves the Comp-
Cert compiler by creating a verified SSA-based middle-end and a GVN optimization pass. They also
formalize the AC algorithm to validate SSA construction and GVN passes, and prove the soundness
of AC. We implement both AC and CHK—an extension of AC in a generic way, and prove they
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are both sound and complete. We also provide the corresponding dominator tree constructions, and
evaluate performance.
There are also informal formalizations for computing dominators. Georgiadis and Tarjan [30]
propose an almost linear-time algorithm that validates if a tree is a dominator tree of a CFG.
Although the algorithm is fast, it is nearly as complicated as the LT algorithm, and it requires
a substantial amount of graph theory. Ramalingam [4] proposes another dominator tree validation
algorithm by reducing validating dominator trees to validating loop structures. However, in practice,
most of modern loop identification algorithms used in LLVM and GCC are based on dominance
analysis to find loop headers and bodies.
Formalization for SSA and SSA-based optimizations Verifying the correctness of compiler
transformations is an active research area with a sizable amount of literature. We focus on the work
relevant to SSA-based optimizations.
CompCertSSA verified a translation validator for an SSA construction algorithm that takes
imperative variables to variables in a pruned SSA form. In contrast, our work fully verifies the SSA
construction pass vmem2reg for LLVM directly. A bug in the CompCertSSA compiler will cause the
validator to abort the compilation, whereas verifying the compiler rules out such a possibility. More
pragmatically, translation validation is harder to apply in the context of LLVM, because the compiler
infrastructure was not created with validation in mind. For example, the CompCertSSA translations
maintain a close mapping between source and target variable names so that simulation can be
checked by simple erasure; this is not feasible in the LLVM framework. The CompCertSSA project
reports performance measurements of only small benchmarks totaling about 6k lines, whereas we
have tested our pass on 336k lines, including larger programs.
Unsurprisingly, the CompCertSSA and Vellvm proofs share some similarities. For example,
CompCertSSA’s GVN proof uses an invariant similar to the one in our Theorem 13 and Lemma 17.
However, the LLVM’s strategy of promoting allocas means that our proofs need a combination of
both SSA and aliasing properties to prove correctness. Moreover, our proof technique of pipelining
“micro” transformations is novel, and it should be broadly applicable.
To fully prove GVN, we would need additional properties about congruence-based term equiv-
alence. Although this fits naturally into our framework, Figure 8.2 shows that the combination of
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GVN with all other optimizations (except mem2reg) does not provide significant speedup—the full
suite of -O2 and -O3 level optimizations only yields a 11% speedup (on average).
The validation algorithm of CompCertSSA is proven to be complete to certificate the classic
SSA construction [28] (which computes dominators by the Lengauer-Tarjan algorithm [40]). Al-
though vmem2reg is based on the Aycock-Horspool algorithm [12], Section 8.5 shows that the
correctness of the classic algorithm is independent to the proofs for vmem2reg, and that the perfor-
mance of the optimized vmem2reg is compatible with the classic algorithm.
Mansky et al. designed an Isabelle/HOL framework that uses control-flow graph rewrites to
transform programs and uses temporal logic and model-checking to specify and prove the correct-
ness of program transformations [45]. They verified an SSA construction algorithm in the frame-
work. Other researchers have formalized specific SSA-based optimizations by using SSA forms
with different styles of semantics: an informal semantics that describes the intuitive idea of the SSA
form [28]; an operational semantics based on a matrix representation of φ nodes [72]; a data-flow
semantics based term graphs using the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant [19]. Matsuno et al. defined a
type system equivalent to the SSA form and proved that dead code elimination and common subex-
pression elimination preserve types [47]. There are also conversions between the programs in SSA
form and functional programs [9, 34].
Validating LLVM optimizations The CoVac project [74] develops a methodology that adapts
existing program analysis techniques to the setting of translation validation, and it reports on a
prototype tool that applies their methodology to verification of the LLVM compiler. The LLVM-
MD project [67] validates LLVM optimizations by symbolic evaluation. The Peggy tool performs
translation validation for the LLVM compiler using a technique called equality saturation [63].
These applications are not fully certified.
Mechanized language semantics There is a large literature on formalizing language semantics
and reasoning about the correctness of language implementations. Prominent examples include:
Foundational Proof Carrying Code [10], Foundational Typed Assembly Language [26], Standard
ML [27, 65], and (a substantial subset of) Java [37].
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Other mechanization efforts The verified software tool-chain project [11] assures that the
machine-checked proofs claimed at the top of the tool-chain hold in the machine language program.
Typed assembly languages [20] provide a platform for proving back-end optimizations. Similarly,
The Verisoft project [6] also attempts to mathematically prove the correct functionality of systems
in automotive engineering and security technology. ARMor [78] guarantees control flow integrity
for application code running on embedded processors. The Rhodium project [41] uses a domain
specific language to express optimizations via local rewrite rules and provides a soundness checker
for optimizations
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Chapter 11
Conclusions and Future Work
This dissertation presents Vellvm in which we fully mechanized the semantics of LLVM and the
proof techniques for reasoning about the properties of the SSA form and the correctness of trans-
formations in LLVM using the Coq proof assistant. To demonstrate the effectiveness of Vellvm,
we verified SoftBound—a program transformation that hardens C programs against spatial memory
safety violations (e.g., buffer overflows, array indexing errors, and pointer arithmetic errors) and the
most performance-critical optimization pass in LLVM’s compilation strategy—the mem2reg pass.
We have showed that the formal models of SSA-based compiler intermediate representations can
be used to verify low-level program transformations, thereby enabling the construction of high-
assurance compiler passes.
This dissertation focused on formalizing and reasoning about general-purpose intermediate rep-
resentation and the SSA form. In the following we show some of future research directions for
developing compilers effectively.
Memory-aware optimizations Like mem2reg, most of the SSA-based passes in LLVM transform
code are based on not only SSA invariants but also on aliasing information that is crucial for
compilers to produce output with higher performance: in the absence of alias analysis, the global
value numbering (GVN) and loop invariant code motion (LICM) passes in LLVM can get only
insignificant speed-up [39].
The GVN of LLVM optimizes both pure instructions and instructions with memory-effects
(such as loads, stores, and calls), and is the most performance-critical -O2 optimizations in LLVM.
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Figure 11.1: The effectiveness of GVN
Figure 11.1 experimentally shows the effectiveness of GVN in the LLVM’s -O2 level optimizations.
In our experiments, doing the full suite of -O1 level optimizations with GVN yields a speedup of
3.3% (on average) compared to only -O1 level optimizations of LLVM; doing the full suite of -O2
level optimizations (which includes GVN) yields a speedup of 3.5%; doing the full suite of -O2 level
optimizations without GVN yields a speedup of 0.3%. Therefore, GVN is another good application
for verification. Figure 11.2 experimentally shows that the alias analysis in LLVM has a significant
impact on performance of GVN-optimized code. In our experiments, doing the full suite of -O1
level optimizations with GVN yields a speedup of 4.3% (on average) compared to only -O1 level
optimizations of LLVM; doing the full suite of -O1 level optimizations with GVN that does not use
the alias analysis pass yields a speedup of 0.5%.
Given the performance impact of aliasing information, the correctness of alias analysis serves
as a formal foundation for the memory-aware optimizations. Because LLVM does not represent
memory in SSA, we need new metatheory for reasoning about memory aliasing. Based on the
verified alias analysis, we can verify GVN by using the micro code transformations and pipeline
fusion described in the dissertation.
Loop analysis and transformations Transformations for loops form the other kind of intra-
procedural optimizations in LLVM, which all depend on the loops analysis that identifies natural
loops in a CFG. Because the code in loops executes more frequently than other code, optimizing
loops is crucial for improving performance.
In the loop optimizations in LLVM, LICM (which performs loop invariant code motion, at-
tempting to remove as much code from the body of a loop as possible) is a good candidate to verify.
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Figure 11.2: The effectiveness of Alias Analysis
First, LICM does not arbitrarily transform CFGs like what other loop optimizations (loop-deletion,
loop-unrolling, loop-unswitch, loop-rotation, etc.) do. Therefore, we can be focused on the correct-
ness of the loops analysis. Second, moving memory operations out of loop can potentially lead
to relatively large speedup [32, 39]. Third, the recent work [46] shows that the LLVM’s LICM is
a problematic pass in terms of the sequentially consistent memory model because it speculatively
hosts or sinks stores out of loops, which potentially causes additional data races in the transformed
program. Formalizing the LICM in the sequential setting may lead to a straight-forward extension
for studying the LICM in the sequential consistent memory model. Fourth, although the CompCert
project verified lazy code motion [69], it only hoists instructions in the absence of alias information
and SSA. Therefore, formalizing the LLVM LICM could lead to more interesting results.
Efficiency versus verifiability Industrial-strength compilers should not only be correct, but also
be efficient in compile-time. Therefore, most of the main-stream production compilers are imple-
mented in imperative languages, and use imperative data structures and sophisticated algorithms.
On the other hand, Coq is a pure functional language that does not follow the imperative design
pattern. For example, in-place update of data structures (which are frequently used for transforming
programs imperatively) and hashtables are not allowed. Moreover, imperative algorithms used by
practical compilers complicate reasoning about termination and invariant preservation. The verifi-
cation of mem2reg illustrates the trade-off we made for achieving both efficiency and verifiability.
There is still much design space to explore. First, we can design verifiable functional data
structures and algorithms. Designing efficient functional algorithms has a long history and many
results [23, 29, 56]. The challenge is how to adopt the results in Coq that only allows recursions
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proven to terminate, and in which a good formalization pattern can dramatically reduce proof costs.
Second, we may add selective imperative features to Coq, which should enable common imperative
design, and also work with the existent features in Coq, such as dependent types, polymorphism,
module systems and etc. Moreover, we need to check termination more carefully, because recursion
can be encoded by using reference types.
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